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FOREWORD 
A growing world population, and especially coastal and island communities in the developing world, depend upon healthy oceans as 
a source of livelihoods and food. But the oceans are in crisis. As much as 85 percent of global fisheries are exploited to their limits or 
beyond. Ninety percent of large predatory fish are gone. Coastal habitats are under stress from a multitude of activities. 
Efforts to manage fisheries and to protect important marine habitats are stymied by illegal activity. Marine living resource crime, 
including the illegal catching of fish and the destruction of habitats or ecosystems, often crosses national borders and involves 
several nationalities, including that of crew, flag of vessel and ownership, as well as in the supply chain from boat to plate. 
Marine living resource crime obstructs efforts to sustainably manage marine resources. Serious violations of international rules for 
the conservation and management of marine living resources need an urgent response. Transnational crime cases warrant 
international legal cooperation.  
Marine living resource crime must be addressed if we are to achieve the goals agreed at Rio+20 to ensure sustainable development.  
WWF is working to help governments, communities and industry ensure the world’s oceans are healthy and can provide food 
security and sustainable livelihoods into the future. 
This report, commissioned by WWF, and prepared by the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS) 
sets out a range of options to combat marine living resource crime. It argues for particular international legal actions to enforce 
laws against marine living resources crimes. Coordinating enforcement requires harmonising enactments against marine living 
resources crime, which are small, but revolutionary, steps towards universalising jurisdiction to deliver effective governance at sea. 
States will then better be able to ensure the oceans can provide food security and livelihoods for generations to come. 
WWF looks forward to seeing the report’s recommendations discussed, developed and implemented and is prepared to assist 
governments in these important tasks. 
 
 
 
John Tanzer  
Director 
WWF Global Marine Programme 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This Executive Summary and Recommendations sets out practical options for progressing towards universal enforcement 
jurisdiction over marine living resource (MLR) crime.  
The approach is likened to designing a map of vectors, lanes and vehicles for a transport system: First, we make general 
observations concerning the direction for law and policy reforms. These draw upon our earlier studies of extraterritorial national 
jurisdiction, coordinated and universalised, to enforce criminal laws. Second, we draw specific conclusions that suggest particular 
legal and policy avenues to take forward these law and policy reforms. These conclusions are based upon the lessons learned from 
the case studies. Finally, recommendations are made concerning strategic directions. These are based upon a survey and 
consideration of the various institutional vehicles potentially available to carry forward universal enforcement jurisdiction over 
MLR crime.  
The map of options is designed to facilitate discussion and projects for the development of universalised enforcement jurisdiction 
over MLR crime. There is more than one path to the destination and various options could be actioned simultaneously by different 
agencies. For example, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), a regional marine environment protection organisation 
and cooperating national administrations could each take different actions that best suit their circumstances. For example, the FAO 
might initiate an expert workshop and feasibility study, a regional marine protection organisation might develop guidelines and a 
code of conduct based upon its existing legal instruments, and cooperating national administrations might adopt complementary 
legislation on MLR crimes and cross-institutional coordination templates that facilitate international law enforcement cooperation.  
A. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS FOR LEGISLATING MLR CRIMES 
Harms to marine living resources, whether in the form of overexploitation of target stocks, by-catch of non-targeted species or 
marine wildlife species, loss of biological resources, degradation of management systems for the marine environment, or ecosystem 
disruption and environmental pollution, are of global concern because of their impacts on the global commons or shared marine 
resources, and the international importance of marine ecosystems to human well-being. However, these harms are crimes only 
when criminalised under an applicable law. 
When marine living resources harm is caused in breach of law, it is sometimes a crime with international dimensions, whether by 
reason of transnational impacts, the necessity of shared governance, the breaches of global standards for marine conservation and 
management, or the involvement of transnational organised criminal groups in perpetrating these harms. Even though an act 
causing such harm may be a breach of international legal standards, the harmful breach is not a criminal act directly prohibited and 
prosecuted as a crime under international law. International law does not directly criminalise harm to marine living resources. 
The most likely existing legal framework within which to situate a new binding legal standard would be the UN Convention on 
Transnational Organised Crime (CTOC). A protocol to CTOC could be dedicated to MLR crime or protocol could embrace MLR 
crime in the wider context of crimes at sea. The most likely existing legal framework within which to situate a new, non-binding soft 
law international standard would be in national legislation implementing the International Plan of Action to Combat Illegal 
Unregulated and Unreported Fishing, although this is potentially subject to institutional reticence as suggested below. 
1. LEGAL PROCESS: No Universal Crimes under International Law 
A crime prohibited directly under international law is termed universal. The number of universal crimes is few. Only genocide, 
piracy at sea, war crimes and crimes against humanity are prohibited directly under international law and the harms that these 
universal crimes may cause to MLR are purely coincidental. 
Promoting a new form of universal crime in the form of a defined series of acts that harm MLR and are criminalised directly under 
international law would be a most difficult challenge. The four universal crimes established by the mid-twentieth century (genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture) are even still, in the twenty-first century, subject to major and bitter controversies 
as to their legal definitions and proper enforcement. Elevating or recasting illegal harms to MLR as universal crimes would be a 
quite long term and probably quixotic undertaking. 
Therefore, an effort to obtain international acceptance of a new universal form of crimes harming MLR is likely to be an expensive, 
long campaign that will deliver frustrating results and none in the short or medium-term.  
RECOMMENDATION 1.1 
• Do not promote a new universal crime under international law of causing harm to marine living 
resources. 
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2. LEGAL PROCESS: Universalise National MLR Crimes 
Countries may take action within their national jurisdictions to prosecute MLR crimes. This national jurisdiction extends under 
international law extraterritorially, in some circumstances, to allow laws to prescribe offences committed within a foreign 
jurisdiction or on the high seas. Thus, States can prescribe laws with global reach. Universalised national MLR crimes should apply 
to acts harming the marine environment outside the national maritime zone of the State (i.e. exclusive economic zone, continental 
shelf, territorial sea, archipelagic waters and internal waters).  
RECOMMENDATION 2.1 
• Promote national laws criminalising defined extraterritorial harms to MLR. 
Transnational links, such as the presence of a cross-border element or of multi-jurisdictional actors or elements, are typically 
present in treaties seeking to suppress terrorism, trafficking and organised crime. They are prerequisites for the application of most 
crime suppression treaties to ensure recognition of the international nature and importance of coordinated efforts to suppress the 
crimes specified. Examples of transnational links include the following: (1) the crime occurs in whole or part in an international 
space, beyond any national jurisdiction; (2) the crime crosses national boundaries, occurring in more than one national jurisdiction; 
or (3) the perpetrators include more than one nationality. The nature of MLR crime is that it often involves a vessel that operates 
beyond the boundary of the flag state, is owned in another country, managed in yet another, uses officers and crew of diverse 
nationalities, and lands its catch in the ports of yet other States. The prerequisite of transnational links in MLR crime could 
promote consensus on the need for concerted international action to combat MLR crimes specified. 
RECOMMENDATION 2.2 
• Require, in order for universalised jurisdiction over MLR criminal law to apply, that a cross-border or 
multi-jurisdictional element be present in MLR crime, e.g. crossing of international maritime zone 
boundaries, or agents and objects governed by more than one national jurisdiction. 
3. LEGAL PROCESS: Harmonise National MLR Crimes Definitions 
Crimes against MLR are effectively universalised if States adopt the same or similar laws against them. This presumes that the 
harmonised laws will have common features, preferably optimal features for the effective prevention, deterrence and punishment of 
MLR crimes wherever they occur.  
RECOMMENDATION 3.1 
• To universalise jurisdiction over MLR crimes, harmonised national enactments of MLR criminal laws 
should have common features that optimise the prevention, deterrence and punishment of MLR 
crimes. 
A general definition of the crime to be suppressed can aid in the subsequent interpretation of the scope of the MLR crime, lending 
clarity to its enactment and enforcement. For example, is the scope of the harm it addresses to be confined to fisheries or to extend 
also to MLR activities unrelated to fishing? Fisheries-related crimes themselves may be defined to extend to the management of by-
catch and environmental impacts, as well as to unregulated and unreported fishing. Criminalisation of harm to MLR unrelated to 
fishing can include activities such as illegal bio-prospecting for marine genetic resources, undermining marine management and 
conservation systems, and marine pollution and ecosystem disruption. To maximise the potential reach of universalised 
jurisdiction, MLR crime categories of harm should be defined as broadly as possible within the bounds of international consensus. 
Thus, proposed categories of harm to MLR should initially include: target fish stocks exploitation; mismanagement of bycatch; 
biological resources poaching; undermining of management systems, and environmental pollution and ecosystem disruption. The 
implementation of high seas boarding and inspection highlights the concept of “serious violations” as leading to global consensus 
on the definition of fisheries crimes on the high seas. 
RECOMMENDATION 3.2 
• Define MLR crimes across general categories of harm as broadly as possible within the bounds of 
international consensus. 
• Use the concept of ‘serious violations’, as developed in the context of regional fisheries crimes, as the 
basis for a broader harmonised definition of serious MLR crimes.  
International consensus already supports the prohibition of acts that cause MLR harm as specified under existing marine and 
environmental treaties and codes of conduct. Thus, breaches of those prohibitions set out in existing marine and environmental 
treaties that already recognise certain acts of MLR harm as illegal should be drawn upon to define those breaches also as criminal 
acts, even if committed extraterritorially. These relevant standards are to be found in current global and regional treaties, including 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Fish Stocks Agreement, PSM-IUU Agreement, multilateral environmental agreements, 
regional seas agreements, and regional fisheries management agreements. In addition, FAO codes of conduct and action plans and 
regional plans of action could provide relevant standards supported by international consensus. Liaison with the signatories to 
these instruments through their respective governing bodies could provide a way to identify the relevant standards for harmonised 
criminalisation. For example, in the case of regional agreements, parties to these agreements could choose to nominate the relevant 
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standards to be implemented though universalised criminal jurisdiction. This would be an ongoing process that could be reflected 
in an evolving harmonisation instrument, such as one using a simplified procedure for amending its annexes. 
RECOMMENDATION 3.3 
• Define specified MLR crimes that supplement a general definition of MLR crime by incorporating 
schedules of crimes that correspond to standards in existing international legal regimes for MLR 
conservation and management. Maintain and update definitions of specified MLR crimes through 
ongoing engagement with parties to the bodies and participants in the processes established by those 
regimes.  
MLR crimes intersect with other criminal acts that are regarded as serious crimes. These include bribery, money laundering, 
participation in organised crime syndicates, and obstruction of justice (such as giving false or misleading evidence). These are 
termed cross-over crimes, as the principal crime ‘crosses over’ into a recognised additional crime. Natural resources crimes, such as 
MLR crimes, often involve these cross-over features. For example, corruption of public officials managing the natural resources 
may be required to perpetrate a crime and the obstruction of police investigations and laundering of the proceeds of the crime may 
be necessary to conceal it. In relation to money laundering, the natural resources crime must be specified as one that triggers the 
offence of money laundering, i.e. as a ‘predicate offence’ to the subsequent crime of laundering the proceeds. 
RECOMMENDATION 3.4 
• National legislation should criminalise ‘crossover’ crimes connected with MLR crimes. Predicate 
offences for money laundering offences should be amended to include universalised MLR crimes.  
Complicit conduct that supports a principal offence may be proscribed as an ancillary crime. Ancillary crimes include conspiracy, 
preparation, counselling, procuring and attempt, aiding and abetting, concealment, misprision and participation as an accessory 
after the fact. Different legal systems may recognise and enact all or only various of those ancillary offences. To ensure that 
universalised jurisdiction over MLR crimes applies to the broadest possible range of acts of harm, national legislation should 
criminalise not only the primary offence, but also specify acts that are ancillary to it as crimes.  
RECOMMENDATION 3.5 
• The enactment of national legislation prescribing MLR crimes should include the widest possible 
range of related support acts as crimes ancillary to the primary offence, to the extent allowed by the 
jurisprudence of the national legal system.  
Many MLR crimes are civil or administrative offences that are regarded as minor rather than serious crimes. Most international law 
enforcement cooperation ignores minor offences and concentrates on serious offences. To ensure that they are regarded as 
sufficiently important to trigger international law enforcement cooperation, harmonised MLR crimes should be classified as 
serious.  
Serious offences require a maximum sentence entailing a period of imprisonment or its equivalent, usually at least 0.5 to 4.0 years 
imprisonment. Harmonisation of specific MLR crimes could qualitatively categorise them as equivalent to serious crimes, and as 
explicitly triggering law enforcement cooperation mechanisms. Rather than quantify the potential period of imprisonment, 
penalties could be specified in general terms requiring them to be sufficiently severe to prevent, deter and punish.  
RECOMMENDATION 3.6 
• MLR crimes that are specified for harmonisation should explicitly trigger international law 
enforcement cooperation and should be formally qualified as serious crimes with penalties 
sufficiently severe to prevent, deter and punish.  
Many jurisdictions have enacted legislation that makes directors criminally liable for illegal company actions. In addition, 
corporations themselves, as well as individual persons such as company directors, can be subject to direct criminal liability. For 
example, a fine or community service penalty may be imposed directly on a corporation, a corporation may be suspended from 
operation or required to advertise a public apology. To increase the potential effectiveness of universalised jurisdiction over MLR 
crimes, in addition to individual natural persons, corporations should be liable. 
RECOMMENDATION 3.7 
• Corporations should be subject to direct criminal liability and sanction for MLR crimes commissioned 
by them. 
4. LEGAL PROCESS: Cooperate Across Jurisdictions to Enforce MLR Criminal Law  
1. Criminal Law Enforcement Cooperation 
International law permits a State to enforce its extraterritorial laws. However, most physical enforcement must take place within 
the State’s own territory, rather than a State being allowed to project its enforcement operations beyond its territory. That is to say, 
every State already has under international law the power to prescribe criminal laws with global reach, but only limited jurisdiction 
to physically enforce them, i.e. mostly within its own territories and to some limited extent beyond, such as within its flagged vessels 
and premises or on the high seas. 
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Thus, within another State’s territory, that other State’s cooperation is necessary for the extraterritorial enforcement of criminal 
jurisdiction. Cooperation requires dual criminality, which is presumed if the crime is enacted in a harmonised fashion by States 
universalising it; but this may also require that the crime is regarded as a serious crime by them. For optimal flexibility, 
international cooperation to enforce universalised criminal jurisdiction over MLR crimes should employ the fullest range of mutual 
legal assistance measures. 
RECOMMENDATION 4.1 
• Harmonised MLR crimes should be regarded as serious offences for the purposes of law enforcement 
cooperation, irrespective of the applicability or potential length of a gaol sentence under national law.  
• To give effect to extraterritorial criminal law enforcement, a wide range of specified measures for 
inter-agency cooperation should include:  
o Information exchange between designated national agency contact points for: 
 Criminal intelligence 
 Non-compliance intelligence  
 Financial intelligence 
o Inter-agency joint law enforcement investigations operations coordinated through approvals 
processes, including for: 
 Covert operations 
 Hot pursuit across national borders 
o Cooperation in prosecution procedures, including for: 
 Mutual legal assistance, such as collecting, preserving, authenticating and supplying 
evidence, e.g. photographs, samples, witness statements, documents and data 
 Extradition of the accused 
 Arrangements for witnesses to give evidence 
 Prosecution of the accused in lieu of extradition by the cooperating jurisdiction 
o Provisions should be made for mutual recognition of judgements applying criminal penalties. 
Civil penalties and civil claims can complement traditional criminal law enforcement measures. Civil penalties include fines, fees 
and other financial penalties, confiscations, compensation, bans, deregistration, suspensions, community service, enforceable 
undertakings, injunctions, withheld benefits, mandatory negative publicity, apologies, and so on. Civil penalties or judgements are 
ordered at the national level but often require international cooperation in order to take effect. Cooperation through international 
procedures to enforce civil penalties and judgements extraterritorially presumes that they are given formal legal recognition in the 
foreign jurisdiction.  
RECOMMENDATION 4.2 
• To complement the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, civil penalties and judgements should be 
procedurally available at the national level and supported through international law enforcement 
cooperation.  
• Procedures for civil actions and international cooperation to facilitate them should enable: 
o Freezing, confiscation and forfeiture of suspect or criminal assets  
o Sharing of forfeited criminal proceeds 
o Mutual recognition of judgements applying civil penalties  
Dedicated institutional mechanisms can be helpful to facilitate MLR criminal law enforcement cooperation between States. 
INTERPOL facilitates law operational coordination but is not a mechanism for law enforcement policy review. A specialised policy 
review forum is needed concerning the design and effectiveness of international MLR crime law enforcement cooperation 
mechanisms. In some cases, such as for the protection of human rights, review processes include independent expert panels, such 
as human rights complaints committees. The expert panel model could be utilised also in the field of MLR law enforcement 
cooperation. 
RECOMMENDATION 4.3 
• Establish a conference process to review the design and effectiveness of international cooperation 
mechanisms for MLR criminal law enforcement  
o Establish within that framework an international panel to consider individual and State 
notifications of difficulty, to provide advice and to make recommendations (including for 
technical assistance) concerning the integrity of law enforcement cooperation 
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2. Port State Measures 
The powers of a Port State to set conditions for entry into port, even conditions that seek to protect MLR beyond its exclusive 
economic zone, is a form of universalised enforcement jurisdiction through which it can enforce against foreign vessels voluntarily 
entering its ports. The full range of enforcement powers is available to the Port State to enforce against vessels voluntarily in its 
ports for the commission of MLR crimes, including civil penalties and vessel forfeitures and criminal prosecutions. To avoid 
disadvantage to individual ports applying Port State measures (PSMs), consensus among like-minded Port States on a common 
program for the coordinated imposition of an expanded program of PSMs must be an important part of any future strategy to 
universalise jurisdiction for better protection against MLR crime. A comparison of the practice of Port States in exercising controls 
over vessel pollution and safety indicates some improvements that might be made to PSMs for IUU fishing, as suggested in the 
following recommendations. 
RECOMMENDATION 4.4 
• Urge ratification of PSM-IUU Agreement.  
• Port authorities should impose both civil and criminal penalties for breach of MLR-related conditions 
for port entry. 
• Convene a consultative workshop on refinements to requirement under the PSM IUU Agreement 
pending its entry into force, concerning how it could be made more efficient by: 
o Quantification of requirements for advance notice (e.g. time, data) by foreign fishing vessels prior 
to intended port entry;  
o Using a fishing vessel risk profile as the basis for inspection sample rate requirements;  
o Initiating inspections on the basis of information provided by another Port Authority or by a third 
party;  
o Defining protocols for detailed inspections; 
o  Requiring more specificity of the reports Flag States are to make on actions they take to remedy 
non-compliance;  
o Setting criteria for the restoration of good standing of a fishing vessel. 
A global MLR blacklist can be compiled to deny the use of port facilities for any blacklisted vessel. A global MLR blacklist could 
leverage off regional blacklists already established by RFMOs and the High Seas Vessel Authorization Record established by the 
FAO under Article VI of the 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures 
by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas. The global blacklist might comprise schedules specific to particular categories of offences. The 
formal establishment of a global blacklist might be facilitated by a common resolution by each RFMO to compile information and 
generate a global list; or by a resolution under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; or by a resolution under the FAO 
Committee on Fisheries. 
RECOMMENDATION 4.5 
• Convene a consultative inter-regional workshop to compile a global MLR blacklist of vessels in breach 
of, or strongly suspected of being in non-compliance with, specified conservation and management 
norms.  
o The list should include, as well, vessels under common management with vessels conducting 
illegal activities, and vessels actively supporting a breach or non-compliance.  
A non-cooperating State blacklist could be compiled to target flags of convenience and ports of convenience to discourage their use. 
Naming on the list might diminish the public international status of the non-cooperating Flag State or Port State and also result in 
non-arbitrary and justified disadvantage in terms of port access, flagging, joint-venture and MLR trade opportunities. 
Consideration of the criteria established by the FAO Committee on Fisheries and the EU for determining whether Flag State 
compliance with international MLR conservation and management norms could form starting points for criteria concerning non-
cooperating State black lists. 
RECOMMENDATION 4.6 
• Conduct consultation on the establishment of global non-cooperating State lists for determining 
whether a Flag State or a Port State is not complying with international MLR conservation and 
management norms and on the feasibility of establishing a non-cooperating Flag State blacklist.  
3. Long-arm Unilateral Jurisdiction  
To influence behaviour in foreign jurisdictions, long-arm laws applied within the limits of international comity are a widely 
accepted tool, particularly when using legal jurisdiction based upon active personality. The criminalised behaviour may be the 
original conduct in a foreign jurisdiction or its consequential conduct within the criminalising jurisdiction, such as possession of 
illegally produced goods or disguising their origins. The penalties for consequential conduct often include civil penalties, such as 
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confiscations, that result in debts over or arrests of vessels. They may also entail civil standards of proof of debt that infer the 
illegality of the good’s production from the criteria used in the good’s market certification requirements.  
RECOMMENDATION 4.7 
• Convene regional workshops on long-arm jurisdiction over MLR crime to promote its utilisation, 
addressing, inter alia:  
o Unlawful possession of MLR produced in breach of foreign or international law  
o Money laundering for which the predicate offence is MLR crime 
o Strict liability and standards of proof for civil penalties  
o Debts arising from penalties for MLR crimes and consequent sharing of forfeited assets  
B. STRATEGIC ROUTES FORWARD TO UNIVERSALISE MLR CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
MLR crime can be combated using both legal and institutional mechanisms. The following survey and assessment of existing 
mechanisms is divided between legal frameworks and institutional frameworks. The legal frameworks are subdivided according to 
whether they are international or regional and then further categorised according to their primary area of concern, i.e. whether they 
deal primarily with marine, environment, or general crime concerns, according to their original purpose. Institutional frameworks 
are subdivided in the same way, into global and regional bodies.  
5. STRATEGIC ROUTES: Global Legal Frameworks 
A new international legal framework to harmonise definitions of certain MLR crimes would carry forward the universalisation of 
jurisdiction to enforce against them. It would build on existing international laws for criminal law enforcement cooperation by 
raising the understanding, profile and importance of MLR crime and by developing tailored provisions suited specifically to law 
enforcement within the multinational context and transnational commission of MLR crimes. The observations set out below In 
relation to options to develop a global legal instrument seek both to enable States to prescribe harmonised MLR crimes and to 
exercise universalised MLR enforcement jurisdiction.  
The following survey demonstrates that, at the global level, no legal regime specifically concerning the punishment of MLR crimes 
has yet been established. The survey also shows that many more treaties and institutions criminalising some relevant aspect of, or 
potentially applicable to, MLR crimes have been developed within the legal frameworks for crime prevention than those for general 
affairs, marine or environment protection. This is to be expected as crime prevention laws and institutions have long been 
concerned with universalising jurisdiction to enforce against crimes. In contrast, international bodies concerned with general 
affairs, marine and environmental affairs are primarily concerned with standard setting rather than criminal law enforcement.  
1. Marine Legal 
Fisheries management has extensive impacts across the broad range of management of other MLR, as fisheries activities impact on 
target stocks but also on non-fish species affected as by-catch or impacted by degradation of ecosystem integrity and by environmental 
pollution. Legally binding global standards for the management of fisheries are set out in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1982, FAO Compliance Agreement 1993, UN Fish Stocks Agreement 1995, and the FAO PSM-IUU Agreement 2009, etc.  
However, fisheries treaties tend not to require criminalisation of breaches by individuals of their prescribed standards. Instead of 
engaging criminal justice systems, they address breaches through managerial and administrative capacity building mechanisms. 
Breaches of internationally prescribed standards of conduct are treated as non-compliance problems rather than universalised crimes. 
The PSM-IUU Agreement provides the most relevant legal framework for the universalisation of MLR crimes. A protocol to the 
Agreement, or a declaration or resolution by the parties to it, could seek to harmonise among its parties the adoption of national 
criminal provisions and to universalise enforcement jurisdiction through law enforcement cooperation. However, as the Agreement 
has yet to come in to force and has many implementation hurdles to clear, a push to universalise MLR crime under it is premature 
at this time. 
With the exception of the PSM-IUU Agreement, which has not yet entered into force, international standards directly governing 
MLR crimes are set out in non-legally binding policy instruments. These include UN Resolutions on Driftnet Fishing, UN 
Resolutions on Sustainable Fisheries, the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct on Responsible Fishing, as well as FAO Guidelines such as the 
International Plan of Action on Capacity, International Plan of Action on Seabirds, International Plan of Action on Sharks, and the 
2004 FAO Model Scheme on Port State Measures to Combat IUU Fishing.  
To combat illegal fishing, the most important among these soft law instruments is the International Plan of Action-IUU Fishing 
adopted by the FAO in 2001. The IPOA-IUU offers a promising basis upon which to build the non-legally binding normative 
infrastructure for universalised MLR crime. Likelihood of success in this endeavour is better than for a legally binding framework 
such as the PSM-IUU Agreement.  
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Soft law instruments may be more achievable in the near term than a legally binding international agreement. The difficulty of 
reaching consensus on binding terms also can result in decline to a lowest common denominator in the adopted binding 
obligations. Soft law, in the form of guidelines and best-endeavours commitments, on the other hand, may be expressed in more 
ambitious aspirational terms. Soft law can also build both consensus and international practice concerning international standards 
in the interim until binding measures are adopted. For example, guidelines on the universalisation of MLR jurisdiction could urge 
the further adoption of legally binding agreements at the bilateral or regional levels to facilitate cooperative enforcement actions 
(such as is urged also under the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention).  
RECOMMENDATION 5.1 
• Initiate a soft law development process to supplement the IPOA-IUU with guidelines promoting the 
harmonised enactment of extraterritorial MLR crimes and the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over 
them. 
2. Environmental Legal 
None of the multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) that aim to resolve global environmental problems address themselves 
to the shaping of domestic mechanisms of criminal law or to international legal cooperation in relation to their enforcement. They 
commonly require simply that parties take the appropriate legal and administrative measures to implement and enforce their 
obligations under the MEA. However, it is not uncommon for them to set out provisions for law enforcement cooperation. A partial 
exception is the Basel Convention on Hazardous Waste, which declares illegal traffic in hazardous wastes to be criminal. It provides 
a model for the universalisation of criminal jurisdiction against transnational criminal activity, including model legislation, a 
database of national legislation, guidance for detection, prevention and control of illegal traffic, and a legal instruction manual on 
prosecuting illegal traffic. The legal model provided by the Basel Convention demonstrates how the universalisation of enforcement 
jurisdiction against MLR crime might evolve over time.  
RECOMMENDATION 5.2 
• Utilise the model provided by the Basel Convention on Trafficking in Hazardous Wastes to commit to 
prevent and punish MLR crime offenders. The gravity of the illegality should categorised as criminal 
at a serious level and technical assistance made available to develop model criminal laws, develop a 
database, compile an instruction manual and conduct regional training workshops.  
3. Criminal Justice Legal 
In contrast to the MEA regimes, global cooperative efforts to combat transnational crime have produced many treaties that require 
that their parties to proscribe specified acts as criminal. As yet, none of these require the proscription of specific acts of MLR harm. 
Nevertheless, if some MLR crimes under national laws are serious offences that carry a maximum penalty of no less than 4 years 
gaol and if they are conducted by organised transnational criminal syndicates, then the Convention on Transnational Organised 
Crime (CTOC) would apply requirements that its parties to cooperate in their suppression and punishment. There are signs of 
momentum gathering to address environmental crime under the CTOC. Naturally, this would concern environmental crime that is 
transnational and organised, which would cover much MLR. There is no suggestion yet to commence any negotiations on a CTOC 
protocol on natural resources and environmental crime. However, formulation of a binding protocol suitable to combat MLR crime 
would be conceptually straight forward. The CTOC is the natural and most likely global framework for new legally binding 
commitments to universalise MLR crimes. 
Other multilateral crime prevention treaties requiring that their Parties act to prohibit and punish corruption and bribery relate to 
transnational environmental crime but tenuously, as corruption and bribery are often incidental activities that facilitate 
environmental crimes. The OECD Bribery Convention offers very limited possibilities for universalising jurisdiction over MLR 
crimes. It applies already to corrupt transactions in the MLR sector. Even though widespread, these are only those involving 
international transactions with foreign countries, involving also foreign public officials, active bribery and Parties that have ratified 
the OECD Convention. The UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) applies primarily to domestic corruption without a 
transnational link required but does provide for international technical assistance and capacity building. It could provide a useful 
legal framework for capacity building in fisheries ports for fisheries and customs inspectors in order to constrain corrupt facilitation 
of MLR crimes.  
RECOMMENDATION 5.3 
• Encourage a new binding protocol under tCTOC in the form of commitments to adopt national 
legislation to harmonise enactments of MLR crimes in consultation with MLR management and 
conservation organisations. The legal framework could link relevant ‘crossover’ crimes that support 
MLR crimes, such as bribery, money laundering, conspiracy and participation in organised crime 
syndicates, as well as serve also as a basis for national law enforcement cooperation applied to the 
widest possible range of MLR offences, such as information exchange, mutual legal assistance, 
extradition and transfer of proceedings, as well as for operational initiatives such as joint 
investigations.  
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6. STRATEGIC ROUTES: Regional Legal Frameworks 
Progress in the assertion of criminal jurisdiction over national resources crimes have occurred only at the regional level. Those 
regions comprise the European Union, southern Africa and the insular Pacific. In the European Union and the insular Pacific, these 
advances have specifically concerned marine pollution (2005 EU Directive on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of 
penalties for infringements) and marine living resources (1992 Niue Treaty on Cooperation and Fisheries Surveillance and Law 
Enforcement in the South Pacific Region). In line with this regional progress, expanding the number of regional legal frameworks 
addressing MLR crime would be an appropriate way to advance the universalisation of criminal jurisdiction over MLR crime. 
RECOMMENDATION 6.1 
• Consider a regional legal framework from which to commence the universalising of criminal 
jurisdiction over MLR crimes.  
o A flexible approach could enable actions at regional level or by its individual regional States 
1. Marine Legal  
Some regional fisheries management organisation agreements on implementation of conservation and management measures set 
out maritime enforcement cooperation procedures. The forms of cooperation include intelligence sharing, joint enforcement 
operations, mutual legal assistance, extradition and sharing of seized assets. There are legal precedents in regional fisheries 
management agreements legal frameworks for cooperation also in related criminal justice enforcement. These legal precedents 
suggest that expansion of criminal law enforcement cooperation to include a broader range of MLR is feasible.  
RECOMMENDATION 6.2 
• An amendment, protocol, resolution or guidelines under a regional MLR management framework 
could nest a range of MLR crime harmonisation and cooperative enforcement measures.  
o Propose that regional agreements authorise State enforcement jurisdiction against foreign 
vessels, crew and assets, based on evidence of an MLR offence as defined by the regional MLR 
agreement.  
o Propose that regional MLR agreements include law enforcement cooperation in freezing financial 
assets of corporations and beneficiaries, blacklisting vessels, and the issuing of warrants against 
individuals charged with IUU fishing or associated non-fishing offences such as support or 
‘crossover’ crimes. 
2. Environmental Legal  
Two regions have adopted legal instruments that provide frameworks to combat environmental crime through environmental law 
enforcement cooperation. There is scope for additional legal instruments for law enforcement cooperation to be adopted for other 
regions. In 2008, the Council for the European Communities adopted a directive on the protection of the environment through 
criminal law. It addresses breaches of national laws that implement Community environmental Directives by treating as criminal 
offences those environmentally harmful conducts already made unlawful by previous Community laws. This is a preferable model 
for a multilateral instrument on MLR crime because it leverages off already established consensus concerning what acts are to be 
defined as unlawful. Thus, environmental harms that countries have already agreed to treat as unlawful under MLR laws form the 
basis of the acts to be criminalised under a new multilateral instrument.  
In relation to MLR, the Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic 
Area and various MOUs under the 1989 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), 
provide instances of regional MLR conservation standards. The UNEP RSP has adopted binding MLR protocols under framework 
conventions for six regions: Eastern African Region; South East Pacific; Wider Caribbean Region; Mediterranean; Red Sea and Gulf 
of Aden; and Black Sea. Due to the respective interests of their respective regional organisations, discussed in section 8 below, the 
MLR agreements for which initiative to harmonise criminal jurisdiction over MLR crime might be pursued are the South East 
Pacific and the Wider Caribbean Region.  
RECOMMENDATION 6.3 
• Consult with potentially interested members of regional marine environmental organisations with a 
view to harmonising regional MLR crimes by drawing upon accepted regional MLR management 
standards under the: 
o Protocol for the Conservation and Management of Protected Marine and Coastal Areas of the 
South East Pacific 1989 
o Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife in the Wider Caribbean Region 1990 
7. STRATEGIC ROUTES: Global Organisations 
The phenomenon of MLR crime has registered to varying degrees with global and regional institutions. Likely institutional vehicles 
at the global level to carry forward an initiative for the universalisation of MLR crime were canvassed by categories: general, 
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marine, environmental and criminal justice institutions. The following recommendations are preliminary and require further 
substantive research on the relative merits of specific institutions and institutional strategies.  
1. Marine Organisations 
Global institutions engaged in MLR issues are more likely to be successfully engaged in a project to universalise jurisdiction against 
MLR crimes. It would be a major step forward to have the area of MLR crime adopted as the theme of a meeting of the UN Informal 
Consultative Process on Oceans and Law of the Seas (UNICPOLOS) meeting and then as an area that could benefit from the 
attention of the General Assembly and the UN Secretary General. As a result of the sensitivity of the area of MLR crime for 
countries whose nationals organise illegal fishing activities, priority for this area on the UNICPLOS agenda might be more 
accessible if presented as a facet of the broader area of maritime crime. A crime against MLR could then be highlighted in panel 
presentations.  
RECOMMENDATION 7.1 
• Promote a UNICPOLOS theme devoted to MLR crime as a facet of the broader area of maritime crime.  
2. Environmental Organisations 
UNEP’s initiatives in relation to compliance with multilateral environment agreements (MEAs) and enforcement of national laws 
is closely related to the prosecution of environmental crimes. Its work on capacity building for judges and prosecutors are aspects 
of this engagement. A focus on combating transnational environmental and MLR crime would be an aspect of that engagement 
and complements its existing work. However, it would need to be conducted in close consultation with other international 
organisations more directly involved in marine and crime prevention issues, particularly the Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ), CTOC Conference of Parties, INTERPOL and the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). 
RECOMMENDATION 7.2 
• UNEP is an appropriate vehicle to carry forward an initiative to universalise jurisdiction to combat 
MLR crime but would need to be in partnership with other international organisations more deeply 
engaged in MLR conservation and management.  
3. Criminal Justice Organisations 
Among UN organisations currently engaged in combating environmental and MLR crimes, UNODC is likely to be most able to take 
forward an initiative to universalise jurisdiction to combat MLR crime. Environmental crime is an area of emerging crime that 
UNODC will become increasing engaged in both by virtue of its own mandate and by reason of its Secretariat role to bodies such as 
the CCPCJ and the Conference of Parties to the CTOC. It is not a political body and will not mandate political actions such as the 
drafting of guidelines or commencement of treaty negotiations. Its role would be to conduct research and publication and to 
organise a workshop on the subject, if mandated to do so by a policy-making body such as the CCPCJ or CPC. 
The CCPCJ is the primary United Nations system decision-making body forming policy in the area of environmental crime. The 
work that it has undertaken since 2007 is liable to be expanded in the future to address fishing crimes. The CCPCJ is, therefore, a 
most important vehicle for progressing the development of policy for universalised MLR crime within the UN system. To reinforce 
the work of the UNODC on MLR crime, it might be possible also for the UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
(Congress) to pick up the MLR crime issue in 2015 as part of its mandate to set the agenda for international cooperative projects for 
the progressive development of criminal justice. 
RECOMMENDATION 7.3 
• Promote the adoption of policy by the CCPCJ (and Congress) in favour of the development of 
universalised jurisdiction over MLR crimes and request UNODC to research implementation of this 
policy, particularly, to conduct workshops and consultations with MLR bodies.  
INTERPOL is rapidly expanding its Environmental Crime Programme and opportunities to promote the universalisation of 
jurisdiction over MLR crime are available through the new Fisheries Crime Working Group. A useful strategy could be to prepare an 
INTERPOL report on the contemporary problems of international legal gaps in national enforcement jurisdiction over fisheries or 
MLR crime. The report could be commissioned for consideration by the Fisheries Crime Working Group to canvass solutions 
including the universalisation of enforcement jurisdiction. Although the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute 
(UNICRI) has no mandate to develop legal norms but functions only as a research institute or think tank, it could also provide a 
forum for developing research and knowledge concerning global MLR crime, including aspects of the universalisation of national 
jurisdiction. 
Dialogue with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to increase awareness of its members and of the OECD Secretariat 
concerning the importance of MLR crimes would encourage the future inclusion by the FATF of MLR crimes as a designated of 
category of offences for predicate crimes in money laundering.  
RECOMMENDATION 7.4 
• Engage INTERPOL and UNICRI and to develop reports and research in this area and open dialogue 
with the FATF to encourage it to designate MLR crimes as predicate offences for money laundering. 
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4. General  
As noted in Recommendation 6.1 above, UNICPOLOS could provide an avenue through which the issue of MLR crime might be 
brought to the attention of the UNGA. The UNGA could then mandate that the UN Secretary-General prepare a report on the 
threats posed by MLR crime and opportunities to combat MLR crime.  
RECOMMENDATION 7.5 
• Build preparatory support within UNGA to instruct the UN Secretary-General to prepare a report on 
the threats posed by MLR crime and legal and institutional opportunities to combat them. 
8. STRATEGIC ROUTES: Regional Organisations 
Regional institutions bolster economic and political solidarity, environmental protection or marine resources management and are 
greater in number than global institutions but are sometimes poorly resourced and ephemeral. Regional organisations for economic 
co-operation are typically better resourced and more robust than narrowly mandated environmental or fisheries management 
organisations. However, regional fisheries management organisations that serve clear economic goals may enjoy longevity and 
adequate resources to fulfil mandates, including MLR criminal law enforcement. 
1. Marine Organisations 
Regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) have been established where there are active international fisheries and for 
waters where fish stocks cross international maritime boundaries. The dynamics within each RFMO vary in each regional context. 
Indicators that an RFMO might be suitable to carry forward the universalisation of criminal jurisdiction over MLR crime include 
the presence of numerous coastal States with clearly defined MLR conservation and management interests; numerous and/or 
strong coastal State participation; distant water fishing States with benign interests in fisheries and strong law enforcement 
capacity; as well as a governing treaty and constitutional structure that facilitates innovation and integrates broad MLR 
conservation and management objectives. These elements are present in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(WCFPC) region where the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) provides a strong coastal State base of interest. Provisions 
in its members’ Niue Treaty, which includes mutual legal assistance in criminal prosecutions and civil procedure confiscations, 
suggest that universalisation of criminal jurisdiction against MLR crime is a feasible development in the south-west Pacific region. 
Similarly, strong coastal State interests are present in the Regional Plan of Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices Combat 
IUU Fishing (RPOA) that has been adopted in South East Asia. 
RECOMMENDATION 8.1 
• Work through FFA and relevant members of the WCPFC to carry forward the universalisation of 
criminal jurisdiction over MLR crime in its region. 
• Work through the RPOA to carry forward the universalisation of criminal jurisdiction over MLR crime 
in its region. 
2. Environmental Organisations 
Each regional seas marine environment program is influenced by the level of regional political and economic integration, of 
available operational funding, the presence of driving economic forces, participation of economically developed coastal states with 
benign interests, their relative numbers within the regime, as well as the character of impacts on marine biodiversity. In the Wider 
Caribbean Region, the Caribbean Environment Programme is serviced by a secretariat provided by UNEP, established in 1986 in 
Kingston, Jamaica. The parties to the regional marine environmental framework agreement and its protocols, including the 1990 
Protocol on Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife, are the regional organisation’s members, including the United States, which 
generates resources and expertise to combat MLR crime.  
In the South East Pacific, the Permanent Commission for the South East Pacific is an independent regional secretariat, established 
in 1952 and based in Ecuador. It administers the 1989 Protocol for the Conservation and Management of Protected Marine and 
Coastal Areas. Its members are Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, who are parties to the UNEP regional seas framework 
convention. Chile plays an important role due to its extensive coastal zones. The Commission engages in significant efforts to 
combat maritime crimes in the region, especially IUU fishing and, therefore, has an established interest in the collective efforts to 
combat MLR crimes.  
RECOMMENDATION 8.2 
• Work through the Permanent Commission for the South-East Pacific to organise a workshop on a 
criminal jurisdiction initiative to combat MLR crime under the RSP program. Similarly, approach the 
Caribbean Environment Program.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This Report on Universalised Jurisdiction over Marine Living Resources Crime explores both the notion and the potential for 
practical application of criminal jurisdiction with global reach to prosecute criminals engaged in crimes against marine living 
resources.  
There are compelling reasons for international concern over illegal harm to MLR and to mobilise coordinated action against it. 
Although common understanding on the international legal mechanisms needed to suppress MLR crimes effectively is gathering 
strength, it does not currently indicate a clear grasp of the potential uses of universalised criminal law jurisdiction to enforce against 
breaches of MLR conservation rules. The clear trend towards universalisation of criminal law enforcement in other fields, 
particularly through coordinated international law enforcement to combat organised crime, suggests that such coordination in 
relation to MLR crime could follow.  
The Universalised Jurisdiction over Marine Living Resources Crime project explores the scope, limits and potential development of 
universalised criminal jurisdiction over MLR crime. This requires examining the meanings of its underlying concepts of harm and 
of crime and how they are internationalised. The meaning of marine living resources (MLR) crime is examined, identifying 
prohibited harms, such as damage to protected habitats, illegal trade in endangered species and theft of genetic resources. 
Universalised criminal jurisdiction is a key concept, referring to the internationally harmonised definition of these crimes and the 
international coordination of national legal powers to enforce against them. It is examined in depth and contrasted with universal 
jurisdiction, a different form of international jurisdiction, more usually exercised by an international court of a harm directly 
prohibited under international law. Universalised criminal jurisdiction occurs under national laws, by harmonising national 
proscriptions of the criminal conduct against MLR within countries and extraterritorially, and further, by facilitating international 
law enforcement cooperation between national constabularies, ports, customs, quarantine and other authorities.  
International harmonisation of MLR crimes in national laws would draw principally upon existing international legal standards for 
MLR conservation set out in global and regional agreements. It would identify those MLR standards of central concern to the 
international community, for which breaches are considered serious violations of binding international standards. It would unpack 
the concept of illegal unreported and unregulated fishing (‘IUU’) to focus on specifically illegal acts that shape MLR offences. 
International law enforcement cooperation to exercise universalised enforcement jurisdiction would draw upon techniques 
including: criminal and financial intelligence gathering and exchange; mutual assistance in collecting evidence for prosecutors; 
arrests and extraditions; stolen asset seizures, confiscations and sharing; and sharing of organisational resources to strengthen 
national law enforcement capacity. Due to MLR crimes at sea involving special physical challenges, multilayered cooperation 
between government departments across sectors and between countries is needed.  
The project undertakes case studies on practical exercises of MLR law enforcement jurisdiction by national administrations and 
international organisations. The case studies consider extraterritorial and internationally coordinated exercises of jurisdiction to 
investigate how (or whether) they actually enforce beyond their borders against MLR crimes. The studies include international law 
enforcement cooperation for the suppression of transnational organised crime, long-arm penalties against foreign crimes, Port 
State control measures, and high seas boarding and investigation of foreign vessels.  
The Universal Jurisdiction over Marine Living Resources Crime project concludes by considering practical opportunities to 
harmonise national definitions of MLR crimes and to strengthen international coordination of enforcement against them. It surveys 
existing legal frameworks and international vehicles potentially available at the global and regional levels to carry forward the 
progressive development of universalised jurisdiction over marine living resources crimes.  
Part I – Conceptual 
Part I of the Report addresses conceptual matters essential to understanding the research project. These include the notions of 
global marine harms, crime, jurisdiction and the universalisation proscription of crimes. 
Chapter 2 – Global Marine Harms 
An exploration in Chapter 2 of the conceptual material sets out a description of marine living resources (MLR) harms of global 
concern and an explanation of reasons why MLR crimes that cause these harms are suitable subjects for international attention. 
These reasons include the international impacts of MLR crimes directly on the global commons or shared marine resources, and the 
international importance of marine ecosystems to human well-being. In additional, some MLR crimes have international 
significance due to their international impacts on the work of shared international governance, their undermining or breaching of 
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global standards for marine conservation and management, and the involvement of transnational organised criminal groups in 
perpetrating these harms.  
Chapter 3 – Crime  
The concept of crime is introduced in Chapter 3, which analyses crime into its core elements of conduct obligations and sanctions. It 
compares serious crimes with MLR offences, which are typically treated as less serious civil or administrative offences. The 
distinction is important, as crimes widely considered to be suitable subjects for international attention are those characterised as 
serious, rather than as civil or administrative. Therefore, it would be necessary to elevate the characterisation of MLR crimes to 
serious crimes in order to treat them as international crimes. The material on crime also discusses trends in the designation of 
corporations as criminal actors, due to the prevalence of complex corporate structures for fishing ventures, and the nature of 
ancillary crimes related to MLR crimes. The distinction is made between universal crimes, which are prescribed under customary 
international law, and universalised crimes, which are coordinated under treaties but take legal effect only when States prescribe 
them under their national laws.  
Chapter 4 – Jurisdiction  
Following the discussion of crime, the notion of jurisdiction is examined in Chapter 4. Prescriptive and enforcement aspects of the 
exercise of State jurisdiction are distinguished. Prescriptive jurisdiction is the State power recognised under international law to 
make laws but this recognised power attenuate as prescription becomes extraterritorial. A State’s enforcement jurisdiction is its 
power recognised under international law to enforce laws and it is primarily exercised within the State’s territory. However, it can 
be exercised within State territory to enforce laws prescribed extraterritorially can also be physically exercised beyond territory in 
some circumstances. National enforcement of two crimes of universal jurisdiction are compared – piracy and humanitarian crimes 
– demonstrating the legal risks presented by competing concurrent enforcement jurisdictions using different legal processes to 
cover the same subject crime and person.  
Chapter 5 – Universalised Crimes  
The Report analyses, in Chapter 5, the circumstances under which States are willing to prescribe crimes in order to universalise 
jurisdiction over a crime. It surveys international treaty crimes concerning political violence, organised crime and trafficking and 
finds that an international link factor is usually required. This is an event in commission of the crime that is transnational. 
Nevertheless, humanitarian crimes do not require a transnational event. The means of coordinated international criminal law 
enforcement are then briefly noted, prior to being considered at greater length as a case study in Chapter 10.  
Part II – Case Studies 
Part II embarks upon a series of case studies intended to reveal trends and opportunities relevant to the universalisation of 
enforcement jurisdiction against ML R crimes. The case studies concern the exercise of criminal law enforcement cooperation 
against organised crime, of long arm national criminal measures, of port state measures high seas boarding and of inspections of 
vessels. 
Chapter 6 – Transnational Law Enforcement Cooperation 
Intersections between MLR crime and transnational organised crime are manyfold, including bribery and corruption, money 
laundering, obstruction of Justice, participation in organised criminal groups, conspiracy, and other serious offences. International 
law enforcement cooperation enables the enforcement by one country of its laws against such offences, even though aspects of the 
enforcement process occur within another country’s jurisdiction. International law enforcement cooperation has many aspects, 
both informal and formal, within the constraints of that other’s voluntary cooperation. Informally, countries may cooperate to 
exchange criminal intelligence. Formally, they may provide each other with evidence admissible in their respective courts, extradite 
indicted persons or witnesses, and officially recognise each other's criminal procedures and sentences.  
Chapter 7 – Long-arm National Measures 
The exercise of national laws designed to affect behaviour within foreign jurisdictions is termed ‘long-arm jurisdiction. Within the 
limits of international comity, international law permits the enactment of legislation with such extraterritorial application, but not 
the unilateral enforcement of that law within another country's jurisdiction. Therefore, long-arm legislation is needs to be enforced 
principally within the jurisdiction of the enacting country. In legislating against foreign MLR crimes, long-arm legislation may 
criminalise illegal harvesting of MLR, possession or handling of illegally harvested MLR products, or disguising the origin of such 
products. These offences are enforced as crime against the law in the enacting country, even though the original illegal act occurred 
in other countries jurisdiction. 
Chapter 8 – Port State Measures  
The case study of port state measures reveals an important opportunity to universalise exercise enforcement jurisdiction. The 
powers of a Port State to set conditions for entry into its ports are granted to it under customary international law. They present an 
enormously powerful jurisdiction to enforce the protection of MLR laws, even those prescribed for waters beyond those of the Port 
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State. The compilation of a global blacklist of vessels associated with MLR crimes that would signify global denial of the use of port 
facilities to any blacklisted vessel would have the effect of universally enforced MLR conservation laws. Chapter 6 also finds that, to 
discourage the use of flags of convenience, a non-co-operating Flag State blacklist could be compiled that would signify denial of the 
support facilities also to any blacklisted Flag State. 
Chapter 9 – High Seas Boarding of Vessels 
The case study in Chapter 7 finds that, under the 1995 UN Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, the physical 
exercise of enforcement power against MLR crime has been extended extraterritorially in circumscribed circumstances. It examines 
the 1995 Agreement’s implementation by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission through the Commission’s High 
Seas Boarding and Inspection Procedures. The concept of ‘serious violations’ identified in inspections, as adapted from the 1995 
Agreement and set out in the Procedures, is leading to global consensus on the definition of serious MLR crimes. Such a consensus 
is necessary in order to define international MLR crime. 
Part III – Findings 
Part III addresses the practical implications of the research. It considers the pragmatic institutional aspects of how to universalise 
enforcement jurisdiction against MLR crimes and brings the project to its conclusion by making a series of recommendations. 
Chapter 10 – Global Legal and Institutional Options 
Chapter 11 is a survey of legal models and institutional vehicles that might be available to progress the universalisation of 
enforcement jurisdiction against MLR crimes. The survey is divided into studies of laws and institutions. Each of these is 
subdivided for convenience of treatment into general, marine, environmental and criminal justice groupings of laws and of 
institutions. Priority legal developmental opportunities are identified as soft law under the International Plan of Action - IUU and a 
protocol under the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Institutional fora that could, within their 
evolving mandates, host events on the universalisation of enforcement jurisdiction against MLR crimes are the: UN Open-Ended 
Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and Law of the Sea, UN Environment Programme, UN Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, and 
INTERPOL.  
Chapter 11 – Regional Legal and Institutional Options 
Chapter 12 surveys legal models and institutional vehicles at the regional level. Again, the survey is divided between laws and 
institutions and each of these is subdivided into general, marine, environmental and criminal justice groupings. It finds that 
regional institutions that might be willing to develop and adopt soft law instruments to progress the universalisation of enforcement 
jurisdiction against MLR crimes instruments are the: Forum Fisheries Agency, South East Asia Regional Plan of Action, Caribbean 
Environment Program, and the Economic Community of West African States. 
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MLR SCOPE 
Geographical Scope 
 The geographical scope of marine living resources addressed here means resources present in the marine environment, which 
extends across all oceans, seas, semi enclosed seas that form part of the Earth's salt water bodies. It excludes rivers, lakes, glaciers, 
ice flows or other fresh water bodies. Simply put, this means the range of jurisdictions for which jurisdictional powers and norms 
are prescribed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. These include the high seas and all zones of national 
jurisdiction (the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf) or national sovereignty (internal waters, territorial sea and 
archipelagic waters) up to the low-water mark or the fresh water boundary. 
Biological Scope 
The biological scope of living resources includes ecosystems, organisms, specimens of organisms and the genetic material of 
organisms. An ecosystem means ‘a dynamic complex of plant, animal and microorganism communities and their nonliving 
environment interacting is a functional unit’.1 Organisms may come from the plant or animal kingdom or from archaea. (The latter 
being single cell organisms identified late in the 20th century as the third branch of life with a different chemistry from either plants 
or animals.) Specimens include parts of organisms no longer living and derivatives thereof.2 Genetic resources means material 
containing functioning units of heredity of actual or potential value.3  
                                                                    
1 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993) art 1.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid art 2.  
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MLR HARMS OF GLOBAL SIGNIFICANCE 
Target stocks overexploitation 
Wild capture fisheries comprise the component of marine living resources with the highest direct economic value and which are 
most commonly extracted from the marine environment.4 An example of harm to a harvested stock arises when the targeted species 
is endangered and its capture is prohibited, in which case the harvesting activity is often described as poaching. Harm to a MLR 
targeted and allowed for harvest may be caused also by fishing in excess of the total allowed catch (or without any quota). Fishing in 
a closed area or during a closed season or beyond the allowed period of time could harm the future reproductive capacity of the 
stock. Similarly, fishing with non-permitted fishing gear might result in a high proportion of undersize, juvenile catch, with 
detrimental effect to the targeted MLR stock.  
MLR by-catch 
Bycatch signifies MLR not directly targeted for capture but that nevertheless are captured in a harvest operation. The operation 
might have been directed towards other species or to other age groups in the species stock. As it comprises a waste of effort in the 
harvest operation, it is usually unintentional, caused by factors that range from poor intelligence to inappropriate equipment to 
operational mismanagement.  
Sometimes bycatch is intentional, however. For example, when a nontarget species co-mingles with the target species, bycatch of 
the nontarget species during harvesting of the target species and might cause harm. For example, targeting dolphin because they 
are known to associate with yellowfin tuna results in intentional dolphin bycatch in yellowfin tuna harvests. Similarly, inefficiencies 
or reductions in return-for-effort caused to fishing operations by the techniques available to avoid bycatch of non-targeted species 
may incline fishers to avoid those techniques. For example, the inconveniences of having to use streamers, night fishing and thawed 
baits to discourage seabirds from snagging themselves on hooks in longline tuna fisheries, can incline fishers to deliberately fail to 
use those techniques. 
Biological resources loss 
The unauthorised harvesting of marine genetic resources also poses significant potential losses. The harm here is not to MLR but to 
the economic opportunities otherwise available to coastal States having the exclusive economic rights over those resources. 
Management system degradation 
MLR harvest management systems intended to be used in fisheries operations and designed to provide natural resources 
information and vessel compliance feedback to governmental managers are essential component of sustainable MLR management. 
For example, a fishing vessel master’s misreporting of the area of recent fishing activity, or the master’s failure to repair a fishing 
vessel satellite transponder, might not in themselves deplete the fishery but could contribute the mismanagement of the fish stock, 
especially if those actions were replicated by others in the fishery. Disruption of such MLR systems undermines both the natural 
resources knowledge base and the operational oversight of governmental managers of MLR. It systemically harms sustainable MLR 
management.  
Environmental pollution and ecosystem disruption  
Contaminants in the marine environment that cause detriment to uses of it can emanate from a range of sources, traditionally 
classified under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as: land-based, vessel sourced, dumped waste and offshore installed 
sources.5 Of these, land-based sources of marine pollution comprise by far the largest contributor, at over 80% by volume of marine 
pollution, including watershed and riverine discharges and direct waste discharges, such as sewage and industrial waste, and 
aerially transported contaminants, such as smog drift.6 The next largest source of pollution emanates from vessels, mostly resulting 
from operational discharges such as from the release of bilge water (rather than accident or misadventure) directly into sea water 
but also through the atmosphere.  
Pollution has been found to cause harm to MLR in local pollution hotspots, such as bays and harbours where direct discharges 
dominate, which cause diseases and flesh lesions in fish, as well as at broad scale levels, such as through global warming and 
acidification of seawater which detrimentally impacts, inter alia, coral reef health. Historic and widespread continuing use of the 
marine environment as a waste sink means that such pollution is generally an accepted although unintended way of coastal living 
and an unfortunate but legal cost of industry. Only the most extreme acts of marine pollution might lack social approbation. 
Massive acts of pollution such as the despoliation of natural resources as a means of warfare, the dumping of contaminated wastes 
                                                                    
4 In 2010, wild capture fisheries amounted to 88.6 million tonnes of fish. The estimated total value of wild capture and aquaculture production for 
2010 was $217.5 billion. FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2012, 4 < http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2727e/i2727e.pdf>  
5 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 (entered into force 16 November 
1994) part XII. 
6 Oceans and the Law of the Sea – Report of the Secretary-General, 59th sess, Agenda item 50(a), UN Doc A/59/62/Add.1 para 97. 
 
 Page 28 
and dynamiting of biodiversity rich marine habitats, seem to be considered so extreme as to be culpable. This suggests that the 
intentional destruction of MLR habitats and ecosystems is a category of MLR harm considered to be criminal in nature.  
MLR HARMS AS INTER-STATE LEGAL CONCERNS 
International importance 
Among the many different types of crimes against laws for natural resources management, marine living resources crimes are a 
category of fundamental international importance. Oceans comprise 72% of the earth's surface, produce 15-20% of humanity’s food 
protein, contain the vast majority of Earth's life species, and - centrally relevant to discussion of international crime - their natural 
resources and maritime spaces are shared across all national jurisdictions. 
International standards 
Global and regional legal measures to promote compliance with international MLR conservation standards and to prevent MLR 
crime are already in place and too numerous to list here. The notion of universalising that law enforcement jurisdiction to suppress 
international MLR crime is another incremental step to strengthen existing global and regional measures. Its modest innovation is 
to make the logical connection between breaches of laws and criminal law enforcement cooperation in the context of international 
MLR management.  
Shared natural resources 
The ways in which marine living resources may be shared are many and varied. A distinct biomass of fish, for example might be 
shared because it is located in the high seas, or is located across national maritime boundaries, or is highly migratory or a 
combination of these factors. In addition, that species might be of international concern because of its scientific interest or a 
‘charismatic’ status, or because the health of that fishery has indirect ecosystemic impacts elsewhere in other jurisdictions. 
Shared spaces 
The notion of universalised criminal jurisdiction under a treaty regime to enforce MLR law is particularly useful to complement 
Flag State jurisdiction on the high seas, i.e. in international areas where, otherwise, only Flag States would have legal jurisdiction to 
penalise their vessels for failing to meet international MLR conservation norms. Unfortunately, many Flag States are neglectful in 
ensuring such compliance. 
Shared governance capacity 
 In the exclusive economic zone, where coastal States exercise sovereign rights, universalised criminal jurisdiction to enforce against 
MLR crime might also provide a useful complement to coastal State enforcement capacity, as many coastal States lack the capacity 
to effectively enforce their own MLR conservation laws across large maritime spaces. Even further inshore, coastal States might 
conceivably allow foreign States to assist enforcement of MLR conservation laws in their own territorial waters, subject to 
safeguards to protect coastal State sovereignty. 
Transnational actors 
Another reason for international concern over MLR crime is that the criminal actors typically operate beyond the jurisdiction of any 
one State alone. The actors in major MLR crime are multinational in composition and operate transnationally.  
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The concept of crime has its roots in the perpetration of injustice. Yet the exact boundaries of justice and of crime are not precisely 
defined. Indeed, they are continually being debated and constantly evolving, taking on new shapes in response to new 
circumstances.  
Justice itself is an ancient notion but it is not fixed or static. Some of Its religious connotations are indicated in the book of 
Deuteronomy, which evidences a sophisticated development of the concept of justice by the sixth century BCE and in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics in the third century BCE. Two and a half thousand years later, new celebrated legal scholarship on the subject 
is still emerging.7 Discourse concerning the nature of justice is perennial.  
Similarly, the boundaries of crime are still expanding and new concepts of crime developing. The mid-20th century saw the concise 
expression of notions of crimes against humanity and the late 20th century the development of notions of transnational crime, 
environmental crime and cybercrime. This report explores a new frontier for crime. Within the sphere of environmental crime, the 
early 21st century could see the maturation of the notion of universalised crime against the environment.  
Terminologies used to describe crimes are often confusing. A preliminary task here is to set the specific meanings for the different 
terms used when defining the notion of crime. In identifying specific meanings, it becomes possible to distinguish between different 
types of crimes and to explore for each their respective constituent parts. This will help avoid confusion when distinguishing the 
concept of crime against MLR from other conduct and exploring its components and elements.  
One of the reasons why it is important to define a clear common terminology is that universalisation of concepts of crime requires 
bridging disparate global cultures. Understandings of crimes are deeply rooted in the specific cultural contexts of the societies in 
which they occur. Each society has its own variation on what is considered right or wrong, each has its own individual legal system, 
and each uses slightly different words to signify the legal aspects of crime. 
CRIME ELEMENTS 
A basic conception of criminal law is that a specified conduct is formally obligated or prohibited by an effective authority that 
impartially punishes breaches of the obligation or prohibition. The component notions of specified conduct, formal obligation or 
prohibition and punishment of breaches are briefly examined here to sharpen our understanding of MLR criminal law.  
                                                                    
7 See scholars such as John Rawls Theory of Justice (3rd edn) 1999 Harvard University Press. 
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Conduct obligations 
In relation to the formal obligation or prohibition, the law may mandate that a person undertake an action or it may prohibit a 
specified action. For example, it may mandate that ballast water be cleaned before it is discharged into the waters of a port or it may 
prohibit entry into port by a vessel that has its hull fouled by pest organisms.  
Accordingly, the specified conduct is to do something or not to do something, i.e. active or passive. A breach of an obligation would 
be a crime of omission, whereas a breach of a prohibition would be a crime of commission. It is the vessel master’s failure to take 
action to clean ballast water, as compared to the act entering port with a fouled hull that comprises the breach. The human conduct 
comprises the breach and contributes in part to any actual harm caused by exotic pests in the vessel’s ballast water or by pests 
fouling the hull.  
The notion of impartial punishment of breaches of the law presumes that the prescribing authority has the capacity to monitor 
conduct and to punish identified breaches effectively. This presumption is more accurate in urban spaces, where there private 
citizens in dense human populations inform law enforcement officials situated nearby of breaches of the law, than in ocean spaces 
where there are few other private vessels to provide information and fewer public law enforcement vessels. When legal breaches are 
identified at sea, punishment may be meted out via several distinct processes. 
Sanctions  
As governmental regulation has burgeoned, so have the types of sanctions and processes for addressing breaches of regulations. 
Their range and diversity seems to be limited only by the imagination of the time. Although the distinctions between sanctioning 
processes are not always clear, they can be categorised as criminal, civil or administrative. Types of sanctions include death, 
imprisonment, fines, fees and other financial penalties, confiscations, compensation, bans, deregistration, suspensions, community 
service, enforceable undertakings, injunctions, withheld benefits, negative publicity, apologies, and so on. Within Anglophone legal 
systems, the terminology used to describe the wide variety of sanctions for crimes is often confusing and is sometimes inconsistent.  
The characterisation of the sanctions as criminal, rather than as administrative or civil, is important within the context of 
international cooperation to combat MLR crime. MLR crimes are generally minor offences for which administrative or civil 
sanctions and processes apply. Most international law enforcement cooperation frameworks are designed to address serious 
criminal offences, rather than administrative or civil offences. Indeed, serious criminal offences are defined in international 
instruments as those for which the penalty is a maximum term of imprisonment of at least one year (or four 4 in other cases). This 
means that MLR crimes do not currently cross the threshold set by most jurisdictions for criminal law enforcement cooperation. 
Therefore, universalising MLR crimes would require that they be redefined as serious criminal offences. 
Civil Sanctions 
A ‘civil penalty’ can be described as one that is ‘imposed by courts applying civil rather than criminal processes.’8 Most commonly 
civil sanctions consist of monetary fines,9 which can be imposed on both personal and corporate bodies, but can also extend beyond 
punishment to include imposition of corrective behaviour activities and the payment of compensation. A vessel may be confiscated 
as an instrument of crime or as part of a penalty for the principal crime. 
Civil proceedings generally take place in a court (rather than an administrative tribunal) before an independent judge. They involve 
lower standard of proof at which facts must be established than criminal processes, generally being the balance of probabilities or 
else reasonable satisfaction, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Civil proceedings allow witnesses to be compelled to give 
evidence, facilitate evidence gathering through disclosure processes, and allow for a wider range of possible parties to the case. 
Reversal in the onus of proof, to place the burden of proof upon the defendant rather than the State once the State has made out an 
initial case is also more common in civil than in criminal proceedings. Thus, the civil proceedings result in less of procedural 
safeguards for the defendant than the criminal process.10  
Administrative Sanctions 
Administrative sanctions can be understood as penalties imposed by a regulator or some other enforcement body that is a 
government executive agency, ‘without intervention by a court or tribunal.’11 Administrative sanctions can include imposition of 
fines, fees, taxes, infringement notices and orders to pay compensation, as well as loss of licenses, permits, allowances or privileges. 
Notionally, these sanctions are intended to ensure the prevention of further damages rather than to penalise and abrogate rights.12 
                                                                    
8 Australian Law Reform Commission, Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties in Australia, Report No 95 (2002) [2.45]. 
9 Ibid [2.50]. 
10 Ibid,[2.80]. 
11 Ibid [2.64]. 
12 European Commission, Study on Measures Other Than Criminal Ones in Cases Where Environmental Community Law has not Been Respected 
in a Few Candidate Countries, 6, <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/crime/pdf/cd_summary_report.pdf> 
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Given the fact that administrative penalties generally result from the ‘mechanical’ or ‘automatic’ imposition of statutorily 
determined sanctions, they do not involve a judge at first instance and there are few procedural elements. 13 Instead, judicial review 
is usually available to a complainant to correct any fault in the legal authority, required procedure or natural justice applied in the 
administrative process. Challenges to administrative penalties can result defaults to both criminal and civil proceedings for breach 
of regulatory provisions.  
Criminal Sanctions  
Criminal sanctions are punishments imposed by courts for breaches of criminal law. Generally, punishments impose a fine or 
imprisonment, with imprisonment being within the exclusive jurisdiction of criminal law. Some jurisdictions may also extend the 
scope of criminal sanctions to include the death penalty, corporal punishment and the confiscation of goods or assets. The convicted 
person acquires the stigma of a criminal record.  
Criminal sanctions are distinguished by their enforcement procedures, which are relatively formal.14 For example, criminal offences 
are required to before a court presided over by a judge and, depending on the offence and jurisdiction, a jury. A prosecutor must 
tender evidence that proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended and did commit the prohibited conduct.15 Most 
importantly, criminal procedural rights benefit the accused, including the presumption of innocence, prohibition on self-
incrimination, the right to silence, the rights not to be tried twice for the same alleged crime or for a retrospective crime. 
The available literature suggests that the differences between criminal, civil and administrative sanctions lie within the procedures 
used to implement them. The main distinguishing feature between criminal, civil and administrative sanctions is arguably the 
unique nature of the criminal trial. Meyer defines non-criminal sanctions in international law as, ‘penalties for conduct proscribed 
under international criminal law, which have been imposed by civil courts, administrative agencies of other law enforcement 
authorities outside of a criminal trial.’16 For Meyer the criminal trial itself is the sole identifier for whether a sanction is criminal or 
not.  
Coupled with this is the fact that the processes involved prior to non-criminal sanctions being imposed differ greatly. Criminal 
sanctions require police authorities to investigate criminal behaviour and gather evidence. Within administrative processes the 
investigation of breaches occurs on a lower evidentiary standard, presumptions of innocence generally do not exist and in the cases 
of corporations, regulations may require cooperation with competent authorities. In addition to this, a significant difference 
between administrative and criminal sanctions regarding the freezing of assets, is that the presumption of innocence within 
criminal procedures is not found within case law regarding administrative sanctions.17 What this suggests is that criminal, civil, and 
administrative sanctions, can be distinguished by the different principles and rights afforded within each process.  
Criminal actors 
Persons who break the law are sometimes termed criminals or offenders and we tend to imagine them as they stand accused in the 
dock in a trial court. Yet some accused not have no leg to stand on but are not human. In the case of fishing operations, the 
defendant might be a shelf company directed by other companies.  
A ‘legal person’ is the formal term for a person having rights and responsibilities before the law. A legal person can be a human 
being, i.e. a natural person, or a constructed entity. A corporation is a constructed entity that is a legal person having rights and 
responsibilities before the law. As it is, in essence, merely an association of human beings, therefore its conduct is attributable to 
the persons comprising it, i.e. its personnel, who provide human agency and may be sanctioned for the company’s regulatory 
breaches. However, given that corporations do have independent legal responsibilities as legal entities, they can also have criminal 
responsibility for their employee’s actions.  
During the last quarter of the 20th century, it became more often accepted practice to attribute criminal responsibility to 
corporations and to prosecute not only the directors but also the company itself. Corporations can be subject to vicarious criminal 
liability and to direct criminal liability. Vicarious criminal liability tends to address civil and administrative offences of a less serious 
nature and for which the penalties are fines. These offences concern non-compliance with prescribed standards for corporate 
conduct, such as those addressing occupational health and safety, employee benefits and workplace harassment. Corporate direct 
criminal liability concerns more serious crimes, such as manslaughter, conspiracy, price-fixing and theft. For example, the 
Commonwealth of Australia Criminal Code 1995 provides in relation to all offences that it applies to corporations in the same way 
as to natural persons.18 
In relation to crimes for which a mandatory jail sentence is the prescribed penalty, such as murder, there is no point in prosecuting 
a legal entity, as a corporation cannot serve a jail sentence. Yet if other penalties than jail are also prescribed, then the corporation 
                                                                    
13 Australian Law Reform Commission, Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties in Australia, Report No 95 (2002) [2.87]. 
14 Ibid [2.71]. 
15 Ibid [2.73]. 
16 Frank Meyer, ‘Complementing Complementarity,’ (2006) 6 International Criminal Law Review 549, 552. 
17 Melissa van den Broek, Monique Hazelhorst and Wouter de Zanger, ‘Asset Freezing: Smart Sanction or Criminal Charge?’ (2010) 27 Utrecht 
Journal of International and European Law 18, 25. 
18 Commonwealth Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) ss 12.1-12.6. 
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itself might be prosecuted usefully. Indeed, some jurisdictions have enacted legislation that provides that, if imprisonment is the 
only punishment prescribed, then a fine may be imposed on a corporation nevertheless. Also, where a fine is the prescribed criminal 
punishment for a natural person, then a higher a fine may be imposed on a corporation for the same offence.19 
Questions concerning corporate criminal responsibility remain around which of a corporation’s personnel can be identified with the 
corporation itself, and also the circumstances in which their actions can be attributed to the corporation itself. Less senior 
employees may attract corporate vicarious criminal liability , so long as they act within the scope of their employment, whereas 
more senior personnel, particularly directors, executives and senior officers, who comprise the ‘mind’ or alter ego and culture of the 
company, may attract its direct criminal liability.20 
Ancillary crimes 
Complicit conduct that supports a principal offence may be proscribed as an ancillary crime. Ancillary crimes can occur prior, 
during or after the principal offence.  
Those criminalised conducts that that occur prior to the principal offence include conspiracy, preparation, counselling, procuring 
and attempt, whereas aiding and abetting occur during the principal offence, as compared to those criminalised conducts that occur 
after, including concealment, misprision and participation as an accessory after the fact. A major focus of contemporary law 
enforcement effort is to combat money laundering, which is an ancillary crime that involves concealing the proceeds of the principal 
crime. 
When a principal MLR crime occurs within a country’s jurisdiction, then it has jurisdiction over the ancillary crimes also, if it has 
legislated to prescribe the complicit conduct as ancillary crimes. Some complicit conduct, such as foreign procurement of illegal 
fishing equipment or forged documentation, may occur in other countries. Therefore, the reach of national MLR laws prescribing 
ancillary crimes could extend extraterritorially.  
For example, in establishing a monitoring, control and surveillance system for foreign fishing, a coastal State might require that 
bunker vessels providing fuels to vessels fishing in its exclusive economic zone must submit records within 24 hours to the coastal 
fishery management authority detailing the identity, type and position of each the receiving and the bunkering vessel, the type and 
quality of fuel, the time of bunkering and the name and owner of the master of each. If illegal fishing by a vessel were to occur, non-
reporting or false reporting by the bunkering vessel would be an ancillary offence. 
UNIVERSAL CRIMES 
When international law prohibits specified conduct by an individual person and enables States or international organisations to 
impose a criminal sanction to enforce the prohibition, then that prohibited conduct is a universal crime. It is individual behaviour 
that is prohibited directly by international law.  
Historically, international law prescribing a universal crime is embodied in customary international law. In modern times, treaty 
law has the principal role in defining criminal conduct and universalising international efforts for its suppression. The approach 
taken in international crime suppression treaties requires that States enact laws proscribing the specified conduct and enforce those 
laws. Therefore, the criminal conduct is a breach of national laws coordinated internationally through a treaty, rather than a direct 
breach of international law itself. Nevertheless, if State participation in a crime suppression treaty is so widespread as to be virtually 
universal and the participating States actually implement its obligations, then the treaty obligations can be regarded as reflecting a 
new rule in customary international law. In that case, the treaty rule has evolved into customary international law and the conduct 
criminalised under the rule can be regarded as a universal crime directly against international law. Until such time as the treaty rule 
becomes customary, the rule might be regarded as universalising a specified crime but not yet as a universal crime. 
Therefore, an important distinction is drawn between crimes against customary international laws and crimes against national laws 
prescribed by treaties. Crimes prohibited by customary international laws and crimes prohibited by treaties are both “international 
crimes” but only crimes prohibited by customary international law may properly be termed “universal”.21 The accepted categories of 
customary international crimes are a few: war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and piracy. Therefore, even in relation to 
aspects of the status of these, considerable controversy remains. The universal status of a purported international crime might be 
contested even though its international status is recognised.  
                                                                    
19 L. Waller and CR William, Criminal Law Texts and Cases (Butterworths, 10th ed, 2005) 14, providing examples of Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4B(3) 
and Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 360(A). 
20 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (Law Book Company, 2001) 154, citing Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass 
1972 AC 153. 
21 Neil Boister, ‘Transitional Criminal Law?’ (2003) 14(5) European Journal of International Law 953, 963. 
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Universalised crimes 
The freer movement of people, money, goods and services creates opportunities for criminals. At least a quarter of all terrorist 
attacks are coordinated across international borders. Money-laundering worldwide is estimated by the International Monetary 
Fund to be equal to approximately 2-5% of global GDP. Human trafficking in 4 million people every year earns US$ 5-7 billion. In 
addition, narcotics and firearms trafficking, smuggling, fraud, cybercrime, paedophile tourism, natural resources poaching and 
trade in illegal waste form growing areas are entrepreneurial growth areas. These crimes are generally termed transnational crimes.  
In response, national criminal laws are being extended extraterritorially, leading to a multiplicity of international jurisdictional 
interactions and need to adapt national criminal laws most relevant to transnational so as to facilitate international coordination. 
During each negotiation of a criminal law enforcement coordination treaty, successfully reaching consensus on the definition of a 
transnational crime is another step globalising criminal law. 
The nature of the crimes defined in new law enforcement coordination treaties is most often transnational but not necessarily so. In 
addition to transnational crimes, there is growing international consensus on the internationalisation of other forms of 
international crime. Accelerated globalisation in the late 20th century in the fields of communications, technology, commerce, travel 
and culture is influencing national legal cultures. Outside of transnational treaty crimes are other classes of crime protecting 
specifically designated human rights (proposed as being universal) by prohibiting crimes against those human rights. Therefore, 
new notions of international crimes are emerging, only some of which are transnational crimes. 
All treaty crimes can be regarded as international crimes, in that they are internationally harmonised and in the process of 
becoming universalised. Until such time as the treaties are virtually universally ratified and the relevant provisions implemented, 
such that they become customary international law, their defined crimes remain only treaty crimes. They are not yet universal but 
are international crimes are in the process of being universalised. 
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Jurisdiction refers to a State’s authority to prescribe and enforce its municipal law. It is a disjunctive concept encompassing a 
State’s jurisdiction to prescribe, as distinct from its jurisdiction to enforce.22 In a criminal law context, prescriptive jurisdiction 
refers to a State’s authority to criminalise certain conduct, whilst enforcement jurisdiction refers to its authority to actually apply 
sanctions implementing those laws. However, prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction are inherently linked, as a State’s 
legitimate enforcement of a law must be predicated on its valid authority to criminalise the conduct in question.23  
Under international law a State has wider scope to prescribe laws than it does to enforce them. This is due to the limitations of 
sovereign equality and non-intervention. These principles allow States to prescribe their laws as they see fit, 24 but restrain their 
enforcing of those laws extraterritorially. As the U.S. Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law puts it, ‘officials of one State may 
not exercise their functions in the territory of another State without the latter’s consent.’25 It is therefore clear that whilst a State 
may undertake enforcement measures within its own territory, international law will prevent it from initiating arrests, commencing 
investigations or punishing individuals within the territory of another State. National enforcement jurisdiction under international 
law is primarily territorial.26   
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
Universal jurisdiction refers to the State’s exceptional right to prescribe and enforce international law against any person engaged 
in an offence directly against international law, in those circumstances where international law itself prescribes a crime and allows 
all States to enforce it. Such power to enforce is held by the law enforcement authorities of all countries and is applicable 
unilaterally against offenders of any other country.  
There is controversy as to the premise and reach of universal jurisdiction. In relation to its premise, controversy surrounds whether 
universality is based in the extraordinarily grave character of the crime – so to automatically permit any States to take 
extraterritorial enforcement action, or whether universality is based in international consensus on jurisdictional exceptionalism – 
as the prerequisite to allow extraterritorial enforcement action. The former enables universal jurisdiction to be exercised against 
any extraordinarily grave crime. Thus, universal jurisdiction is ‘criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime.’27 In 
contrast, the latter premise creates a prerequisite of inter-State consensus concerning the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over particular designated crime.  
                                                                    
22 Roger O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 735, 736. 
23 Karinne Coombes, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: A Means to End Impunity or a Threat to Friendly International Relations’ (2011) 43 The George 
Washington International Law Review 419, 424. 
24 This is of course provided that municipal laws do not contravene international law, see O’Keefe, above n 1, 740. 
25 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987)  
26 Roger O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 735, 740. 
27 Princeton University Program in Law and Public Affairs, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (2001) 23 
<http://www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf>  
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As universal jurisdiction is essentially extraterritorial in its prescriptive aspects, the enforcement aspects might also be expected to 
require extraterritorial reach. However, because State enforcement jurisdiction is fundamentally territorial, the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention limit the abilities of national authorities to enforce any laws extraterritorially. This has led some 
commentators, such as O’Keefe and Commbes to suggest that universal jurisdiction is simply shorthand for universal prescriptive 
jurisdiction.28 Put another way, ‘[i]n practical terms, the gap between the existence of the principle and its implementation remains 
quite wide.’ 29  
The controversy over the reach of universal jurisdiction stems from divergent views on whether an enforcing State need have any 
other connection with the crime, such as physical custody over the accused or impact upon its population or economy. Such 
controversies over the premise and reach of universal jurisdiction have relevance to whether MLR crimes can be regarded as 
universal crimes, as explored below. 
Piracy 
The concept of universal jurisdiction evolved in relation to action to combat piracy on the high seas. As no State can exercise 
national territorial jurisdiction on the high seas, law enforcement against foreign vessels engaged in piracy would transgress against 
foreign Flag State jurisdiction, unless authorised by the relevant foreign Flag State.  
The custom emerged among European countries that any State may wield enforcement powers against pirate vessels, even when 
those vessels are not within the territorial jurisdiction of the enforcing State and the crime of concern has not been committed 
within its territorial jurisdiction. Thus, the instance of piracy need have no direct physical or economic connection with the 
enforcing State. The rationale of universal jurisdiction over piracy is that all seafaring States share an indirect interest in 
suppressing potential attacks against vessels, seafarers cargoes or other mercantile interests at sea where none of them can exercise 
territorial jurisdiction. Accordingly, the custom developed that allowed the exercise of law enforcement against piracy on the high 
seas was based upon common agreement by Flag States. 
The emergence of consensus concerning the exercise of universal jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas might be regarded as 
inherent in the extraordinarily grave nature of the crime: pirates are regarded as hostile to all, hostis humani generis, and therefore 
subject to forceful suppression by all countries. On the other hand, the limitation of intervention to the high seas indicates that the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction against piracy is premised upon the absence of any territorial jurisdiction enabling States 
otherwise to impose law enforcement in that geographical space. Given that not all piracy may involve severe or extreme violence,30 
it is the common international interest in establishing an enforcement regime to fill the jurisdictional vacuum on the high seas, 
rather than the extraordinarily grave nature of the crime, that forms the more persuasive rationale for international legal consensus 
to exercise universal jurisdiction in relation to it.  
The custom allowing universal jurisdiction to suppress piracy crystallised in the formal agreement of States to combat piracy under 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, article 100, which provides that: 
All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State. 
The Convention specifically allows the forceful exercise of law enforcement powers upon pirate vessels under article 105:  
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, 
or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the person and seize the property on 
board… [italics added] 
The exercise of law enforcement powers is permitted against vessels engaged in piracy, even though pirate vessels retain the 
nationality and notional protection of their Flag State. For example, if the crew of a warship or other governmental ship mutinies 
and takes control over the vessel in order to engage in piracy, the naval or governmental vessel is nevertheless regarded as a pirate 
ship and is subject to seizure by any State.31 
The articulation within the Convention on the Law of the Sea of inter-State agreement to exercise universal jurisdiction against 
piracy provides an alternative basis of authority to custom in international law to take enforcement action. When its antipiracy 
provisions were formulated during the 1970s, decolonisation was posing challenges by newly independent countries to the 
established Euro-centricity of customary international law. Crystallisation of the customary rule with the then new 1982 Convention 
                                                                    
28 Roger O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 735, 745. 
29 Xavier Phillippe, ‘The Principle of Universal Jurisdiction and Complementarity: How do the Two Principles Intermesh?’ (2006) 88 International 
Review of the Red Cross 375, 379. 
30 Actual violence is not a necessary feature in a practical or a legal terms. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 
10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 (entered into force 16 November 1994) art 101, defines piracy as consisting of “…any illegal acts of violence 
or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends…”.  
31 Ibid art 102 - 103. The Convention provides that “the retention or loss of nationality is determined by the law of the State from which such 
nationality was derived” (Article 104.). 
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ensured its continuity. The Law of the Sea Convention is currently ratified by 166 parties, most of them developing countries, 
therefore providing ongoing support for this extraordinary exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.32 
Lack of common procedure 
The exercise of universal jurisdiction to suppress piracy is conducted at the discretion of the enforcing State. There is no common 
international procedure. Article 100 of the Law of the Sea Convention simply provides: 
… The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also 
determine the action to be taken with regard to ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in 
good faith. 
For example, the United States statute criminalising piracy, provides that ‘[w]hoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy 
as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.’ 33 The 
prosecution of suspected pirates is predicated on the individual being located within the territory of the United States.  
This lack of a coordinated criminal procedure can provide challenges when pirates are apprehended in far distant waters by 
international forces. In the Gulf of Aden, where Somalia-based pirates have attacked many foreign flagged commercial vessels over 
the past decade, naval operations have been conducted against pirates by warships of over 20 different countries. These navies have 
coordinated their operations through combined taskforces (e.g. Combined Task Force 151, Combined Task Force 152, Operation 
Atalanta). However, this coordination has been principally in relation to military assets, rather than law enforcement.  
Apprehended pirates have been arrested and prosecuted by the law enforcement authorities of diverse countries, including: France, 
India, the Netherlands, and USA. Procedures, for the detention, prosecution, trial and punishment of pirates have not been 
coordinated34 and some countries may be unable or unwilling to conduct prosecutions under their own national laws. Therefore, ad 
hoc arrangements have been put in place to facilitate prosecutions by East African regional countries, such as Kenya, Somalia, 
Tanzania Mozambique, the Maldives, et cetera, each under their own laws and jurisdictions.35 
This use of national prosecution procedures on an ad hoc basis reflects the lack of a common procedure for national courts 
exercising universal jurisdiction. Neither customary international law nor the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
establish a consensus for a common platform on which to conduct detentions, arrests, prosecutions, trials or sentencing. It is 
apparent then that exercises of universal jurisdiction can produce very disparate outcomes, depending upon the legal culture of 
each State enforcing its laws.  
Humanitarian crimes 
The customary exercise of universal jurisdiction against the crime of piracy provided a precedent for the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction as a basis for law enforcement against other types of crimes. Principally, these are humanitarian crimes, such as war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.  
The 1949 Geneva Conventions oblige their High Contracting Parties to try any person, regardless of nationality, who commits a war 
crime.36 These crimes are defined as committing or ordering grave breaches of the conventions:  
wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transport or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a 
person to serve on the forces of a hostile power, willingly depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial 
prescribed in the present convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not 
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and want only.37 
In response, the United Kingdom’s Geneva Conventions Act (s1), for example, provides that: 
“any person, whatever his nationality, who, whether in or outside the United Kingdom” commits a grave breach of the 
Conventions, is guilty of an offence”.38  
This allows the UK jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions irrespective of where the crimes were committed or 
the nationality of the perpetrator. The Conventions do not expressly use the words ‘universal jurisdiction,’ yet it is clear that the UK 
is asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction over breaches of the Geneva Conventions.  
                                                                    
32 UN Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm.  
33 Piracy and Privateering Act, 18 USC § 1651 (1994).  
34 Eugene Kontorovich (2010) ‘A Guantánamo on the Sea: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists’ 98(1) Cal L. Rev. 243; (2004) The 
Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation 45(1) Harv. Int. L. Jnl 183. 
35 UN Office on Drugs and Crime Counter Piracy Programs: Support to the Trial and Related to Treatment of Piracy Suspects (Issue 11, March 
2013) http://www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica//piracy/UNODC_Brochure_Issue_11_wv.pdf 
36 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth 
Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, art 146. 
37 Ibid art 147. 
38 Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (UK) s 1. 
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Virtually all countries have ratified the four 1949 Geneva conventions, reflecting universal acceptance of their precepts, including 
their universalisation of criminal jurisdiction over war crimes. Accordingly, universal jurisdiction over war crimes has evolved, from 
a treaty commitment between the parties, to become customary international law based upon universal treaty practice. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross, in its study on customary international humanitarian law, considers that States now 
have under customary international law the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts for the prosecution of war 
crimes.39 
In addition to war crimes provisions under the Geneva conventions, other treaties seek to universalise criminal jurisdiction over 
war crimes and other crimes perceived as exceptionally grave. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide 1948, provides that: 
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to 
… provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide… 40 
and that  
persons charged with genocide … shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was 
committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction …41 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court has elaborated and expanded upon some of the war crimes identified under 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their First Additional Protocol of 1977 but also given fresh meaning to the concept of universal 
crimes against humanity. The jurisprudence of contemporary International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and for Rwanda have 
also articulated new precedents by drawing upon drawing upon these treaties and other legal sources to expand contemporary 
conceptions of war crimes and of crimes against humanity.  
Beyond war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, the Convention Against Torture requires that all parties take such 
measures ‘as may be necessary’ to establish criminal jurisdiction over torture offences in cases, where the alleged offender is present 
in its territory. The treaty is currently ratified by 153 States, representing over three quarters of United Nations members, but 
subject to a significant number of reservations by its parties.42 Although this means that its provisions cannot yet be confidently 
regarded as articulating customary international law rules of universal jurisdiction, international tribunals have judged that 
customary international law articulates torture as a universal crime when it occurs in the context of armed conflict or a crime 
against humanity.43 
Ad hoc national law enforcement 
Current practice suggests that many States will enforce universal jurisdiction for humanitarian crimes only over people already 
located within their territory.44 Reydams explains that, of the few cases prosecuted on the basis of universal jurisdiction, all 
defendants ‘without exception’ had been located within the territory of the prosecuting State, many of them having taken up 
permanent residency.45 The International Commission for the Red Cross has found that, in at least sixteen States, legislation 
predicated on universal jurisdiction requires the perpetrator to be present within the State’s territory.46  
In the case of piracy on the high seas, no State has territorial jurisdiction over the maritime space, but an enforcing vessel is 
considered as a piece of floating territory.47 In the case of humanitarian crimes most crimes would be committed where people live, 
i.e. within the territory of the State most affected. Therefore, the Fourth Geneva Convention, on the protection of civilian persons 
(article 146), provides that the a party  
… may, if it prefers, hand such persons [who have committed grave breaches] over to Another High Contracting Party 
concerned, provided that such High Contracting Party has made out a ‘prima facie’ case… 
Thus, if Another High Contracting Party can make out an apparent case that the crime was committed on its territory or by its 
citizen, then other parties may hand over that alleged offender.  
                                                                    
39 International Committee Of The Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Rule 157 Jurisdiction over War Crimes 
<http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter44_rule157>  
40 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into 
force 9 December 1951) art.5. 
41 Ibid art 6. 
42 United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Convention against Torture 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en> 
43 For example, see Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) (Mertis) [2012] ICJ Rep 144, 99.  
44 Fannie Lafontaine, ‘Universal Jurisdiction – the Realistic Utopia’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1281. 
45 Luc Reydams, ‘The Rise and Fall of Universal Jurisdiction’ in William Schabas and Nadia Bernaz (eds), Handbook of International Criminal Law 
(Routledge, 2010) 337, 348.  
46 Secretary-General, The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, UN Doc A/66/93 <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/380/74/PDF/N1138074.pdf?OpenElement>  
47 SS ‘Lotus’ (France v Turkey) (Jugdment) [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 10. 
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Similarly, the Convention against Torture provides for the State exercising universalised jurisdiction to prosecute in circumstances 
where the offender is present in its jurisdiction, if it does not extradite the offender for prosecution by another more closely 
associated country (e.g. of the offender’s nationality or where the crime occurred). Thus, the function of universal jurisdiction to 
enforce against humanitarian crimes provides a net to ensure that the accused does not escape prosecution despite misfeasance by 
States with a direct territorial or nationality connection to the offender. It offers a complementary exercise of enforcement powers, 
secondary to enforcement by States having a more direct connection to the crime.  
Limitation of universal jurisdiction to a complementary role gives States some assurance that the law enforcement powers it makes 
available concerning alleged breaches of humanitarian norms will not be readily vulnerable to misuse by unfriendly foreign powers. 
The need for this assurance arises from the centrality of humanitarian issues to political conflict and the ambiguities in definitions 
of humanitarian crimes that lend themselves naturally to political causes. Enactment of laws in some European countries to 
liberally facilitate prosecution of humanitarian crimes on the basis of universal jurisdiction in the first years of the 21st century was 
followed immediately by the manipulation of those same laws to initiate political prosecutions and abuses of criminal process.48  
Some States, however, do not require any direct connection with the criminal conduct or even custody over the accused at the time 
of trial in order to prosecute, i.e. They allow trials for crimes based on universal jurisdiction to proceed in absentia.49 Coombes 
asserts that ‘whether it is unlawful to enforce international criminal law in absentia remains a matter of the municipal law of the 
enforcing State.’50 Nevertheless, the legality of trials in absentia under international law is far from clear. President Guillaume of 
the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case gave a damning judgement on universal jurisdiction in absentia stating it was ‘unknown to 
international conventional law.’51 He made further criticisms of the practice, even stating that, except for a limited core of crimes, 
‘international law does not accept universal jurisdiction; still less does it accept universal jurisdiction in absentia.’52  
However, it is clear that perpetrators need not be present within the territory of the prosecuting State for pre-trial procedures to 
take place.53 Investigations, evidence gathering, and the issuing of arrest warrants, can all take place without the perpetrator being 
present within the prosecuting State’s territory.54 Issues of extraterritorial evidence collection, political pragmatism and municipal 
practice may still make this difficult in some States.  
For national courts, issues may also arise from their concurrent criminal jurisdictions over the same crime by the same offender. 
Conflicting assertions of jurisdiction are resolved ad hoc on the basis of comity between the States. There is no applicable rule in 
customary international law and usually no treaty formula that sets out priority between them. 
The United Nations Model Treaty on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, adopted in 1990, provides a framework that 
could assist States interested in negotiating bilateral or multilateral treaties on the transfer of proceedings in circumstances where 
they have concurrent jurisdiction. It provides that a party may request another party to take over the criminal proceedings “if the 
interests of the proper administration of justice so require”55 and that when criminal proceedings are pending in two or more states 
against the same suspected person in respect of the same offence, “the states concerned shall conduct consultations to decide which 
of them alone should continue the proceedings”.56 Thus, it provides a process for arranging transfer but is most useful only in cases 
where the State that has commenced the trial with the offender in custody does not wish to proceed or two or more states have 
agreed which one of them will proceed. The European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters is the most 
ratified treaty on this matter of low a significant number of bilateral treaties have been adopted. 
International tribunal procedure 
In contrast to national authorities, it can be argued that the problems of limitations on extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction on 
the basis of universal jurisdiction do not apply to international judicial bodies or tribunals.57 This is due to the fact that they are 
often created by treaty regimes that construct an autonomous international enforcement authority, independent of national 
territory.58  
                                                                    
48 See, for example, the Belgian law on universal jurisdiction: Stefaan Smis and Kim Van der Borght ‘Belgian Law concerning The Punishment of 
Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law: A Contested Law with Uncontested Objectives’ http://www.asil.org/insigh112.cfm. 
49 This was the case in France where thirteen Chilean officials were convicted in absentia for crimes committed under the Pinochet regime. Karinne 
Coombes, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: A Means to End Impunity or a Threat to Friendly International Relations’ (2011) 43 The George Washington 
International Law Review 419, 437. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) [2002] sep. op. Guillaume, 9. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Fannie Lafontaine, ‘Universal Jurisdiction – the Realistic Utopia’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1281, 1284. 
54Ibid 1284. 
55 Model Treaty on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, GA Res 45/118, art1. 
56 Ibid art 13. 
57 Bantekas argues that “in a very broad, non-legal, sense they [international criminal tribunals] exercise the raison d’étre of universal jurisdiction; 
i.e. that international crimes should not go unpunished and that all States have a right to prosecute.” Ilias Bantekas, International Criminal Law (Hart 
Publishing, 4th ed, 2010) 352. 
58 Ibid. 
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In regards to the Nuremburg International Military Tribunal, the US Court of Appeal in the decision of Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky 
held that “it is generally agreed that the establishment of these tribunals and their proceedings were based on universal 
jurisdiction.”59 In contrast, however, modern international criminal tribunals have been created by mechanisms of the United 
Nations Charter, or multilateral treaty regimes. Such bodies cannot be said to exercise customary universal jurisdiction as “[t]heir 
competence is derived from their constitutive instruments and is not at all restricted by the jurisdiction principles and constrains 
applicable to municipal courts.”60  
This is true of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as well as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), which were created by the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is also true of the 
International Criminal Court, which gains its jurisdiction from the Rome Statute, developed under the auspices of the UN General 
Assembly. Part Five of the Rome statute sets out investigations and prosecutions provisions that integrate common law and civil law 
legal cultures to develop a universal International procedure. While none of the international judicial bodies can be said to exercise 
‘universal jurisdiction’ of the type customarily exercised by States, they are recognised as playing an important role in the 
enforcement of international criminal law.61  
The argument that an international judicial tribunal’s enforcement jurisdiction is as limited as the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
by the individual States that themselves create it misses a fundamental point, i.e. that the international criminal tribunal has 
jurisdiction under new treaty terms agreed between States. They are products of interstate agreements to universalise criminal law 
by expressly allowing expansive enforcement jurisdiction in specified circumstances, despite the stricter limitations they otherwise 
require of themselves for exercises of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction.  
Although an international criminal tribunal derives its jurisdiction from States, the tribunal’s constitutive instruments grant it 
expanded law enforcement agency. The parties allow the tribunal to exercise a carefully defined and delimited enforcement 
jurisdiction that extends across their multiple national territories in order to prevent criminal impunity. However, the tribunal's 
prosecution powers are strictly controlled and limited within the compass of agreed crime categories, prosecutorial procedures and 
controls by the tribunal’s governing body of member states. For example, the International Criminal Court is constrained to a 
complementary jurisdiction that comes into operation only upon default in the proper exercise of its own humanitarian law 
enforcement obligations by a State that otherwise has jurisdiction. 
Concurrent jurisdiction and complementarity 
The establishment of international judicial bodies to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes creates potential for conflict 
between national and international courts each with jurisdictions over the same crime. Customary law is silent on the issue of which 
court should take precedence.62 Therefore, treaty regimes establishing an international court or tribunal have resolved this issue 
either by vesting the court with primacy or creating a relationship between the courts on the basis of complementarity. 63 
The ICTY and ICTR were granted primacy over national courts. This regime was established “because of an anticipated failure of 
national courts to address the crimes,”64 and once national courts began to regain legitimacy the ICTY sent some cases back to 
national courts for prosecution.65 The need for primacy in the ICTY and ICTR regimes was also based also the fear of biased 
proceedings where adversaries were brought before such courts.66 Whilst anticipated impunity is a justification for the primacy of 
international forums, it is at odds with principles of State sovereignty and non-intervention. This was less of an issue for the ICTY 
and ICTR as they were ad hoc tribunals arising from a single conflict.67 The ICTY Statute states: 
1. The International Tribunal and national courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991. 
2.  The International Tribunal shall have primacy over national courts. At any stage of the procedure, the International 
Tribunal may formally request national courts to defer to the competence of the International Tribunal in accordance 
with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal.68 
For the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), however, primacy over national courts was not acceptable. Instead, the 
Rome Statute set out a regime of ‘complementarity’69 that provides that only if national courts are ‘unwilling’ or ‘unable’ to 
                                                                    
59 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985) in Kenneth Randall, ‘Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law’ (1988) 66 Texas Law Review 785, 805. 
60 Ilias Bantekas, International Criminal Law (Hart Publishing, 4th ed, 2010) 352. 
61 Australian Views on the Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, UN Doc A/65/181, 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Australia.pdf>  
62 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2003) 348. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid 525. 
65 Ibid 530 
66 Ibid 349. 
67 Ibid 525. 
68 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002) art 9. 
69 Ibid art 1, 17.  
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prosecute certain crimes “may the International Criminal Court step in to remedy the deficiencies resulting from the failure of one 
or more States to fulfil their duties.”70 The Rome Statute provides that the Court’s jurisdiction is “secondary to that of national 
courts.”71 As such, the ICC would be precluded from prosecuting a crime where a national court has taken sufficient efforts to 
ensure justice.  
 
  
                                                                    
70 Mohammed Zeidy, Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law: Origin, Development and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishes, 
2008) 4. 
71 Ilias Bantekas, International Criminal Law (Hart Publishing, 4th ed, 2010) 429. 
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The categories of universalised crimes are going through a period of rapid expansion. The two decades bookending the turn of the 
21st century have seen an increasing number of global treaties adopted that seek to address exceptionally grave crimes by 
coordinating international action against them. The types of crimes currently addressed by these treaties are dominated by those 
entailing violence against the individual or undermining governments. They can be classified into three groups: political violence, 
trafficking or smuggling, and organised crime.  
It is only a matter of time until natural resources crimes emerge as a category of crime of global concern. Unsustainable practices 
leading to local and regional collapses in natural resources that provide food and essential environmental services can have severe 
ramifications in human insecurity and political instability. Where these unsustainable practices breach national or international 
standards, and amount to criminal conduct, it is inevitable that international mechanisms for natural resources criminal law 
harmonisation and cooperative enforcement will be developed. 
What is it that makes each of these existing categories of crime an international concern? For the most part, they each require that 
an international element be in place in order for the harmonised crime prescription provisions to apply. Usually, the crime may be 
required to be perpetrated by persons of one nationality but in the territory of or against the vessels, government or nationals of 
another country, as is the case for hijacking aircraft. In relation to piracy, the crime must be perpetrated beyond national territory. 
Less often, the crime need have no direct international dimension but is considered sufficiently grave or shocking for dedicated 
international coordination to support its suppression. This is the case for genocide in some circumstances, and for torture.  
If the harm is an international concern, then States may harmonise their definitions of it as a crime under their national laws. In 
effect, this universalises the crime. A factor limiting universalisation, however, is that most instruments have not achieved 
unanimous ratification and implementation such as to be regarded as evidencing customary international law. Therefore, whether 
customary international law has evolved to produce rules defining a particular crime as truly universal remains a subject for 
jurisprudential debate.  
The following sections of this report investigate the legal implications of universalising criminal law enforcement jurisdiction to 
suppress international MLR crime. The multifaceted connections between universalised criminal law enforcement and 
international MLR conservation in a multitude of maritime spaces by multinational vessels and crews suggests that the 
universalisation of MLR crime law enforcement is more legally complicated than for most other crimes of international concern. 
Although it is a logical step to connect breaches of MLR management laws and criminal law enforcement cooperation, its legal and 
practical complexity is apparent. Categories of global crimes of concern and their respective treaty instruments are examined below 
for analogues to better appreciate considerations in the formulation of universalised jurisdiction to suppress international MLR 
crime. 
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HARMONISATION OF CRIME DEFINITIONS  
Global treaties that universalise follow a common structural pattern. Each of the universalising instruments identifies the area of 
proscribed criminal activity, harmonises criminalisation, and then facilitates crime suppression cooperation activities. In 
identifying the general area of crime to be universalised, each treaty defines the area of proscribed criminal activity in general terms 
and then defines more specifically the circumstances in which the treaty applies and the specific criminal acts of concern.  
The two fundamental areas of crimes harmonised are political violence and organised crime. In relation to political violence, torture 
and certain acts of terrorism are defined and prescribed for criminalisation. The defined acts of terrorism include kidnapping 
diplomats, hijacking of aircraft, acts of violence against aircraft, airports, maritime platforms and vessels at sea, as well as 
bombings, and the financing of terrorist acts. In relation to organised crime, criminalised acts include slave trading or trafficking in 
people, migrant smuggling, trafficking in narcotics, trafficking in arms, illegal broadcasting, bribery, corruption, participating in an 
organised crime group, obstruction of justice and money laundering.  
International harm  
Violence to the individual is the principal harm caused by conducts broadly categorised here as political violence and organised 
crime that have mobilised States to negotiate and adopt treaties to combat them. Violence to the individual is apparent in relation to 
torture, terrorism and trafficking in people but violence is also indirectly caused by smuggling migrants, drugs and weapons. Yet 
not all crimes of international concern need entail violence. Crimes that threaten the capacity of the State to govern are also the 
subjects of international coordination. International efforts to combat organised crime, corruption, obstruction of justice and the 
laundering of criminal proceeds are also coordinated under crime prevention treaties.  
Depredation upon MLR undermines the ability to manage them sustainably. Therefore, MLR crimes fall squarely into the category 
of threatening the capacity of the State to govern its maritime spaces and resources. Yet is that enough to connect MLR crimes to 
international political concern? The question remains whether this particular area of crime is related closely enough to 
international political concern to warrant universalised legal action? 
Transnational Link: Political violence, Organized crime  
The following analysis seeks to discern whether crimes of international concern already universalised under United Nations treaties 
display a pattern that is shared by MLR crimes. If so, those MLR crimes could be articulated through treaties that harmonise MLR 
crime definitions and coordinate criminal law enforcement jurisdiction.  
The fact that treaties adopted through the United Nations to combat crimes of violence and subversion of government are adopted 
at all means that they do address an international concern. Yet, the individual relationships with the international concern are not 
uniform. The nature of their links to a particular international concern varies within an identifiable pattern. Usually, the link is one 
of the following formulae: 
(1) The crime occurs in whole or part in an international space, beyond any national jurisdiction;  
(2)  The crime crosses national boundaries, occurring in more than one national jurisdiction;  
(3)  The perpetrators combine more than one nationality; or  
(4)  The crime is so grave as to shock the conscience of all humanity. 
In the first three instances listed, a transnational element is present engaging more than one national jurisdiction. In contrast, in 
the latter instance, no transnational element is necessary. 
Many international conventions that relate to terrorism apply the same ‘formula’. They define a particular act as an offence, identify 
a transnational factor required to be present, oblige States that may be directly affected by the offence (commonly through the 
presence of the alleged offender) to enact legislation or establish jurisdiction to punish the offender under their criminal laws, or 
else to extradite such a person to a State that will punish the offender.  
 
For example, under the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970, the place of take-off or the 
place of the actual landing of the aircraft needs to be located outside the territory of the State of registration of that aircraft in order 
for the Convention to apply (Article 3, paragraph 3). Similarly, in relation to drug trafficking under the UN Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988, while no transnational link is specifically outlined in the 
Convention, the need for States to establish jurisdiction before they either extradite or prosecute the alleged offender, and the 
requirement that a party have jurisdiction to request extradition, implies that a transnational link is required for the Convention to 
operate.  
The UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime 2000 applies to the prevention, investigation and prosecution of 
offences established in accordance with the Convention only where the offence is transnational in nature. An offence is 
transnational in nature if; 
(a) It is committed in more than one State; 
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(b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in 
another State;  
(c) It is committed in one state but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than 
one State; or 
(d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State.  
The nature of MLR crime is that it often involves a vessel that operates beyond the boundary of the flag state, is owned in another 
country, managed in yet another, uses officers and crew of diverse nationalities, and lands its catch in the ports of yet other States. 
It is apparent that MLR crime involves harms that are predominantly transnational in nature and that fit the pattern of 
relationships with international concern and could be articulated through a treaty that harmonises the definition of MLR crime, so 
as to universalise jurisdiction over it.  
No Transnational Link Required: Torture and Corruption  
The international link giving rise to global concern set out in the fourth category above, i.e. the crime is so grave as to shock the 
conscience of all humanity, is different nature. Its shocking nature, rather than its occurrence across national boundaries or 
international spaces, is what generates international concern over it. Other than torture, there are few examples of such 
internationalised crimes of shocking nature. 
The Convention Against Torture 1984 provides the universalised jurisdiction in Article 5, as follows: 
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in 
article 4 [i.e. torture] in the following cases: 
(a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in 
that State; 
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State; 
(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it appropriate. 
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in 
cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant to 
article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article. (emphasis added) 
As provided for in paragraph 2, States parties to the Convention against Torture must prosecute the alleged torturer if that person is 
present within their territorial jurisdiction, irrespective of the nationality of the offender or the victim or of where the torturer 
occurred. That is, the crime of torture is universalised by treaty, without the requirement that the offence has a transnational link to 
the prosecuting State.  
The crime of torture would appear to be uniquely qualified to transcend the transnational link requirement due to its ability to 
shock the conscience of humanity. However, the more mundane crimes associated with corruption have been universalised also 
without the requirement for a direct transnational link. Treaty provisions requiring the criminalisation of corruption under the 1997 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and under the 2003 
United Nations Convention on Transnational Organised Crime each require a transnational link to the country exercising criminal 
law enforcement jurisdiction, but the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) does not.  
The 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption internationally harmonises the definition of corruption but does not 
require that there be a transnational corruption link across jurisdictions in order for the definition and the Convention’s consequent 
enforcement provisions to apply. That is to say, it can apply entirely within one State’s territorial jurisdiction. Chapter 3 of the 
Convention requires each State party to criminalise the offering or soliciting of bribes by national public officials (art 15); 
embezzlement by public officials (art 17); money laundering (art 23), and the obstruction of justice (art 25) even though there is no 
international connection involved. 
The fact that corruption was designated in 2003 as an internationalised crime, although it does not shock the conscience of 
humanity and there may be no transnational link involved in its set of circumstances, indicates that the boundaries on defining 
international crimes set in the 20th century are falling away. The range of crimes that might potentially be internationalised is 
growing beyond its traditional categories.  
LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION 
Offences proscribed by criminal law should be enforced. Universal harmonised prescription of a crime must be complemented by 
universal law enforcement. As observed above, other than the Convention against Torture and UNCAC, treaties that universalise 
crime definitions usually apply only if there is a transnational link to the enforcing State. Therefore, enforcement of an international 
crime usually involves transnational connections and requires international law enforcement cooperation.  
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The law enforcement cooperation activities between parties required to enforce the universalised crime varies with the 
circumstances of the crimes and terms of the treaties. Usually, they provide at least a basis for extradition, require States to provide 
assistance in connection with investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings brought in respect of the offence, and oblige 
States to cooperate to prevent the offence occurring. In the case study of law enforcement cooperation against transnational 
organised crime in Chapter 6, the three pillars of international law enforcement cooperation are discussed in depth. For present 
purposes, it is essential to note only that they comprise: information exchange, prosecution or extradition, and institutional 
capacity building. 
CONCLUSION 
States, by negotiating terms agreed through a legal instrument, can commit to adopt laws under their national jurisdiction to 
criminalise recognised MLR crimes. Their universalised prescription of MLR crime operates through their national laws, rather 
than being directly prohibited under international law. International harmonisation of the definition of MLR crime transforms it 
into a universalised, but not always universal, crime.  
Marine Living Resources crimes typically involve vessels that cross national maritime spaces and have flags, operators, owners and 
crews that are variously foreign to Coastal and Port States, which is to say that they have multiple transnational linkages. The harms 
that they do threaten the capacity of Coastal States to govern maritime spaces and resources sustainably. These international 
linkage and national threat factors suggest that illegal harms to MLR are a suitable, indeed typical, subject area for universalisation 
of criminal laws. The growth in numbers of crime suppression treaties in recent decades and trends in their subject matters indicate 
expansion in the limits on defining international crimes. There is no conceptual obstacle to negotiation of an international 
instrument to harmonise the definition of certain MLR crimes and to coordinate national criminal law enforcement jurisdictions, 
hence universalising such MLR crimes. 
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TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AT SEA 
Crime at sea is a growing international concern. The UN General Assembly annual Resolution on Oceans and the Law of the Sea 
makes reference an increasing number of times each year to the importance of combating maritime crime in its various forms.72 In 
2012, the Resolution 67/78 recognised the problem in its preamble:  
Noting with concern the continuing problem of transnational organized crime committed at sea, including illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons, and threats to maritime 
safety and security, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, smuggling and terrorist acts against shipping, offshore 
installations and other maritime interests, and noting the deplorable loss of life and adverse impact on international trade, 
energy security and the global economy resulting from such activities…73 
It went on to say in an operational paragraph that the General Assembly: 
113. Recognizes the importance of enhancing international cooperation at all levels to fight transnational organized 
criminal activities, including illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, within the scope of the United 
Nations instruments against illicit drug trafficking, as well as the smuggling of migrants, trafficking in persons and illicit 
trafficking in firearms and criminal activities at sea falling within the scope of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime….74  
                                                                    
72 Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 11 December 2012, GA Res 67/78, UN GAOR, 67th sess, Agenda Item 75(a), UN Doc 
A/RES/67/78 (11 December 2012), the latest resolution, makes reference nine times. See also Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly On 24 
December 2011, GA Res 66/231, UN GOAR, 66th sess, Agenda Item 76(a), UN Doc A/RES/66/231 (24 December 2011) and Resolution Adopted 
by the General Assembly on 7 December 2010, GA Res 65/37, UN GAOR, 65th sess, Agenda Item 74(a), UN Doc A/RES/65/37 (7 December 2010)  
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
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It is noteworthy that the annual UNGA Resolution on Oceans and the Law of the Sea makes no specific reference to MLR crime. UN 
General Assembly Resolution 67/79 on Sustainable Fisheries does make a specific reference to illegal fishing in one paragraph, 
where it cautiously states that the General Assembly:  
68. Also notes the concerns about possible connections between transnational organized crime and illegal fishing in 
certain regions of the world, and encourages States, including through the appropriate international forums and 
organizations, to study the causes and methods of and contributing factors to illegal fishing to increase knowledge and 
understanding of those possible connections, and to make the findings publicly available, and in this regard takes note of 
the study issued by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime on transnational organized crime in the fishing 
industry, bearing in mind the distinct legal regimes and remedies under international law applicable to illegal fishing and 
transnational organized crime…75 
The first such resolution was adopted in 2008,76 making the mention by the UN of organised crime in the MLR context a relatively 
recent development. Most recently, in 2013, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime produced a paper that specifically addresses 
fisheries crimes and marine pollution crimes as forms of transnational organised crime.77 
The upward limit of the territorial sea is 12 nautical miles from the coastline. Crimes at sea are often transnational, in that they 
cross the maritime boundary lines of national territory. MLR crimes are typically transnational for the same reason. In addition, 
MLR crimes may sometimes qualify as also being other forms of maritime crime. As is illustrated below, MLR crimes can often be 
organised crime. Less often, MLR crime might also overlap incidentally with another form of maritime crime, such as people 
trafficking, when foreign fishers are taken on-board under conditions of slavery.78 Additionally, other forms of transnational crime 
might be engaged in incidentally when MLR crimes are committed, for instance when the proceeds of the MLR crime are 
laundered, or when the activity is facilitated by the corruption of public officials, or the administration of justice is obstructed. 
The following study commences with a review of the tools of international law enforcement cooperation that are critical to practical 
efforts to combat MLR crime and then analyses the intersections between MLR crime and other transnational crime that are 
already prohibited under international treaties.  
LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION  
International criminal law enforcement rests upon three pillars of international cooperation: information exchange, extradition or 
prosecution, and institutional capacity building.  
Information Exchange 
The exchange of information between law enforcement agencies occurs both informally and formally. Informal exchanges may 
occur on a cross-institutional basis or at a person-to-person level to provide information on illegal activity, or for use as criminal 
intelligence or financial intelligence concerning pending and past crimes. Formal exchanges occur through a State’s central legal 
authority to provide official information that can be admitted into court as evidence. 
Intelligence on non-compliance and crime 
In order to take action against international, transnational and transboundary crime, law enforcement agencies require detailed 
information on criminal activity.79 The United Nations Secretary General has noted that “[t]he production of intelligence requires 
the collection, collation and analysis of a wide range of information on the persons and organizations suspected of being involved in 
organized criminal activity.”80 This necessitates the collection and analysis of vast amounts of material from a wide range of sources 
                                                                    
75 Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 11 December 2012, GA Res 67/79, UN GOAR, 67th sess, Agenda Item 75(b), UN Doc 
A/RES/67/79 (11 December 2012). See also Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 6 December 2011, GA Res 66/68, UN GOAR, 66th 
sess, Agenda Item 76(b), UN Doc A/RES/66/68 (6 December 2011) and Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December 2010, GA 
Res 65/38, UN GAOR, 65th sess, Agenda Item 74(b), UN Doc A/RES/65/38 (7 December 2010) and Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly 
on 4 December 2009, GA Res 64/72, UN GAOR, 64th sess, Agenda Item 76(b), UN Doc A/RES/64/72 (4 December 2009). 
76 Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 5 December 2008, GA Res 63/112, UN GAOR, 63rd sess, Agenda Item 70(b), UN Doc 
A/RES/63/112 (5 December 2008). 
77 UN Office on Drugs and Crime Combatting Transnational Organised Crime at Sea – Issue Paper (2013). 
78 UN Office on Drugs and Crime Transnational Organised Crime in the Fishing Industry - Focus on: Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants, 
Illicit Drugs Trafficking (2011). 
79UNSOC, Strengthening Existing International Cooperation in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Including Technical Cooperation in 
Developing Countries, With Special Emphasis on Combating Organized Crime E/CN.15/1992/4/Add.2 6 March 1992 [34] 
<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/145576NCJRS.pdf > 
80 UNSOC, Strengthening Existing International Cooperation in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Including Technical Cooperation in 
Developing Countries, With Special Emphasis on Combating Organized Crime E/CN.15/1992/4/Add.2 6 March 1992 [35] 
<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/145576NCJRS.pdf> 
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and has led to the creation of international law enforcement cooperation agencies such as INTERPOL whose mission statement is 
‘to securely communicate, share and access vital police information.’81 
The difficulty in gathering intelligence is indicated by analogous problems that arise under the data reporting systems required by 
many treaty regimes in order to determine compliance. As Morjin notes with respect to human rights violations, ‘[m]any reports 
that are submitted contain such limited information that it is not possible for treaty bodies to give useful recommendations without 
significant further research.’82 In fact, many states fail to report at all, largely due to a lack of resources or ability to collect and 
report data on the incidence of criminal activity.83 
Financial intelligence 
In accordance with the recommendations of the OECD Financial Action Task Force (FATF), most countries have established a 
national Financial Intelligence Unit responsible for collecting financial data relevant to criminal law enforcement. The global nature 
of money laundering requires international cooperation in order to enforce anti-money laundering law. This is demonstrated by the 
publicly documented case of Franklin Jurado, who laundered $36 million through more than ‘100 accounts, in 68 banks, in nine 
countries’ in order to make assets ‘appear to be of legitimate origin.’ 84 Intergovernmental law enforcement cooperation includes the 
exchange of financial data between states, as well as traditional criminal investigations by competent agencies, prosecutions, and 
sanctions.85  
Mutual legal assistance 
Information that is admissible in a court to provide to prove an alleged fact is called legal evidence. The UNODC defines mutual 
legal assistance, as ‘a process by which States seek and provide assistance in gathering evidence for use in criminal cases.’86 
Without the existence of mutual legal assistance arrangements between states, the ability to combat transnational, transboundary 
and universal crimes would be an impossible task.  
The principally territorial nature of states enforcement jurisdiction means that a State seeking to prosecute a crime committed 
wholly or partly outside of its territory can compel the gathering of evidence and undertaking of investigations only within its own 
jurisdiction. Where evidence exists outside of a state’s territory, law enforcement agencies must approach foreign authorities in the 
appropriate jurisdiction for voluntary assistance. As there is no entitlement to such assistance under customary international law, 
access to ‘evidence located in a foreign jurisdiction must be predicated on appropriate agreements of a general nature or ad hoc 
arrangements.’87 Arrangements for Mutual legal assistance arrangements therefore play a vital role in international criminal law, as 
the successful prosecution of transnational or international crimes is clearly contingent upon the cooperation of the states 
involved.88  
Traditionally, mutual legal assistance in international criminal matters was carried out through diplomatic channels by letters of 
rogatory.89 This process involved the issuing of a letter by a judge or other public official addressed to their counterpart in a foreign 
jurisdiction that requested particular measures be undertaken in order to secure evidence.90 While letters of rogatory are still 
undertaken today, States have opted to expedite this process under other arrangements, varying with the nature of the assistance 
sought91 and the diplomatic and political relationship between the two States. The most common arrangements are multilateral and 
bilateral treaties and enabling domestic legislation.92 
Article 1 of the UN’s Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters outlines the range of assistance that may be included 
in MLA agreements.93 These include: 
                                                                    
81 INTERPOL, Vision and Mission < http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Vision-and-mission > 
82 John Morijn, ‘Reforming United Nations Human Rights Treaty: Monitoring Reform‘ (2011) 58(3) Netherlands International Law Review 295, 303. 
83 Ibid. 
84UNGA, Special Session on the World Drug Problem <http://www.un.org/ga/20special/featur/launder.htm>  
85 UNSOC, Strengthening Existing International Cooperation in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Including Technical Cooperation in 
Developing Countries, With Special Emphasis on Combating Organized Crime E/CN.15/1992/4/Add.2 6 March 1992 [11] 
<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/145576NCJRS.pdf > 
86 UNODC, Manual on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition <http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-
crime/Publications/Mutual_Legal_Assistance_Ebook_E.pdf > 
87 Ilias Bantekas, International Criminal Law (Hart Publishing, 4th ed, 2010) 355. 
88 Phillip Heymann, ‘Concluding Remarks: Two Models of National Attitudes Toward International Cooperation in Law Enforcement’ (1990) 31 
Harvard International Law Journal 99, 99. 
89 Chat Le Nguyen, ‘Towards the Effective ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance in Combating Money Laundering’ (2012) 15(4) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 383, 387. 
90 Ilias Bantekas, International Criminal Law (Hart Publishing, 4th ed, 2010) 356. 
91 Asian Development Bank and Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Mutual Legal Assistance, Extradition and Recovery of 
Proceeds of Corruption in Asia and the Pacific, 27 <http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/37900503.pdf>  
92 Chat Le Nguyen, ‘Towards the Effective ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance in Combating Money Laundering’ (2012) 15(4) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 383, 387. 
93 United Nations Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters art 1. 
 
 Page 49 
(a) Taking evidence or statements from persons; 
(b) Assisting in the availability of detained persons or others to give evidence or assist in investigations;  
(c) Effecting service of judicial documents;  
(d) Executing searches and seizures;  
(e) Examining objects and sites;  
(f) Providing information and evidentiary items;  
(g) Providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records, including bank, financial, corporate or 
business records. 
 
Mutual legal assistance provisions are the norm in multilateral treaties dealing with international crimes.94 For example, article 18 
of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime obliges states to ‘extend the widest measure of mutual legal 
assistance in investigations’ as well as requiring states to ‘reciprocally extend to one another similar assistance’ when parties have 
reasonable grounds to suspect that a transnational crime has occurred.95  
Despite the necessary role mutual legal assistance plays within international law, the process is not without difficulty. Each State 
has its own regulations regarding the collection of evidence for use in criminal proceedings. The techniques employed by one state 
to gather evidence may result in the evidence being declared inadmissible if used in a criminal trial within another jurisdiction. 
MLA agreements generally compensate for this by requiring States to comply with the procedures indicated by the state requesting 
the legal evidence, ‘unless they are contrary to its fundamental principles of law.’96 Differences in legal process between criminal 
trials in civil and common law jurisdictions have also posed challenges for the provision of mutual legal assistance. For example, 
Australia had to extend its definition of ‘committal proceedings’ to ensure it could provide assistance to European investigating 
magistrates engaged in pre-trial processes in civil law jurisdictions that do not require a committal proceeding and are not required 
to have an accused in custody.97 It is clear that in order for mutual legal assistance to be effective, some flexibility within legal 
systems is required. 
International courts and tribunals also need State cooperation in evidence gathering. The Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia, for example, obliges states to comply with requests for assistance from the Tribunal to identify and locate 
persons, take testimony and produce evidence, inter alia.98 Similarly, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
contains an obligation for assistance that obliges states produce evidence, take testimony and execute searches when requested by 
the Court.99 As with mutual legal assistance between states, cooperation in enforcement is vital to ensure the successful prosecution 
of international crimes.  
Extradition or Prosecution 
The principle of aut dedere aut judicare100 recognizes the unique position ‘custodial States’ have in ensuring the enforcement of 
law101 and requires them either to prosecute an offender found within their territory, or to extradite the offender to a competent 
jurisdiction that will prosecute. The obligation to extradite or prosecute is therefore an important tool to ensure compliance with 
the provisions of multilateral treaties.  
For example, the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation implements 
this principle, providing that:  
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, 
without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in 
the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State.102 
This is the usual articulation of the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. Bantekas claims that the principle ‘constitutes an obligation 
owed to the entire international community’ and applies to ‘the core international crimes,’103 which would make it an equivalent to 
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universal jurisdiction. Corell however distinguishes two forms of universal jurisdiction: universal jurisdiction ‘stricto sensu’ and 
‘universal jurisdiction based on the principle aut dedere aut judicare,’104 which we have termed ‘universalised jurisdiction.’ Whilst 
these two forms have a ‘close and mutual relationship’105 they are ‘conceptually distinct rules of international law.’106 
Organisational mechanisms 
Treaty conference and secretariat 
A treaty regime’s peak decision making body (or Conference of Parties) and its Secretariat are multi-governmental organizations 
responsible together for the implementation and monitoring of treaty regimes. The Conference of Parties will usually have powers 
under its constitutive treaty to review and amend the treaty or its annexes. For example, changes to annexes listing protected 
species or conservation areas, listing restricted chemicals or vessels, or specifying MLR management standards to be enforced by 
criminal law could be regularly reviewed and revised by an MLR regime’s Conference of Parties. 
A Secretariat’s role and the extent of its authority will usually be defined by the treaty regime itself and any subsequent protocols. 
The general function of secretariats is the day-to-day administrative tasks related to the treaty regime. However, some conventions 
afford significant enforcement powers to the secretariat and their role is fundamental to the effective implementation of the treaty. 
The 1982 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources created a Commission with the authority to 
implement specific provisions of the Convention. For example, pursuant to Article IX, the Secretariat has direct responsibility over 
the facilitation of research, the compiling of data, the publishing of information, and the identification of conservation needs and 
measures.107  
Sharing forfeited criminal proceeds 
Given the strictly territorial nature of state’s enforcement jurisdiction, ‘the enforcement of a confiscation order on the territory of 
another state is clearly at variance with international law.’108 An established mechanism for sharing of forfeited criminal proceeds 
between states cooperating to combat money laundering and its predicate crime can therefore be a useful tool to promote 
cooperative efforts. The 2001 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime provides for the freezing and confiscation of 
assets. It requires parties to ‘afford one another the widest measure of mutual legal assistance,’109 and obliges ‘international 
cooperation for purposes of confiscation.’110  
The Convention also provides a mechanism by which confiscated assets can be shared with developing countries in order to ensure 
their implementation of the Convention. Article 30(2)(c) obliges States to create an account to deliver technical assistance, further 
outlining that: 
States Parties may also give special consideration, in accordance with their domestic law and the provisions of this 
Convention, to contributing to the aforementioned account a percentage of the money or of the corresponding value of 
proceeds of crime or property confiscated in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.111 
Complaints reception and integrity monitoring  
To demonstrate compliance with the provisions of a treaty, its parties are often required to submit detailed reports to a treaty 
Secretariat for distribution to the Conference of Parties. However, given the large number of treaty regimes that exist and the 
difficulties many States face in gathering data and allocating sufficient resources to generate reports, there is a significant incidence 
of non-reporting. Monitoring of treaties and the effectiveness of their implementation is significantly hampered, with figures 
demonstrating that ‘only about 30-35 per cent of reports are submitted on time.’112  
International complaint reporting mechanisms are deployed usually in the implementation of international human rights 
instruments. For example, Article 21 of the 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture provides a procedure for States to 
complain when another party ‘is not fulfilling its obligations under this Convention.’113 This procedure allows the issue to be drawn 
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to the offending State’s attention and provides them with an opportunity to respond. Should the response be inadequate, other 
States may refer the issue to arbitration.114 The complaints mechanism within the Convention against Torture works to ensure the 
provisions of the treaty are complied with and provides a process by which a state’s implementation of the treaty can be assessed.  
MLR CRIME AS TRANSNATIONAL CRIME  
Transnational crime can take many forms, including: trafficking in illicit substances (such as drugs and contraband, as well as 
hazardous wastes), trafficking in people and people smuggling, piracy, and terrorism. The practices particular to transnational 
crime syndicates reflect sophistication in organisational support activities, such as bribery, money laundering, obstruction of justice 
and participation in a criminal organisational structure. The following analysis focuses upon these organisational support activities 
as they are broad and general categories of crime applicable to a range of other illegal activities and, therefore, entail more frequent 
or a greater degree of overlap with MLR crime than do piracy, terrorism or dealing in illicit substances and people smuggling. 
UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime 
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC), adopted in 2000, addresses both the 
harmonisation of certain criminal laws of its parties and the facilitation of law enforcement co-operation between those parties. It 
applies to the prevention, investigation and prosecution of offences to be enacted by the Parties within their national jurisdictions in 
accordance with the Convention. CTOC applies to serious crime and also to four additional listed categories of crime. 
Article 3. Scope of application 
3.1. This Convention shall apply … to the prevention, investigation and prosecution of: …  
(b) Serious crime as defined in article 2 of this Convention; …  
Where the offence is transnational in nature and involves an organized criminal group. 
The CTOC extends broadly to ‘serious crime’, but only where the offence is transnational and involves an organized criminal group. 
This could cover transnational breaches of MLR conservation and management standards by organised crime syndicates. However, 
a substantial amount of MLR crime would fall beyond it, due to the three list qualifications: serious, transnational and organised 
criminal group. Of these three qualifications, to qualify as ‘serious crime’ might be the most problematic, for it involves offences 
which must carry a maximum penalty of at least 4 years imprisonment. Fisheries offences are not typically regarded as serious 
crimes attracting gaol sentences of at least four years. Serious crime is defined in the CTOC under Article 2. Use of Terms: 
 “Serious crime” shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at 
least four years or a more serious penalty… 
Similarly, Article 2 gives the intended meaning of an organised criminal group and of a transnational offence: 
“Organized criminal group” shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and 
acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with 
this convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit… 
It is arguable that fishing companies that deliberately engage in illegal fishing are organised criminal groups. Most would involve a 
group of three or more persons. The Convention does not require that the serious crime be the sole or even a principal aim of the 
organisation. If illegal fishing is a regular activity of the association, it may reasonably be regarded as a criminal group. However, 
whether a fishing company that obtains part of its revenue from MLR crime should be regarded as an organised criminal group is 
not settled. 
Article 2 also defines the meaning of transnational: 
An offence is transnational in nature if; 
(a) It is committed in more than one State 
(b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place 
in another State;  
(c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in 
more than one State; or 
(d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State.  
The reference in paragraph (a) to a transnational offence being committed in more than one State implies that it is committed 
within the State’s territory, including its territorial sea. Thus, an MLR crime is transnational if it crosses a national border into 
another State’s territorial waters. Yet, under international law, the MLR crime would not be committed of another State if it was 
committed in the exclusive economic zone or on the high seas, i.e. it would not be in more than one State and therefore not 
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transnational in nature. Similarly, under paragraph (b), the MLR crime would not be transnational unless it was committed within 
the territorial waters of another State.  
Nevertheless, an MLR crime that extends from the jurisdiction of one State into the exclusive economic zone of another or onto the 
high seas could still be committed by more than one State. For example, a marine fisheries company that fishes illegally in foreign 
territorial waters and has its registered office in one State, boats registered in another, holding companies for the boats registered 
elsewhere again and fishing crew from yet other countries could be described as an transnational organised criminal group that 
engages in criminal activities, under paragraph (c). Similarly, if the MLR crime has substantial effects in another State, it would be 
transnational within the meaning of paragraph (d). For example, fishing a straddling stock on the high seas and thereby depleting it 
within the adjacent exclusive economic zone, or fishing a highly migratory species with similar effect, if committed illegally would 
be a transnational crime. Illegality can occur by breach any of the national laws that apply to members of the group conducting the 
fishing, including even by under-declaring taxable income from the fishing operation. 
It should be noted that the CTOC also requires that parties establish corporate liability, whether criminal, civil or administrative, in 
addition to the criminal liability of the natural persons who are principals of a corporation, for the commission of offences it 
requires to be proscribed.115 Therefore, companies themselves can be regarded as participants in an organised criminal group.  
The four additional listed categories of crime that CTOC requires its Parties to criminalise, if the activities are transnational in 
nature and involve an organized criminal group, are:  
 participation in an organised criminal group (art 5);  
 laundering of the proceeds of crime (art 6); 
 corruption (art 8); or  
 obstruction of justice (art 24).  
Each of these criminal activities (i.e. participation, money laundering, corruption and obstructing justice) are offences that may 
occur incidental to but are in fact typically encountered to some degree in the commission of MLR crimes. Therefore, the 
convention has extensive applicability to MLR crime, if the offences are transnational and involve an organised criminal group. 
Pursuant to Article 15.1, each State Party is required to adopt measures to establish its jurisdiction over the offences established by 
the Convention when: 
(a) The offence is committed in the territory of that State Party; or 
(b) The offence is committed on board a vessel that is flying the flag of that State Party or an aircraft that is registered 
under the laws of that State Party at the time the offence is committed.  
In addition, under Article 15.2 a State Party may (subject to Article 4, which relates the protection of sovereignty), at its own option, 
adopt measures to establish its jurisdiction over an offence when: 
(a) The offence is committed against a national of that State Party; 
(b) The offence is committed by a national of that State Party or a state-less person who has his or her habitual residence 
in its territory; or 
(c) The offence is  
a. Established in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention [i.e. participation in an organized 
criminal group] and is committed outside its territory with a view to the commission of a serious crime within its 
territory; [or is] 
b. Established in accordance with Article 6, paragraph 1 (b)(ii) of the Convention [i.e. laundering of proceeds of 
crime] and is committed outside its territory with a view to the commission of an offence established in 
accordance with Article 6 within its territory.  
Each State Party may also adopt measures as necessary to establish jurisdiction over the offence when the alleged offender is 
present in its territory and it does not extradite him or her. If a State Party exercising its jurisdiction over an offence has been 
notified, or has otherwise learned that one or more other States Parties are conducting an investigation, prosecution or judicial 
proceeding in respect of the same conduct, the authorities of those States Parties shall, as appropriate, consult one another with a 
view to coordinating their actions. (art 15)  
Overall, Article 15 ensures a wide range of legal bases may be used to assert criminal jurisdiction over transnational organised 
crime. It recognises the broad legal bases available to States to assert their criminal jurisdiction over MLR crime, thereby 
reinforcing the international legal basis for universalising criminal jurisdiction over MLR crime. 
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In relation to enforcement of the specified crimes, the CTOC set in place a range of obligations for international cooperation in law 
enforcement. These include requirements that the parties co-operate in the confiscation and seizure of suspect criminal assets (art 
13), extradition of alleged offenders (art 16), provision of mutual legal assistance in prosecutions (art 18), and the exchange of 
information in criminal investigations and in criminal intelligence gathering (art 26-28). To enable the Parties' ongoing cooperation 
in implementation of their obligations, the CTOC establishes a Conference of Parties (art 32) and Secretariat (art33), which is 
provided by the UNODC. 
OECD Bribery Convention and UN Convention Against Corruption 
To facilitate the illegal provision of government permits to harvest, land, process or market MLR, enterprises may bribe 
government officials to fix the necessary documentation.116  
Many transnational MLR crimes would be facilitated by acts offering bribery to foreign public officials. The OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Bribery Convention)117 applies to such 
situations, which commonly arise in the international fishing industry.  
The OECD Bribery Convention addresses active bribery. Actively bribing is offering, promising or giving a bribe, regardless of 
whether it was requested (art 1). The actual bribe itself is defined as: 
Any undue pecuniary or other advantage whether directly or through intermediaries … in order that the official act or 
refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties in order to obtain or retain business or other improper 
advantage in the conduct of international business (art 1). 
The meaning of a foreign country in the context of the OECD Bribery Convention includes ‘all levels and subdivisions of 
government from national local’ (art 1.4.b). A foreign public officials then means ‘any person holding a legislative, administrative or 
judicial office of foreign country, … any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, ... and any official or agent of a 
public international organisation’ (art 1.4.a) 
 Under OECD auspices, a rigorous process of multilateral surveillance began in April 1999 to monitor compliance with the 
Convention and assess the steps taken by countries to implement it in national law. The Convention establishes an open-ended, 
peer-driven monitoring mechanism to ensure the thorough implementation of the international obligations that countries have 
taken on under the Convention. This monitoring is carried out by the OECD Working Group on Bribery which is composed of 
members of all State Parties. The country monitoring reports contain recommendations formed from rigorous examinations of each 
country. 
On 9 December 2009, the 10th anniversary of the entry into force of the OECD Bribery Convention, the Parties adopted an OECD 
Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions that set out 
additional measures to prevent, detect and investigate foreign bribery. These include making companies liable despite the use of 
agents and intermediaries; and improvements in the implementation of law enforcement cooperation, including by improving 
channels for reporting suspected foreign bribery, protecting whistleblowers and in better mutual legal assistance in investigations, 
prosecutions and the recovery of proceeds. 
Overlapping subject matter occurs across many treaties. Concerning bribery and corruption, overlaps occur between the CTOC, the 
OECD Bribery Convention and the UN Convention Against Corruption. The United Nations Convention on Corruption (‘UNCAC’) 
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 31 October 2003 and came into force on 14 December 2005.118 It 
encompasses bribery that is entirely domestic, such as: bribery of private business persons, and of persons holding influential 
political positions, such as political party officials, as well as the active bribery of foreign public officials covered by the OECD 
Convention.  
CONCLUSION  
The Convention on Transnational Organised Crime does not provide a systematic criminal law solution to the problem of global 
MLR crime. Its provisions concerning transnationalism were not formulated with maritime zones in mind. The result is that its 
application to crimes committed on the high seas or in exclusive economic zones is uncertain and haphazard. Further, there is the 
uncertainty as to how to balance a fishing company’s legitimate and illicit activities so as to characterise it as a criminal 
organisation. Finally, the CTOC definition of serious crimes premised on a four-year minimum potential gaol sentence excludes 
most MLR crimes. The four other offences to be criminalised under the CTOC, - bribery, money laundering, obstruction of justice 
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and participation in an organised criminal group - are not required to also be serious crimes and are offences that often occur in 
association with MLR crime. Yet, these offences are also required to be transnational and to be conducted by organised criminal 
groups, raising the uncertainties mentioned above. Some bribery and corruption aspects of MLR crime are in the process of being 
harmonised under other treaties but not in a substantively consistent or globally universalised fashion.  
Harmonised criminalisation of offences is a continuing phenomenon in international law. Criminalisation of some offences that 
occur in association with MLR crimes has occurred. This means that some aspects of MLR crimes are already in the process of 
being universalised. Where harmonisation occurs, the extension of international law enforcement cooperation to facilitate the 
enforcement of national criminal jurisdiction is a practical exercise in universalised enforcement. However, the aspects of MLR 
crime that are being harmonised as global crimes are incidental and piecemeal.  
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The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) provides flag States with exclusive jurisdiction over vessels 
entitled to fly their flag on the high seas.119 Flag States are obliged to implement measures to ensure that such vessels comply with 
agreed international rules and standards in regard to safety, the prevention of marine pollution, social matters, labour conditions, 
as well as a range of other requirements.120 In conjunction with this provision, article 217 requires that flag States enforce 
compliance “with applicable international rules and standards” irrespective of where a violation occurs. 121 Illegal harvesting of 
marine living resources is arguably a consequence of the regime of exclusive flag State jurisdiction and “the most significant 
enforcement gap in the legal regime for the high seas.”122  
Although LOSC provides flag States with exclusive jurisdiction over their vessels on the high seas, it does not afford them exclusive 
jurisdiction over individuals on such vessels. Pursuant to article 117 of LOSC, all States have a duty to take necessary measures to 
ensure that their nationals conserve the living resources of the high seas.123 The provisions of LOSC Part VII indicate that States are 
able to regulate the behaviour of their nationals employed upon fishing vessels on the high seas, regardless of the nationality of the 
vessel.  
The International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing (IPOA-IUU), adopted in 2001 by the UN Food and 
Agricultural Organisation (FAO), also specifically provides that States should adopt measures aimed at preventing their nationals 
from registering their vessels under a flag that is unwilling or unable to meet its international responsibilities.124 States are also 
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urged to adopt sanctions “of sufficient severity” to deter their nationals from engaging in IUU fishing,125 thereby encouraging States 
to impose criminal and civil sanctions aimed at preventing their nationals from engaging in the illegal harvesting of marine living 
resources.  
In the regional context, Article 23(5) of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean provides that:  
Each member of the Commission shall, to the greatest extent possible, take measures to ensure that its nationals, and 
fishing vessels owned or controlled by its nationals fishing in the Convention Area, comply with the provisions of this 
Convention. To this end, members of the Commission may enter into agreements with States whose flags such vessels are 
flying to facilitate such enforcement. Each member of the Commission shall, to the greatest extent possible, at the request 
of any other member, and when provided with the relevant information, investigate any alleged violation by its nationals, 
or fishing vessels owned or controlled by its nationals, of the provisions of this Convention or any conservation and 
management measure adopted by the Commission. A report on the progress of the investigation, including details of any 
action taken or proposed to be taken in relation to the alleged violation, shall be provided to the member making the 
request and to the Commission as soon as practicable and in any case within two months of such request and a report on 
the outcome of the investigation shall be provided when the investigation is completed. 
Long-arm jurisdiction is the exercise of national laws to affect behaviour within foreign jurisdictions. Legislation is enacted with 
extraterritorial application but it is enforced within the jurisdiction of the State that enacted it. Long-arm enforcement of MLR 
conservation and management standards enables a State to take enforcement action against MLR crimes committed in a foreign 
jurisdiction but as a crime against its own laws within its own jurisdiction. 
EXTRATERRITORIAL PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTION 
Do States have an agreed right recognised under international law to legislate or enforce legislation intended to affect behaviour in 
another State’s jurisdiction? Long- arm legislation would need to be based upon recognised principles of international law. 
The principle of territoriality is the primary source of jurisdiction within international criminal law as States are authorised, and 
even obliged, to criminalise certain conduct committed within their own territory. Despite the principally territorial nature of State 
jurisdiction, international customary law recognises four additional bases for a State to validly prescribe conduct as criminal.126 
These are: active nationality, passive personality, the protective principle, and universal jurisdiction. The four extraterritorial 
principles allow States to criminalise conduct outside of their territory. As explained below, universal jurisdiction is considered an 
exceptional jurisdictional principle, as it does not require a nexus between the perpetrator, the crime, and the criminalising State.  
Territoriality  
The principle of territorial jurisdiction, which is the longest and most well established basis of criminal jurisdiction, permits States 
to prescribe and enforce against crimes committed within their own territory.127 Consistent with the principles of sovereignty in a 
State’s own territory and non-intervention by foreign countries, States logically have both prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction 
over crimes committed within their own territory. The significance of the principle of territoriality in international law was 
demonstrated in the judgment of The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), which held in the Lotus case that “in all 
systems of law the principle of the territorial character of criminal law is fundamental.”128  
Active Nationality 
The principle of active nationality provides States with jurisdiction over certain criminal offences committed by their nationals 
abroad. Active nationality is a form of extraterritorial jurisdiction that ensures that nationals comply with State law, ‘whether at 
home or abroad.’129 The active nationality principle has long been established as a basis for prescriptive jurisdiction by civil law 
system countries and, more recently, the active nationality principle has been the basis for common law countries such as Australia 
to enact laws criminalising sexual offences by their residents against children while overseas.130 Further, many treaties, including 
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment,131 the Convention on the 
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Taking of Hostages,132 and the Convention on International Protected Persons authorise extraterritorial jurisdiction based on the 
active nationality principle.133  
Passive Personality 
The principle of passive personality provides States with jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad that result in harm to their 
nationals. The rationale behind this principle is to allow States to protect their nationals living abroad.134 Although the passive 
personality principle has been much criticised for its potential to authorise legal interference in the internal affairs of other 
countries,135 it has been recognised in international treaties such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons136 and the United Nations Convention Against Torture.137 The passive personality 
principle is now seen as “generally acceptable to States,” in certain circumstances.138  
Protective Principle  
The protective principle permits States to exercise jurisdiction over crimes perpetrated abroad that harm their national interests. 
According to Bantekas, it is “unequivocally accepted” that international law permits States to take measures “in order to safeguard 
their national security interests.”139 A State’s ability to combat international crime by enacting municipal law that prohibits the 
counterfeiting of its currency abroad is one such example of the utilisation of the protective principle as a basis for jurisdiction. 140 
However, it is conceivable for the protective principle to provide the basis of jurisdiction over a number of MLR-related 
measures.141  
Universal Jurisdiction 
Universal jurisdiction permits States to assert jurisdiction over crimes irrespective of where they are committed, and without regard 
to the nationality of the perpetrator or of the victim. It provides States with the jurisdictional basis where the traditional links of 
territoriality, nationality and personality do not exist. Arguably, there is an indirect relationship with the State's interests in 
maintaining the international legal order, however it is this lack of a nexus between the commission of the offence and the State 
asserting jurisdiction that has led to the principle of universal jurisdiction being described as an “exceptional international 
jurisdictional doctrine.”142 The prescriptive exercise of universal jurisdiction is restricted to only a handful of international crimes, 
comprising grave humanitarian crimes. It is generally accepted that international law authorises States to exercise jurisdiction over 
piracy, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, with continued debate over the legitimacy of universal jurisdiction over 
the crimes of torture and terrorism.143  
EXTENDED CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
Long-arm criminal jurisdiction enacts and enforces criminal laws to prohibit harmful behaviour in foreign jurisdictions. In relation 
to MLR harms, long-arm laws have been enacted to criminalise illegal harvesting of MLR, possession of illegally harvested MLR 
and laundering of illegally harvested MLR. 
Illegal Fishing in a Foreign Jurisdiction  
By 2000, some States had developed national legislation aimed at regulating their national fisherman engaged on foreign-flagged 
vessels. Several States have criminalised the illegal harvesting of marine resources by their nationals, regardless of where the 
violation occurs. This ‘long-arm’ criminal enforcement is based upon the recognised principle of active personality and the ability 
for States to regulate the behaviour of their citizens irrespective of where they are located.  
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In 1998, Norway criminalised fishing by its nationals on the high seas who fail to comply with the standards of a regional fisheries 
management organisation that has competence in the area. The Norwegian law also requires nationals engaged in fishing upon the 
high seas to obtain authorisation from Norwegian authorities before registering their vessel.144  
Similarly, pursuant to s 113A of the Fisheries Act 1996 (NZ),145 New Zealand citizens are prohibited from unlawfully taking fish 
within a foreign jurisdiction. Contravening the provision constitutes an offence and attracts a fine of up to $250,000.146 The 
legislation provides that: 
113 A: All fishing within foreign fishing jurisdiction to be authorised 
(1) No New Zealand national, and no person using a ship that is registered under the Ship Registration Act 1992 or that 
flies the New Zealand flag, may take or transport fish, aquatic life, or seaweed in the national fisheries jurisdiction 
of a foreign country unless the fish, aquatic life, or seaweed is taken or transported under, and in accordance with, 
the laws of that jurisdiction. 
(2) Every person who contravenes subsection (1) commits an offence and is liable to the penalty set ….147 
New Zealand nationals are also prohibited from taking or transporting fish, aquatic life, or seaweed, upon foreign-flagged vessels on 
the high seas, unless specifically authorised by a State that is a party to a Fish Stocks agreement.148 
In 2007, the District Court of New Zealand convicted two defendants, a New Zealand national and a permanent resident of New 
Zealand for fishing illegally in the Australian fishing zone without a permit.149 The Magistrate relied on various international 
instruments, including LOSC Article 117, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the IPOA-IUU, in coming to his decision. 
I turn to that part of s 113A which purports to control the activities of New Zealand nationals. I consider that the provisions 
of the international instruments to which I have already referred establish that the assertion of such a right of control is 
consistent with international law as either contained or reflected in such instruments. It is true that s 113A was enacted in 
1999, before New Zealand’s ratification of the Fish Stocks Agreement and adoption of the International Plan of Action.150 
The Australian Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) also sets out criminal offences for Australian nationals who illegally harvest 
fish in foreign jurisdictions. It is an offence for an Australian national to use a foreign boat for fishing in the waters of a foreign 
country, in contravention of an international fisheries management measure.151 This is a strict liability offence, meaning the only 
defence available is an honest and reasonable mistake of fact.152 All provisions of the Act apply to Australian citizens153 and apply to 
any area as if it were in the Australian Fishing Zone.154 This model of extraterritorial application of national fisheries management 
legislation to all nationals is also utililsed by the South African Marine Living Resources Act of 1998.155 
Erceg has argued that, in order for States to combat IUU fishing, measures aimed at controlling nationals should be targeted at 
individuals engaged as masters upon foreign flagged vessels, as they are limited in number and enforcement will be a ‘feasible 
task’.156 Spanish legislation specifically targets nationals who act as fishing masters and requires them to notify the Spanish General 
Secretariat for Maritime Fishing before enlisting to work on foreign-flagged vessels of RFMO non-member States.157 However Spain 
has also adopted measures similar to the Norwegian, Australian and New Zealand examples and imposes penalties upon all 
nationals who break fisheries laws while aboard foreign-flagged ships.158  
Despite not providing specific penalties for nationals contravening foreign fisheries legislation, in certain cases Japanese law 
requires its nationals to obtain permission from the government before working aboard a foreign-flagged vessel.159 This is required 
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only where the vessel is fishing for Atlantic and Southern Bluefin Tuna and is designed to prohibit Japanese nationals from 
circumventing RFMO regulations by re-flagging vessels to States who are unable or unwilling to enforce treaty obligations.  
Possession of Products Illegally Obtained in a Foreign Jurisdiction  
A national law with extraterritorial operation that might serve as a model for ‘long arm’ legislation has been pioneered in the United 
States to criminalise specified acts that are committed as breaches of foreign environmental laws. The Lacey Act was enacted in the 
United States in 1900 and is the country’s oldest national wildlife law, remaining unique in its extended global reach to enforce fish, 
wildlife, or wild plant law. The Act makes it unlawful to deal in any fish, wildlife or wild plant regulated by State, federal, Native 
American tribal or foreign laws or regulations, if that specimen was obtained in violation of one of those laws or regulations. Thus, 
the Act makes a subsequent dealing in the specimen illegal, including importing, exporting, transporting, selling or receiving, even 
if that subsequent dealing is by a different person or at a different time from the primary violation of foreign laws or regulations on 
taking, possessing transporting or selling the specimen.160 
The main provision of the Lacey Act that sets out prohibited acts in relation to possessing or handling illegally obtained fish or 
wildlife is §3372.161 
§ 3372. Prohibited acts  
Sub sec (a) makes it unlawful for any person— 
(3) to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any fish or wildlife or plant taken, possessed, 
transported, or sold in violation of any law, treaty, or regulation of the United States or in violation of any Indian tribal 
law; 
(4) to commit the same when it occurs in interstate or foreign commerce and violates any law or regulation of any State or 
any foreign law; 
(5) within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States … to posses or commit the same as in (1) in 
violation of any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any foreign law or Indian tribal law… 
The Lacey Act also requires an import declaration for plants and plant products, except for plant-based packaging materials used 
exclusively to import other products.  Importers must file a declaration upon importation that contains the scientific name of the 
plant, the value of the importation, the quantity of the plant, and the name of the country from which the plant was taken. A 
secondary provision of the Lacey Act prohibits the making or submitting of any false record of any wildlife imported, exported, 
transported, sold, purchased, or received from any foreign country. 162  
Violations of the Lacey Act provisions against unlawful dealing can be prosecuted as serious offences (felonies) or as non-serious 
offences (misdemeanours), depending upon the degree of criminal intention. For a felony, the defendant must have knowingly 
imported or exported fish or wildlife or plants in violation of an underlying law or regulation, or knowingly engaged in the sale or 
purchase of them with a market value of over USD $350, while knowing that the fish or wildlife or plants were taken, possessed, 
transported or sold in violation of an underlying law or regulation.  A misdemeanour penalty requires that the defendant failed to 
exercise “due care” and should have known the specimens were originally illegal. 
The Lacy Act’s §3373 then provides varying penalties with regard to the requisite knowledge or intent of the individual involved.163 
Where a person, in the exercise of due care, should have known that the fish or wildlife were taken in an unlawful manner, that 
person is liable for a civil penalty of up to $10,000.164 A person who knowingly imports or exports fish or wildlife in contravention 
to the Act, is liable for a fine of up to $20,000 or five years imprisonment, or both.165 Forfeiture of illegally produced fish or wildlife 
is permitted under §3374, “notwithstanding any culpability requirements.”166 Pursuant to this section, the vessels, vehicles, aircraft 
and other equipment used to contravene the Act may also be subject to forfeiture under specific circumstances.167  
The Lacey Act is a tool extensively utilized by USA authorities to prevent and deter the criminal possession and handling of 
products illegally obtained in foreign jurisdictions. It sanctions individuals and corporations who handle products illegally 
harvested outside of the boundaries of the USA, regardless of the individual’s knowledge.  
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The Lacey Act has gained international attention and other States such as Papua New Guinea, Nauru and the Solomon Islands, have 
adopted provisions similar to it within their national fisheries legislation.168 The final report of the High Seas Task Force has also 
recommended that States implement a “long-arm” approach to enforcement similar to the provisions of the US Lacey Act.169 
Laundering the Proceeds of Foreign Crimes 
Marine living resources crimes often relate to further crimes such as money laundering, corruption, document forgery, and fraud.170 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has defined ‘money laundering’ as “the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their 
illegal origin.”171 More simply, money laundering involves any activity with the purpose of concealing the illegal origin of criminal 
proceeds.172 In the context of the illegal harvesting of marine living resources, money laundering allows criminal organisations to 
enjoy the profits of their illegal harvest with impunity.  
Studies have indicated that marine living resource crimes can be perpetrated by highly organised transnational operations that 
engage in criminal activity across multiple jurisdictions.173 Illegally harvested resources are often added to legal catches and sold 
into markets through fraud, document forgery or bribery, with the profits then being laundered to conceal their illegal origins. An 
assessment of financial crime and money laundering in the Solomon Islands found that environmental crime, such as illegal logging 
and the illegal harvesting of fish and wildlife, was the third highest predicate offence for money laundering in the Pacific.174  
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC) requires State parties to criminalise the laundering 
of the proceeds of crime.175 A report from the CTOC Secretariat stated that it was important for States to adopt a “follow-the-money 
approach” to transnational environmental crime by using anti-money-laundering measures.176 INTERPOL has acknowledged the 
link between fisheries crimes and ‘other forms of serious transnational crime including corruption, money laundering, fraud, 
human and drugs trafficking’177 and has recently launched ‘Project Scale’, an initiative aimed at combatting fisheries crime.178 The 
current international attention to money laundering of the proceeds of natural resources crimes suggests that the potential of anti-
money laundering law enforcement methods to ensure that individual crime bosses and beneficiaries may be brought to justice, has 
been recognised.  
The relationship between the illegal harvesting of MLR and money laundering can be seen in the case of McNab,179 decided in 2003 
in the US Circuit Courts of Appeals. Following an investigation by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), four individuals were charged with illegally harvesting spiny lobster from the Caribbean and smuggling the product into 
the US.180 The smugglers were found guilty on 101 counts of smuggling, conspiracy, money laundering and violations of the Lacey 
Act.181  
The interaction between MLR crime and money laundering is also recognised in the recently amended anti-money laundering 
legislation of the Philippines. The Republic Act No.9160 defines ‘money laundering’ as a crime where “the proceeds of unlawful 
activity…are transacted, thereby making them appear to have originated from legitimate sources.” 182 In 2012, the Act was 
amended183 specifically to include violations of articles 86-106 of the Fisheries Code184 within the definition of ‘unlawful activity’ 
forming a predicate offence in money laundering. Such violations now include unauthorised fishing,185 poaching,186 the use of 
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unlawful fishing techniques such as explosives and electricity,187 fishing during closed season,188 the taking of rare, threatened or 
endangered species,189 and importing or exporting fish in violation of the Fisheries Code.190 Engaging in such activities now not 
only constitutes an offence against Philippines fisheries laws but, where the proceeds of such activities are laundered, individuals 
may face further charges related to money laundering offences.  
Canada offers less specific coverage of marine living resource crime as predicate offences for money laundering. The Canadian 
Criminal Code makes it an offence to deal with the proceeds of a “designated offence” committed within Canada, or any other 
foreign jurisdiction.191 The provision states: 
(1) Every one commits an offence who uses, transfers the possession of, sends or delivers to any person or place, transports, 
transmits, alters, disposes of or otherwise deals with, in any manner and by any means, any property or any proceeds of any 
property with intent to conceal or convert that property or those proceeds, knowing or believing that all or a part of that property 
or of those proceeds was obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a result of 
(a) the commission in Canada of a designated offence; or 
(b) an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would have constituted a designated offence. 
Individuals who violate provisions of Canada’s Fisheries Act 1985 192 commit “designated offences” and as such may also be 
convicted of money laundering where they had the intent of concealing or converting the proceeds of that offence.  
Money laundering under the Australian Criminal Code requires that the proceeds of a crime be derived from an ‘indictable 
offence.’193 Within the Criminal Code, an indictable offence is an offence punishable by imprisonment for a period exceeding twelve 
months.194 Most offences under the Fisheries Management Act attract fines rather than imprisonment, thus restricting the ability 
for such offences to be utilised as predicate offences to money laundering. For example, where an Australian-flagged vessel has 
engaged in unauthorised fishing on the high seas, the maximum available penalty is a fine.195 This means that MLR crimes cannot 
generally be predicate offences under the anti-money laundering legislation.  
In contrast, in the Australian state of Victoria, anti-money laundering legislation is quite simple in its construction, stating that any 
person who knowingly deals with the proceeds of crime, with the intent of concealing its origins, is liable to twenty years 
imprisonment.196 Two individuals charged with money laundering offences in relation to illegal catches of more than five tonnes of 
endangered freshwater fish were convicted of knowingly dealing with the proceeds of crime.197 They were not charged with crimes 
relating to the illegal harvesting, but rather were charged in relation to laundering offences and dealing with the profits of their 
offence.  
In New Zealand, the Crimes Act makes it illegal to engage in a money laundering transaction in respect of any property that is a 
proceed of a ‘serious offence.’198 A serious offence is defined as an offence punishable by imprisonment for a term of five years or 
more199 and the illegal harvesting of marine resources on the high seas200 carries a prison sentence of not more than five years.201 
As such, the laundering of any proceeds from the illegal harvesting of marine resources on the high seas can constitute a separate 
criminal offence.  
The High Seas Fisheries Taskforce identified the significance of money-laundering within IUU fishing, stating that criminal activity 
focuses on “inserting illegal product into the chain of supply” and involves activities such as “the vertical integration of fishing 
businesses to facilitate money-laundering, the falsification of documentation and the bribery of officials.”202 The Taskforce further 
noted that such activities have a negative effect on society and proposed measures aimed at reducing “broader illegal activity such 
as money laundering” as a means to combat IUU fishing and marine living resource crime.203  
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Nevertheless, it is clear that many jurisdictions do not adequately criminalise the laundering of the proceeds from illegal harvesting.  
Despite many States failing to adequately legislate to prevent the laundering of profits gained from marine living resource crime, 
further developments within this field can be expected.  
EXTENDED CIVIL JURISDICTION 
In their civil jurisdictions, States have the power to deal in fines and property by imposing non-criminal penalties, confiscating 
property, enforcing the payment of debts, issuing injunctions and so forth. 
Civil Penalties 
Civil penalty provisions in most instances require an element of knowledge of the illegal nature of the provenance of the natural 
resources property on the part of the party against whom an enforcement action is brought. However, legislation can impose 
penalties on a strict liability basis, without fault and for which no actual intent need be proved. The USA has been the jurisdiction 
most active to date in asserting its market power to affect behaviour in other jurisdictions by using civil sanctions. 
Lacey Act 
The Lacey Act civil forfeiture provisions are enforceable on a strict liability basis, authorising the forfeiture of products and thereby 
removing any ‘innocent third party’ defence. 204 Recent litigation under its provisions demonstrated that foreign governments may 
successfully sue for compensation against individuals or corporations who import stolen MLR into the USA. 205 In the case of U.S. v. 
Arnold Bengis et al, the Government of South Africa was awarded over USD $22 million in restitution for the illegal harvest of 
South and West Coast rock lobster.206  
The District Court found, however, that the trial magistrate erred in evaluating South Africa’s case for restitution,207 as redress for 
the illegal harvesting of the South Coast lobster was available only for the portion imported into the USA.208 The Court held that 
“our restitution statute does not permit, let alone require, restitution for conduct that does not offend our laws”209 and that 
restitution could not be awarded for illegal harvesting per se: 
[T]his Court sees no legal basis for awarding restitution to South Africa for lobster taken in violation of South African law 
that neither was shipped to the United States nor taken for the purpose of its shipment to this country.210 
Yet the Court found that “there is no serious dispute that South Africa is entitled to restitution of the value of the West Coast lobster 
that was shipped to the United States.”211 Despite the fact that the illegal harvest of South Coast lobster caused harm to South 
Africa, to be successful in obtaining restitution under the Lacey Act, the illegally harvested MLR product must be illegally imported, 
transported, sold, received, handled or possessed in the USA.  
Pirate Fishing Bill 
The recently proposed Pirate Fishing Elimination legislation212 in the United States will allow a civil penalty, in the form of a 
maritime lien, to be imposed upon a vessel where it has been involved in the commission of any of a range of prohibited acts, 
including illegal fishing and document fraud.213 Pursuant to section 9(9) of the proposed legislation, it will be unlawful for any 
person to: 
import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate or foreign commerce any fish or fish product 
taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any foreign law or treaty addressing the conservation or 
management of living marine resources, or any conservation and management measures.214 
The Pirate Fishing Elimination Bill outlines a range of additional prohibited actions, including: refusing the boarding or inspecting 
of a vessel by an authorised officer,215 committing certain acts against an authorised officer,216 resisting arrest,217 providing false 
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information,218 and committing document fraud in relation to any fish or fish product.219 The enforcement provisions provide that, 
where a vessel is used in the commission of a prohibited act under section 9, a maritime lien will be imposed as a civil penalty.220 
The maritime lien may then “be recovered in an action in rem in the district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the 
vessel.”221 In addition to imposing a lien, the vessel may then also be subject to either criminal222 or civil forfeiture223 for breaches 
of the legislation.  
The Pirate Fishing Elimination Bill has been described as an attempt by the US to fulfill its obligations under the 2009 FAO 
Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing224 and was cited 
approvingly by the USA Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.225  
Liens on Foreign Assets  
Maritime liens are a right over the property of a ship owner, traditionally claimed in respect to services rendered to a vessel, or 
injury caused from its operation. They have been defined as:  
a privileged claim upon a vessel in respect of service done to it, or injury caused by it, to be carried into effect by legal 
process. It is a right acquired by one over a thing belonging to another – a jus in re aliena.226  
While more traditional maritime claims related to wages, the carriage of goods, and other costs associated with the operation of 
vessels, legislative provisions have created specific categories of statutory claims often related to pollution, IUU fishing and other 
maritime crimes. Maritime liens continue to be useful as civil penalties to promote redress for injury caused by a vessel or its 
violation of maritime law. Governments have used liens to promote compliance and to support the enforcement of laws regulating 
conduct upon the seas227 and as a remedy to support enforcement for decades. For example, the Japanese Act on Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage provides that where a claimant has a limited claim pertaining to oil pollution, a maritime lien may be imposed 
upon the vessel involved in the accident.228  
As Tetley has outlined “[t]hese statutes confer upon governments or their agencies special rights such as detention and sale of the 
ship, often coupled with a right of priority on the sale proceeds.”229 Maritime liens therefore provide a right of priority to a claimant 
seeking compensation from the owner of a vessel.230  
Many States have also enacted legislation that permits their maritime claims a priority that outranks other existing liens. These laws 
typically allow authorities to arrest and sell a vessel used in the commission of criminal offence.231 All vessel arrests however, must 
comply with the provisions of LOSC art 73, which provides a Coastal State with the authority to arrest vessels within the exclusive 
economic zone to ensure compliance with its laws, particularly in relation to the conservation and management of marine living 
resources.232 Arrests under LOSC are also subject to the condition that a vessel and crew will be “promptly released upon the 
posting of reasonable bond or other security,”233 and that the punishment for breaking the law will not include imprisonment,234 
and that the coastal State will promptly notify the flag state upon the arrest of a vessel.235 
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Australia has taken a novel approach to the arrest of vessels to circumvent these restrictions and overcome competing proprietary 
claims. The introduction of s 106A into the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth)236 came after an unfavourable decision by the 
Federal Court of Australia, which permitted a Norwegian mortgagee to recover a vessel (the Aliza Glacial) arrested by Australian 
authorities for fisheries offences, despite a forfeiture provision within the Fisheries Management Act at the time. The Federal Court 
of Australia held that the mortgagee’s rights prevailed over the Australian Government’s proprietary interest.237 The Fisheries 
Management Act now provides that a foreign boat, its equipment, and any fish on board the vessel immediately ‘are forfeited’ upon 
the commission of specified fisheries offence.238 Thus, it provides for the automatic forfeiture of a vessel at the time in which the 
vessel committed the unlawful act. As Gullett and Schofield have outlined, “if Australia apprehends a foreign-flagged vessel on the 
high seas upon suspicion of her committing a relevant fisheries offence in Australian waters…by operation of Australian law, such a 
vessel would have become an Australian vessel and thus Australia would simply have seized its own vessel.”239 
Arrest of Ships  
The 1999 International Convention on Arrest of Ships is an international regime aimed at regulating the circumstances under 
which ships may be arrested and subsequently released.240 The 1999 Arrest Convention is the outcome of an international effort to 
strike a balance between the interests of maritime claimants and the owners of ships and cargo,241  is the successor to the 1952 
Brussels Convention on the Arrest of Sea-Going Ships,242 and was designed to be consistent with the principles of the 1952 
Convention and with the 1993 International Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages.243 The 1999 Convention took over a 
decade to reach the ten signatures required to enter into force, and at the time of writing, has 10 ratifications and 15 signatures. 244  
The 1999 Convention requires a particular link to exist between the ship facing arrest and the individual a maritime claim is made 
against;245 i.e. the exercise of a right of arrest is legitimate only where the owner246 or demise charterer247 is liable for the claim. The 
1999 Convention also maintains the possibility of arresting other ships that are owned by the same person or company against 
whom a maritime claim is brought.248 The so-called ‘sister-ship arrest’ provision allows the arrest of any other ship owned by the 
person who is liable for the maritime claim, where that person was either the owner or demise charterer of the ship when the claim 
arose.249 
The 1999 Arrest Convention contains an exhaustive list of 22 claims that allow a plaintiff to arrest a vessel in particular 
circumstances, including where they have suffered a loss,250 personal injury,251 damage to the environment,252 or unpaid wages.253 
This list was expanded from the 17 enumerated claims within the 1952 Convention,254 and it now includes also claims based on 
“damage or threat of damage caused by the ship to the environment, coastline, or related interests."255 Conceivably, MLR crimes 
could give rise to loss and damage that affects coastal economy and amenity that, if made subject to claims in court, could enable 
the arrest of ships owned by the defendant owner of charterer of the vessel accused of crimes.  
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Alien Torts - US Statute  
The Alien Tort Statute,256 originally enacted in 1789, is a United States law that provides federal courts with jurisdiction to hear 
cases filed by non-U.S. citizens for torts committed outside of United States territory in particular circumstances. Under the statute, 
U.S. federal courts are vested with original jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the 
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”257 Perhaps due to the ambiguous wording of the statute or confusion surrounding its 
intended use, the provision was rarely used for almost two centuries until the District Court decision in Filártiga v Peña-Irala258 
sparked a relative flood of litigation.259 Since Filártiga, non-U.S. citizens have sought to rely on the law to provide redress for 
human rights abuses by government authorities,260 paramilitary groups,261 and various corporations.262  
The wording of the Alien Tort Statute is broad in scope but the courts have restricted its application since the Filártiga decision.263 
Plaintiff’s face difficulty in demonstrating that a duty has been imposed on a defendant either by the ‘law of nations’ or ‘a treaty of 
the United States.’264 U.S. Courts have traditionally defined the ‘law of nations’ as establishing ‘substantive principles for 
determining whether one country has wronged another.’265 The court has previously acknowledged that the law of nations may not 
always “confine its reach to state action,”266 as individuals can be held liable for genocide, piracy, slavery or war crimes. The issue is 
further compounded by the recent decision of the Second Circuit Court that the “law of nations” does not apply to corporations.267 
No litigation aimed at holding multinational corporations liable for environmental harm has ever been successful under the Alien 
Tort Statute.268 Yet it is generally perceived that violations of the law of nations for the purposes of the Alien Tort Statue will require 
state action.269 
It must also be noted that U.S. courts have consistently upheld the validity of maritime claims under the Alien Tort Statute. In 1900, 
the Supreme Court held in The Paquete Habana that the capture of fishing vessels as prizes of war was rejected by the ‘law of 
nations.’270 Furthermore, piracy has consistently been held as part of the law of nations, while in Sarei v Rio Tinto PLC, the court 
held that provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea formed part of customary international law and 
therefore represented the law of nations. 271  
In the special context of US domestic law, it is quite possible that MLR crimes could give rise to claims by foreign nationals against 
foreign vessel owners or charterers for loss and damage that causes them damage. 
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CONCLUSION  
Long-arm exercises of national jurisdiction are well established in international law and practice. Enactment of extraterritorial laws 
is permitted if based on upon applicable principles of jurisdiction established in customary international law. Enforcement of those 
enactments is practised using diverse means criminal law enforcement and civil law strategies. The former includes the imposition 
of criminal penalties upon nationals entering the jurisdiction who have committed crimes outside under foreign MLR conservation 
management laws and residents, as well as persons within the jurisdiction who deal in or disguise the origins of MLR products 
illegally gathered outside the jurisdiction. The latter, civil penalties, tend to be used particularly in the United States and are 
enforced by means of confiscations and forfeitures of vessels, equipment and catch by governments. Civil enforcement actions 
against MLR crimes based upon debts generated by vessels associated with the crimes give rise to liens on vessels and arrests of 
ships but they are more restricted in their application by international and national laws. The increasd use of long-arm jurisdiction 
by many States will present an opportunity for achieving a universalized MLR crime, 
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SOURCE OF PORT STATE JURISDICTION  
The sovereignty of a Coastal State extends beyond its land territory to include its ports and internal waters (as well as archipelagic 
waters and territorial seas).272 As an area of full sovereign jurisdiction, a port entails both the prescriptive and enforcement aspects 
of sovereign power. The primary significance of Port State jurisdiction for marine living resources (MLR) conservation, however, is 
its enforcement aspect. That is to say, port waters are not usually abundant in MLR for which conservation laws need to be 
prescribed. Yet, most seagoing vessels need to enter port during their voyages and Port State power to set conditions of entry for 
vessels hold enormous potential for the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction. Port State jurisdiction is a firm basis upon which to 
build universalised jurisdiction to enforce laws against marine living resources crimes. 
The decision in the Attorney General v Bates 273 in the English Court of Exchequer in 1610 demonstrated that States have had 
recognised powers to nominate and to determine the conditions for which of their ports are open or closed for international trade 
for the last half millennium.274 The International Court of Justice in its 1982 judgement on the Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua versus United States of America)275 noted that the right of a State to prescribe conditions for 
access to its ports derives from the port’s legal status as internal waters, which are subject to the State’s sovereignty.  
The Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) does not directly address Port State jurisdiction but is consistent with the customary 
position, basing several provisions on the notion of Port State jurisdiction. Principal among these is that ‘In the case of ships 
proceeding to internal waters or a port facility outside internal waters, the coastal State also has the right to take the necessary steps 
to prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to internal waters or such a call is subject.’276 In relation 
to conditions concerning the enforcement of laws for the conservation of MLR specifically, the FAO has defined port State measures 
(PSMs) as ‘requirements established or interventions undertaken by Port States which a foreign vessel must comply with or is 
subject to as a condition for use of ports within the Port State.’277  
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SCOPE OF PORT STATE AUTHORITY 
The conditioning of the privilege of port entry by a foreign vessel on the basis of its prior good conduct beyond the coastal 
jurisdiction of the Port State has its critics who argue that it is an illegitimate extraterritorial projection of State power.278 Although 
prohibition of entry to a sub-standard vessel that poses a pollution or safety threat is clearly within Port State jurisdiction because 
the Port State is directly exposed to immediate risk if the vessel enters port, it can be distinguished from breaches of international 
or foreign Coastal State MLR conservation laws because the breach does not necessarily pose a risk to Port State’s own coastal MLR 
management regime. In response, it is argued that the threat to the Port State is less direct but real as its vessels, nationals or 
companies may fish, trade or consume MLR resources sourced from those waters beyond its own, particularly in relation to 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species. Therefore, it has a legal interest in prescribing laws supporting lawful 
conservation and management beyond its on waters.  
Such exercises of prescriptive jurisdiction to protect interests extraterritorially are not uncommon in international law and are 
categorised as exercises of the ‘protective principle’.279 Alternatively, the exercise of Port State jurisdiction can be said not to 
prescribe extraterritorial conduct at all because it is the good character of vessels entering into the Port State’s internal waters that 
is being regulated, not the defiance of international or foreign MLR laws in distant waters. We do not purport to resolve this 
controversy but note that both the protective principle and the good character entry requirements arguments form sufficient basis 
to support the Port State conditions. 
Consequent upon the prescription of conditions of entry, the Port State can exercise its law enforcement powers by investigating 
whether foreign vessels that have entered port are in compliance with the conditions of entry. Non-compliance may result in the 
Port State taking action under its administrative and criminal procedure, such as denial of entry, the imposition of fines, 
confiscations or prosecutions, or actions under its civil procedures, such as civil penalties and asset seizures.  
The conditions a Port State can set for entry into its designated ports may be voluntarily limited by it under treaty, such as by 
maritime trade or commercial agreements that the Port State has agreed to, but are otherwise set at its discretion. Examples of such 
agreements include the 1923 Geneva Convention and Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports and relevant 
provisions of constitutive agreements for the European Economic Community and the World Trade Organisation. Article 2 of the 
Geneva Convention and Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports, for example, provides that its parties will ‘grant 
the vessels of every other contracting state equality of treatment with its own vessels, or those of any other state whatsoever, in the 
maritime ports situated under its sovereignty or authority, as regards freedom of access to the port, the use of the port, and the full 
enjoyment of the benefits as regards navigation and commercial operations which it affords to vessels, their cargoes and 
passengers.’  
Prior notice should be given to foreign vessels intending to visit port of the Port State’s conditions of entry.280 Although not 
specifically addressed in the LOSC, this general requirement is a matter of logic and is evident in many LOSC provisions. In relation 
to pollution control, LOSC provides that ‘States which establish particular requirements for the prevention, reduction and control of  
pollution of the marine environment as a condition for the entry of foreign vessels in to their ports … shall give due publicity to such 
requirements and shall communicate them to the competent international organisation.’281 In the case of vessels entering port to 
undertake marine scientific research , LOSC provides that ‘States shall endeavour … to facilitate, subject to the provisions of the 
laws and regulations, access to their harbours and promote assistance for marine scientific research vessels ….’282 
As the Port State can set these conditions as a manifestation of its sovereignty, there is no requirement that the conditions 
themselves be limited to reflect a specific international legal norm already set in place by international agreement. The mere fact of 
entering port in breach of the condition set by the Port State unilaterally triggers its enforcement powers,283 nor does any offence 
under international law itself need to have been committed prior to the vessel entering port in order for the Port State to exercise its 
national enforcement powers.  
Moreover, the Coastal State can enforce its criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign vessel even in the territorial sea, if the vessel was 
previously in port and is passing through the territorial sea after leaving port.284 Similarly, the Coastal State can enforce its civil 
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jurisdiction against a foreign vessel passing through its territorial waters if the vessel was previously in the Coastal State’s internal 
waters or in respect of liabilities incurred by the ship itself in the course of its voyage through those waters (e.g. for ship services).285 
Accordingly, a ship's presence in port gives the Port State the right to enforce its criminal and civil jurisdiction on board that vessel 
immediately after leaves port while it is still in territorial waters. 
Port conditions of entry can be set to limit legal access for vessels that have breached MLR conservation standards. The exercise of 
port State powers to limit access to vessels that have breached marine pollution control standards is already well established 
practice. 
Pollution on the High Seas Enforced in Port 
It is well established in treaty law that, while a foreign vessel is voluntarily in port, the Port State can enforce its marine pollution 
laws implementing international standards in relation to the activities of the vessel and that occurred prior to the vessel’s entry into 
port, if the activities occurred in the Port State’s waters (whether its territorial or exclusive economic zone).286 Article 218 of the 
LOSC extends Port State enforcement jurisdiction in marine pollution by providing Port States with powers to enforce against 
breaches of international marine pollution control standards by a foreign vessel, even if the offending act occurred on the high 
seas.287 The Port State can also enforce marine pollution laws breached in the waters of another Coastal State, at the request of that 
State or another State affected by the vessel activities.288  
These Port State controls on marine pollution were agreed during the 1970s and, looked back upon 40 years later, comprise a 
cautiously circumscribed exercise of international law. To apply Article 218 on enforcement jurisdiction in marine pollution matters 
beyond the waters of the Port State, the laws to be enforced by the Port State are limited to those enacted in accordance with the 
LOSC or applicable international rules and standards for vessel-sourced pollution prevention;289 i.e. international pollution 
prevention standards to be enforced by a Port State authority on foreign vessels are provided for in international treaties.290 This 
means that when an activity of a foreign vessel damaging to the marine environment takes place on the high seas or in the waters of 
another State, but is not in breach of international standards, the Port State is not expressly permitted to take enforcement 
action.291  
Other limitations on Port State authority to combat high seas marine pollution are also set in place under the LOSC. A Port State 
authority may only take administrative measures, such as detaining a ship until corrective measures have been taken or it ordering 
a ship to proceed to the nearest shipyard for repairs.292 The Port State can impose only monetary penalties for the breach marine 
pollution control standards in its own waters. For breaches within the territorial sea itself, however, monetary penalties apply, 
except in cases of ‘a wilful and serious act of pollution in the territorial sea.’293  
Finally, under the Port State marine pollution control regime set out in the LOSC, Flag State authority can trump Port State 
authority. Article 228 provides that if the Flag State itself takes proceedings to impose penalties against a vessel flying its flag for 
marine pollution activities beyond the territorial seas of the Port State, then the Port State must suspend its proceedings.294 
Although there are preconditions for a Flag State to meet in order to displace a Port State’s authority to enforce marine pollution 
breaches beyond its territorial seas, the preconditions can be met by a responsible Flag State in good standing. Therefore, although 
the LOSC marine pollution control provisions make inroads on exclusive Flag State enforcement jurisdiction, Flag States retains 
ultimate authority over vessels flying their flags. 
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 Page 70 
The regime for Port State jurisdiction maintained under the LOSC meshes with the global standards for port state controls to 
prevent marine pollution from ships specified under the auspices of the International Maritime Organisation.295 In addition, 
regional standards have been adopted by groups of Port State Authorities under regional memoranda of understanding.296 It should 
be noted that none of the regional maritime pollution control regimes have expressly obligated the fulfilment of powers to extend 
enforcement over high seas pollution incidents under LOSC Article 218, although an IMO resolution outlines the type of evidence a 
Port Authority should look for to determine if there has been a high seas violation.297 Numerous studies have sought to statistically 
determine how effective Port State control measures have been in combating the marine pollution risk posed by substandard 
ships.298 The lack of data available for analysis, particularly from regions with limited economic resources, obscures a clear 
conclusion from being made. For example, some regions do not publish regular annual reports. Nevertheless, a 2008 report 
recognised trends in the data available for each region indicating that the number of deficiencies and detentions in the North-east 
Atlantic and Asia-Pacific regions have been decreasing since 2001 and 2003, respectively.299  
The regime that enables Port State authorities to take action against vessels engaged in pollution on their coastal waters provides a 
template for action by Port States against vessels engaged in MLR crime beyond their coastal waters. A comparison of the Port 
State-based regimes to suppress pollution with those for IUU fishing provides ideas to enable better efforts to use Port State 
authority to combat MLR crime. The outcomes of the comparison will be discussed below, following examination of PSMs to 
prevent MLR crime.  
MARINE LIVING RESOURCES CONSERVATION ENFORCED IN PORT 
There is no explicit provision in LOSC for Port State powers to enforce international standards in relation to MLR crime or IUU 
fishing. Port States have not been required to play a very active role but merely required to coordinate and cooperate with Flag 
States.300 Yet, they provide a firm platform for the universalisation of law enforcement jurisdiction to combat MLR crime.  
As the LOSC maintains the well-established Port States rights under customary international law to set conditions for entry into 
port, a Port State can impose conditions on foreign fishing vessels at the sovereign discretion of the Port State. There is no 
limitation on its discretion to confine those conditions to the standards set for fishing or protection of MLR by global or regional 
MLR and fisheries management agreements. 
Article 23 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (FSA) explicitly provides that PSMs can be taken as a matter of right and of duty but 
also specifies the qualification that the PSMs must be in accordance with international law and promote international fisheries 
management standards.301 However, PSMs are not confined to instances of illegality under international legal standards, as 
discussed above. Although the Port State might choose to apply PSMs to promote the effectiveness of international standards to 
combat MLR crime or IUU fishing, it is exercising its sovereign authority over conditions of entry into its internal waters.302 The 
PSM-IUU Agreement itself provides that it does not affect the powers of the Port States to exercise sovereignty over their ports, 
including the right to adopt more stringent Port State measures than those provided for in it.303  
The FAO database on PSMs to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing (Port-Lex)304 indicates that a multitude of States have 
adopted such PSMs. The EU Commission has reported that it has investigated more than 200 cases involving vessels from 27 
countries since 2010 and that sanctions were imposed against vessels of Flag States such as Comoros, Lithuania, Republic of Korea 
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and Spain, and further sanctions imposed by coastal States such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau.305 The validity of a 
PSM imposed by New Zealand to enforce a conservation measure of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (CCAMLR) was challenged in the case of the Paloma V, a Namibian flagged vessel listed for IUU fishing by 
CCAMLR and detained and investigated in New Zealand.306 The court held that the New Zealand Minister for Fisheries acted 
lawfully in searching the vessel and seizing its computer equipment while it was in port, as the vessel was not a ‘part of Namibia’ 
and was subject to New Zealand's sovereign jurisdiction while in a New Zealand port and the Minister was acting in accordance with 
New Zealand law. 
It must be noted that Port States have both civil and criminal law enforcement jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the terms of 
access to the Port when a foreign vessel is voluntarily in port. Breaches of conditions of entry could be formulated as civil liabilities 
against a vessel, if enacted as such in national legislation.307 In relation to criminal law enforcement, some doubt might be raised as 
to whether gaol or non-monetary penalties can be applied. Two observations made here demonstrate that they can.  
First, although the LOSC limits the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in relation to marine pollution acts that occur beyond the 
territorial sea to imposition of monetary penalties against a foreign vessel in port,308 nevertheless for ‘wilful and a serious acts of 
pollution’ in the territorial sea, non-monetary penalties can still be imposed.309 IUU fishing can be equated with ‘wilful and serious 
acts,’ even beyond the territorial sea, i.e. in the exclusive economic zone. The PSM IUU agreement itself opens the possibility for 
prosecution of foreign IUU vessels where it provides that a party may allow a foreign vessel entry to its ports ‘exclusively for the 
purpose of inspecting it and taking other appropriate actions in conformity with international law which are at least as effective as 
denial of port entry in preventing deterring and eliminating IUU fishing.’310 Such measures would include criminal prosecutions 
and imprisonment.311 
Second, the LOSC limitation on marine pollution prosecutions for acts beyond the territorial sea need not apply to other exercises of 
Port State jurisdiction. The LOSC marine pollution control enforcement limitation reflects only the terms agreed between the 
negotiating parties for the marine pollution sector 40 years ago. Criminal prosecution for non-monetary penalties is not disallowed 
and therefore remains available for breaches of other port access conditions, such as noncompliance with immigration, customs or 
fiscal preconditions, or failures to discharge outstanding debt. Port State powers to prosecute for offences against the conditions of 
port entry are similarly extensive.  
Even if Port State prosecution powers were confined, for purposes of hypothetical argument, to parallel the powers recognised in a 
Port State to prosecute for marine pollution in another Coastal State’s waters only at the request of that Coastal State, or to 
prosecute on its own initiative for marine pollution of the high seas, the Port State’s enforcement powers of standards set by 
international agreements still attain global reach. 
There are, however, limits to the legitimate exercise of PSMs. First, Port States should give advance notice of the application to 
foreign vessels in port of national measures that prevent IUU fishing, setting these measures in place as preconditions to its 
permitting foreign vessels access to its fishing ports, as noted above. Second, to preserve the customary legal right to refuge from a 
storm or ‘force majeure’, the application of PSMs to foreign vessels should be limited to those vessels voluntarily in port.312 
(Nevertheless, even though in port involuntarily, IUU fishing vessels may be subject to confiscation of catch and equipment under 
EU law.)313 Third, the Coastal State’s principal interest in enforcing against MLR crimes in its waters translates into its primary 
right to do so, while a Port State’s right to prosecute is subordinate to that of the Coastal State. This approach, circumscribing Port 
State prosecutions for marine pollution by foreign vessels that occur in the waters of another Coastal State to those actually 
requested by that Coastal State, could rationally be made to apply to Port State prosecutions for MLR crimes by foreign vessels that 
occur in the waters of another Coastal State.  
The PSM-IUU Agreement  
On 22 November 2009, the Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing (the PSM-IUU Agreement) was approved by the 91 Members of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation 
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(FAO).314 Upon its final text being agreed upon by, the FAO described the PSM-IUU Agreement as the first ever global treaty to be 
focussed specifically on the problem of IUU fishing.315 It will enter into force 30 days after a total of 25 FAO members have accepted 
it.316 Within the year-long period that it was open for signature, the Agreement was signed by 22 States and the EU. Yet, to date, it 
has been ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to 317 by only 5 FAO members: the EU, Myanmar, Norway, Sri Lanka and Chile.318 
The lack of individual EU Member States ratifying raises the number of non-EU ratifying States required prior to its entry into 
force.  
The PSM-IUU Agreement only prescribes minimum standards and is based on the customary powers of a Port State to control the 
terms of access to its port but harmonises their use of those powers to implement PSMs against foreign fishing vessels in an attempt 
to deter IUU fishing.319 The PSMs to be implemented by Port States under the PSM-IUU Agreement include the requirements to: 
• Designate ports for the landing of vessels (art 7.1);  
• Publicise the port to which vessels may request entry (art 7.1); 
• Provide minimum standard fishing vessel information prior to it being granted entry to port (art 8); 
• Deny a fishing vessel access to port if there is sufficient information to prove that the vessel has engaged in IUU fishing 
(art 9.4), unless the vessel is allowed entry exclusively for the purpose of other punitive action which is at least as 
effective as denial of entry (art 9.5); 
• Prohibit the landing and transhipping of IUU fish catch (art 11.1); 
• Prohibit port services to vessels that have engaged in fishing activity in contravention of fishing regulations (art 11); 
• Inspect fishing vessels, particularly where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting involvement in IUU fishing 
activity (art 12);  
• Notify the Flag State (art 18.1); and 
• Carry out enforcement measures (art 18.3). 
In relation to enforcement measures, the Article 18.3 of the PSM-IUU Agreement explicitly provides that the treaty does ‘not 
prevent a party from taking measures that are in conformity with international law in addition to those specified’. These measures 
could conceivably include vessel detention and the seizure of catch and/or gear.320 Moreover, beyond the provisions of the PSM-
IUU Agreement, civil penalties and criminal prosecutions of vessels breaching the conditions of entry are within the power of the 
Port State. 
If the PSM-IUU Agreement does not enter into force, then the primary international legal instrument governing PSM-IUU 
measures is the non-binding scheme of recommendations set out in the Model Scheme on Port State Measures to Combat IUU 
Fishing, adopted by the FAO Committee on Fisheries in 2005. In contrast with Article 18.3 of the PSM-IUU agreement, the Model 
Scheme provides that the Port State may take other actions against IUU fishing vessels with the consent of, or upon the request of, 
the Flag State.321 If interpreted as a comprehensive statement of the enforcement options available to the Port State, the Model 
Scheme would purport to limit the range of enforcement measures available. However, the Model Scheme is not a legally binding 
document and it also explicitly provides that nothing in it affects the exercise by States of their sovereignty over ports in their 
territory in accordance with international law.322 
Comparison of IMO PSM and FAO PSC Regimes 
There are many areas of convergence between the current global Port State regimes to combat IUU fishing and pollution, as well as 
some divergences that tend to occur where the pollution prevention regime has greater prescriptive specificity, such as quantified 
standards, in contrast to the generalised qualitative approaches of the IUU fishing regimes. This might be explained by the longer 
history of and developmental period for the PSC regime to prevent pollution under the auspices of the International Maritime 
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Organisation. The following points of divergence are those where pollution control standards may have advanced beyond those to 
prevent IUU fishing.  
1. Advance Notice: Fishing ports are to be provided with notice of a foreign fishing vessels intended access, together with 
requisite information,323 sufficiently in advance so as to allow adequate time for the port state to examine the 
information.324 Shipping ports are to be provided with required information at least 24 hours before intended arrival 
or, in the case of ships eligible for an expanded inspection, at least 72 hours in advance.325 
2. Inspection Rates: Minimum inspection sampling rates are higher for ships than for fishing vessels. Under the PSM-
IUU Agreement, the inspection rate is required merely to be ‘sufficient.’326 In contrast, for ships, they range from 10% 
to 50% and, in the Mediterranean and Asia-Pacific regions, Port State authorities are shifting from a percentage rate to 
a ship risk profile basis, (i.e. based upon whether a ship is listed on a black, white or grey list and the number of 
deficiencies or detentions recorded within the past 36 months).327 
3. Initiating Inspection: There is no direct parallel for IUU fishing vessels of the process of initiating a ship inspection on 
the basis of information provided by another Port Authority or by third party, in addition to the initiative of the Port 
Authority itself.328 
4. Detailed Inspection: The protocol for shifting from general to a detailed vessel inspection is more explicit for ships than 
for fishing vessels. Ships are to be given a detailed inspection if there are ‘clear grounds’ as indicated by detailed 
prescribed criteria329 for believing that they do not substantially meet the Port State requirements.330  
5. Remedial Report: A Flag State is to provide a detailed report in the required format on action taken to remedy the 
deficiencies of a ship on its register.331 The Flag State of a fishing vessel is required to provide a report but no detail is 
specified.332 
6. Restore Good Standing: Black, grey and white listing of vessels has been utilised for vessel pollution risk assessment in 
some regions (North-east Atlantic and Asia-Pacific, although not provided for in the IMO resolution that sets standards 
for Port State controls). A ship’s standing is restored three months following the rectification of its deficiencies, as 
determined by a Port State Authority, so that it will not be denied future entry into regional ports.333 There is no 
provision for the restoration of good standing of a fishing vessel. 
GLOBAL VESSEL BLACKLIST AND PORT STATE MEASURES 
A blacklist is a list of people or organisations regarded as suspicious, untrustworthy or unacceptable and, therefore, marked for 
exclusion or for withdrawal of privileges.334 Increasingly, vessel blacklists are being used, particularly in relation to IUU fishing, to 
identify vessels that will attract the exercise of port State measures.  
The use of blacklists to identify vessels breaching legal standards for MLR conservation has its origins in the practice of regional 
fisheries management organisations and is well established and expanding practice.  
The first regional blacklist was adopted in the early 1980s by the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency in the form of a “Good 
Standing” list of fishing vessels authorised to fish in the exclusive economic zones of its member States.335 The concept was 
subsequently transferred to most other regions, with many further RFMOs adopting blacklists around 2006, largely in the form of 
IUU Vessel lists. The original singular privilege that blacklisted vessels were excluded from was the opportunity to apply for a 
fishing licence that might be granted by a coastal State to foreign vessels to fish in its waters. However, by 2011, blacklisted vessels 
were excluded also from access to port facilities; or if granted access to port, their catch and gear could be confiscated, they could 
not change crew or be provisioned with fuel or other services, or land or tranship fish or have their catch certificates and 
documentation validated.336  
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To date, fishing vessel blacklists have been adopted by the members of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, Inter-American 
Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (WCPFC); North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC); Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (CCAMLR); International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT); North Atlantic Fisheries 
Organisation (NAFO) and the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT). Several of these RFMOS have 
linked vessels on their blacklists with PSMs sanctioning those blacklisted vessels by withdrawal of their port access or port 
services.337 
Any Port State can institute its own blacklist of vessels engaged in MLR crimes. Individual national Port State action can be 
significant if the country is a major fish processing or fish consuming destination, as are the EU, Japan and United States. For 
example, the European Union has created a blacklist under its Regulation on IUU Fishing.338 The EU blacklist includes IUU vessels 
listed by RFMOs on their respective IUU lists.339 It will also establish the EU's own blacklist,340 compiled from data concerning: 
compliance; catch data; trade information; vessel registers; RFMO catch documents and statistical programmes; reports on 
sightings of presumed IUU vessels; information obtained in ports for fishing grounds; and other relevant information provided by 
EU Member States.341  
The EU approach in creating its own blacklist is worthy of special mention because it is unique in its provision for due process in the 
nomination of vessels to the blacklist. The administration of natural justice in the listing process would have been a politically 
weighty consideration due to the likelihood of its listing vessels that are actually owned or operated by nationals of the EU Member 
States. The process requires that vessel owners and/or operators will be notified in advance of the proposed listing, together with 
reasons and evidence for it, and given an opportunity to respond and make an opposing case.342 However, as yet, the EU has not 
utilised this process to place any vessels on its own blacklist but has merely compiled those generated by RFMOs.343 
The EU approach would appear to shield owners and/or operators of suspected IUU vessels, rather than targeting them. Regulation 
1005/2008 defines a ‘Community fishing vessel’ as ‘a fishing vessel flying the flag of a Member State and registered in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
• IUU vessels flying the flag of a third country shall not be authorised to fish in Community waters and shall be prohibited to be chartered;  
• IUU vessels flying the flag of a third country shall not be authorised to enter into an EU port, except in case of force majeure or distress;  
• IUU fishing vessel may be authorised to enter port on the condition that the catch on board and fishing gear prohibited pursuant to conservation 
and management measures adopted by RFMOs are confiscated, and this confiscation is mandatory even if the vessel was authorised to enter for 
reason of force majeure or distress; 
• IUU fishing vessels flying the flag of a third country shall not be authorised to change the crew, except as necessary in case of force majeure;  
• IUU fishing vessels flying the flag of a third country shall not be supplied in ports with provisions, fuel or other services, except in case of force 
majeure;  
• IUU fishing vessels with no fish and crew on board shall be authorised to enter a port for its scrapping, but without prejudice to any prosecution 
and sanctions imposed against that vessel and any legal or natural person concerned; 
• Fishing vessels flying the flag of an EU Member State shall not in any way assist, engage in fish processing operations or participate in any 
transshipment or joint fishing operations with fishing vessels on the IUU vessel list;  
• Importation of fishery products caught by such vessels shall be prohibited, and accordingly catch certificates accompanying such products shall 
not be accepted or validated;  
• Exportation and re-exportation of fishery products from IUU vessels for processing shall be prohibited. 
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Community,’344 thereby not including vessels that are owned or operated by persons or entities in an EU Member State, although 
flagged elsewhere. For example, the IUU vessel Paloma V, mentioned above, was flagged in Namibia but principally Spanish 
owned, through a joint venture of companies registered in Uruguay and Namibia.345 Although the EU vessel blacklist is to include 
information on the vessel owner, beneficial owner and operator (and previous owners and operators, where relevant),346 it does not 
require that vessels be included on the list because of the owner’s and/or operator’s past IUU fishing activities. In contrast, the 
IAATC and WCPFC IUU blacklists are extended on the premise that any vessel under the control of an owner of a vessel already on 
the list is to be added to the list, effectively listing all vessels under the control of a non-compliant owner.347 Although IATTC and 
WCPFC have not yet implemented these provisions, an approach to blacklisting that pierces through the corporate veil and the flag 
of convenience is a progressive development in the global fight against IUU fishing.  
A major challenge in the maintenance of a blacklist is that of accurately identifying vessels over time. Vessel owners and operators 
can readily hide the history and disguise the past identities of their vessels by changing their name, flag, registration, colour, master 
and crew or holding company. There is commercial value for flag states, port authorities and ship chandleries in providing these 
services promptly and without publicity. Consequently, it can be difficult to track the identity of a vessel with a history in MLR 
offences.  
A proposed regulatory response to render the disguised identities of fishing vessels transparent is to create a global registry of 
vessels. The FAO is seeking to establish a Global Record of Fishing Vessels, Refrigerated Transport Vessels and Supply Vessels (the 
‘Global Record’) based on a unique universal identifying number allocated to every fishing vessel in the world. Each vessel 
numbered on the Global Record would be associated with a database providing information about its history, ownership and 
management, permits and authorisations, ports of visit, catch record, inspections, history of infractions, etc. The IMO introduced a 
ship identification number scheme in 1987 which became mandatory in 1996 for all merchant ships.348 The FAO approved the 
Global Record project in 2009 and, given estimates that there are about 4.36 million fishing vessels in the world (73% in Asia), it is 
as yet in the early stages of the project, i.e. promoting political support and soliciting funding for its implementation.349 
Less comprehensive or reliable, but quicker, simpler and cheaper, would be a formal process to link up IUU databases of RFMOs. 
This could create a global patchwork list of IUU blacklisted vessels across the world. Interregional linkages between databases of 
non-compliant vessels for the purposes of pollution and safety control are already used, as the information concerning substandard 
vessels exchanged through regional secretariats (established under regional Memoranda of Understanding on Port State Controls 
over a vessel safety and pollution) is made available to other regional secretariats from their respective databases. Regional 
blacklists could easily be compiled into a global one. 
The PSM-IUU Agreement does not require the establishment of a global blacklist but, instead, mandates the foundations be built 
for blacklisting. It encourages its parties to establish information sharing, preferably coordinated by FAO,350 using an electronic 
information sharing mechanism,351 to transmit the results of each inspection to the Flag State, RFMOs, the FAO and other relevant 
international organisations.352 Once established, electronic information sharing mechanisms under the PSM-IUU Agreement could 
be used for sharing information through the FAO on vessels not in good standing. 
Instituting a global blacklist of vessels engaged in MLR – i.e. beyond those related to IUU fishing – would be more difficult than 
formulating a global blacklist simply for IUU fishing. This is because there is no counterpart framework of treaties for MLR crimes 
that provide an infrastructure for the creation of vessel blacklists and no extant regional blacklists of MLR harming vessels. The 
relevant wildlife and biodiversity conservation treaties are not specific to vessels, ports or MLR, nor do they provide an 
infrastructure for vessel blacklists. Substantial treaty innovation would be needed to craft the necessary legal framework specific to 
a global vessel blacklist of vessels engaged in wildlife and biodiversity crimes, to build up a global framework for Port State 
measures against vessels connected with these MLR crimes, and to interconnect them.  
It would seem more efficient, instead, to craft extensions concerning MLR crimes onto a global IUU fishing vessel blacklist. The 
linkages between IUU fishing operations and fishing vessel activities that harm wildlife and biodiversity are extensive. They include 
not only targeted IUU fishing operations, but also by-catch, ghost fishing and habitat destruction by fishing vessels. Therefore, it is 
                                                                    
344 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing [2008] OJ L 286/1, art 2(6). 
345 Ibid art 37 provides that: Member States shall refuse the granting of their flag to IUU fishing vessels; IUU vessels flying the flag of a Member 
State shall only be authorised access to their home ports; Flag Member States shall not request fishing authorisations in respect of IUU fishing 
vessels; and current fishing authorisations issued by Flag Member States in respect of IUU fishing vessels shall be withdrawn. 
346 Ibid art 29(1): The Community IUU vessel list shall contain the following details for each fishing vessel: (a) name and previous names, if any; (b) 
flag and previous flags, if any; (c) owner and where relevant previous owners, including beneficial owners, if any; (d) operator and where relevant 
previous operators, if any; (e) call sign and previous call signs, if any; (f) Lloyds/IMO number, where available; (g) photographs, where available; (h) 
date of first inclusion on it; (i) summary of activities which justify inclusion of the vessel on it…’.  
347 IATTC Resolution C-11-09; WCPFC Conservation and Management Measure 2010-06, para. 3J and Annex A 
348 IMO Res. A.600(15). 
349 FAO, Global Record of Fishing Vessels Refrigerated Transport Vessels and Supply Vessels <http://www.fao.org/fishery/global-record/en> 
350 PSM IUU Agreement, art 16. 
351 PSM IUU Agreement, Annex D. 
352 PSM IUU Agreement, art 15. 
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feasible to extend a global IUU fishing vessel list to include vessels that engage in MLR crimes, even though not the product of IUU 
fishing.  
Additional other harms to wildlife and biodiversity emanating from vessel activities include habitat destruction from waste disposal, 
cleaning, pollution, lost cargoes, anchoring, cavitation, soundings, marine pest introduction and leaching of toxic hull coatings. 
These harms are largely addressed through the regional regimes of Port State controls to combat marine pollution and maritime 
hazards that regulate merchant vessels. These vessels do not generally use fishing ports and, as they are separately regulated, need 
not be included in a global blacklist sanctioning vessels for MLR crimes. 
GLOBAL NON-COOPERATING COUNTRY LIST 
A non-cooperating country is one that fails to discharge its duties under international law to prevent MLR crimes fishing under its 
jurisdiction. Most often, its jurisdiction will arise in its role as Flag State in respect of its duties to regulate vessels under its flag to 
prevent MLR crimes. However, international duties to exercise jurisdiction to prevent MLR crime arise also in a country’s roles as a 
Port State, or as a Coastal or Market State, and its consequent duties to exercise its jurisdiction over persons, vessels, and corporate 
entities.  
The PSM-IUU Agreement maintains the responsibility of Flag States over their vessel’s actions by placing duties on Flag States to 
follow up PSMs with enforcement actions in certain circumstances.353 The Flag State also has supplemental roles that facilitate 
PSMs, include by requesting a Port State to inspect a vessel flying its flag, and by ensuring that its vessels cooperate with Port State 
authorities undertaking inspections.354 If the Flag State fails to meet its responsibilities, placing it on a global list of non-
cooperating countries could diminish its opportunities to flag vessels and to engage in MLR trade and other related activities, as 
well as diminishing its status as responsible member of the international community. 
Typically, measures against non-cooperating countries take the form of trade sanctions, such as a ban on importations, investments 
or joint contracts. A global non-cooperating country list could identify countries to be subjected to Port State measures. This would 
affect primarily Flag States and the vessels flying their flags, which would be excluded from the privileges of port access and 
services.  
The exclusion of listed non-cooperating countries from port might be considered as contrary to the principle that Port or Coastal 
State measures should not discriminate against vessels of a particular State or group of States. This important principle is widely 
applied in the international law of the sea. The LOSC mandates non-discrimination two dozen times, particularly in relation to 
access to coastal waters and ports.355 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement requires that port control measures be implemented in a 
manner that does ‘not discriminate in form or in fact against the vessels of any State’ when taking measures to promote the 
effectiveness of subregional, regional and global conservation and management measures.356 Similarly, the PSM-IUU Agreement 
provides that it ‘shall be applied in a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory manner, consistent with international law’357 and the 
IPOA-IUU also requires fair, transparent and non-discriminatory measures.358 
However, fair and transparent application of measures that target a particular country are widely accepted in international law. The 
point of distinction is that ‘discrimination’ means ‘arbitrary discrimination.’ Arbitrary discrimination involves withholding 
privileges available to other countries participating in a regime for reasons that are unrelated to the agreed objectives 
for which the regime was instituted.359 
                                                                    
353 Under the PSM-IUU Agreement, art 20, if a Flag State is informed that a vessel flying its flag has been denied access to a port on the grounds 
that the vessel has been involved in IUU fishing activity, or if it is informed that an inspection has been done on a vessel flying its flag that has 
revealed that there are sufficient grounds for believing that the vessel has been involved in IUU fishing, the Flag State is to investigate the matter 
fully and take enforcement action without delay.  
354 PSM-IUU Agreeement art 20. 
355 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 (entered into force 16 November 
1994) art 24. 
356 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to 
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Higly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature 4 December 1995, 24 ILM 1542 
(entered into force 11 December 2001) art 23(3). 
357 PSM-IUU art. 3.4. 
358 IPOA-IUU para. 52. 
359 Non-arbitrary discrimination targeting a country that demonstrates a consistent pattern of wilful non-compliance with the legal standards 
applicable within the regime under which it will be blacklisted, through a process that is fair and transparent, is not arbitrary discrimination. It is only 
arbitrary discrimination that is unlawful. 
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CONCLUSION  
The powers of a Port State under customary international law enable Port States to set conditions for entry into port (subject to 
reasonable advance notice and international agreements) open a new frontier in the struggle to combat MLR crime and IUU 
fishing. Relying on the protective principle in international law, which allows the Port State to prescribe conditions of entry into 
port, even conditions that seek to protect marine living resources beyond its territorial sea and exclusive economic zone, the Port 
State can exercise of enforcement jurisdiction against foreign vessels voluntarily entering its ports. 
A significant opportunity to universalise that exercise of enforcement jurisdiction is pending in the form of a global blacklist that 
would deny the use of port facilities for any blacklisted vessel. To be placed upon the blacklist, a vessel should be in breach of, or 
strongly suspected of being in non-compliance with specified conservation and management norms. A global MLR blacklist could 
leverage off regional lists already established by RFMOs. To facilitate the identification of MLR crimes that are distinct from IUU 
crimes, the global blacklist might comprise schedules specific to particular categories of offences. A systematic process of 
consultative inter-regional workshops might facilitate coordination to compile the blacklist. 
A global MLR blacklist should pierce the corporate veil and the disguise of flags of convenience. Therefore, the blacklist should 
include in its scope those vessels under common management with vessels conducting illegal activities, those actively supporting a 
breach or non-compliance, as well as those directly engaged in such activities. A common management relationship with another 
vessel directly engaged in breach or non-compliance would encompass common ownership, common operating company, common 
master or crew with vessels directly engaged or actively supporting IUU fishing. Direct engagements in illegal or non-compliant 
activities might be established by evidence proven on the balance of probabilities of past vessel breaches. Active support could be 
established by evidence of past support, such as transhipment, bunkering or servicing, with any vessel suspected of direct breaches.  
The formal establishment of a global blacklist of IUU vessels could be facilitated in a number of ways:  
1. A common resolution by each RFMO to compile information and generate a global list; 
2. A resolution under the PSM-IUU Agreement upon its coming into force, or by its negotiating parties prior to its coming 
into force; 
3. A resolution under the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement; or  
4. An resolution under the FAO Committee on Fisheries and Assembly.  
An advantage of approaches 2, 3 and 4 is that they could serve to foster the compilation of blacklists that cover irresponsible 
unregulated or unreported fishing in gap areas between RFMO regions, i.e. where no relevant RFMO has yet been established or 
created a blacklist. However, as the FAO Global Record is a long way from realisation and yet to be proven, the compilation of 
information from existing RFMO blacklists seems a sure place to start. 
From a comparison of the practice of Port States in exercising controls over vessel pollution and safety, we can identify some 
improvements that might be made to PSMs for IUU fishing: the requirements for advance notice by foreign fishing vessels prior to 
intended port entry could be quantified; inspection sample rate requirements might shift from a percentage rate to a fishing vessel 
risk profile basis; inspections could be initiated on the basis of information provided by another Port Authority or by a third party; 
protocols for detailed inspections could be defined; more specificity could be required of the reports Flag States are to make on 
actions they take to remedy non-compliance; and criteria could be set for the restoration of good standing of a fishing vessel. 
To discourage the use of flags of convenience, in particular, a non-cooperating Flag State blacklist could be compiled. Naming on 
the list might diminish the public international status of the non-cooperating Flag State and also result in its disadvantage in terms 
of port access, flagging, joint-venture and MLR trade opportunities. 
The full range of enforcement powers is available to the Port State under customary international law and existing treaties to 
enforce against vessels voluntarily and its ports for the commission of MLR crimes. Therefore, the Port State can impose civil 
penalties and vessel forfeitures and also institute criminal prosecutions entailing non-monetary penalties such as imprisonment.  
Although Port State measures can be applied by any port state individually, the exercise of Port State enforcement jurisdiction 
against vessels associated with MLR crimes will be more effective if it is applied consistently at national, regional and global levels 
and in accordance with international law. Imposed across Port States in coordination, PSMs would be more likely to have the effect 
of isolating and restricting the opportunities of non-compliant vessel owners and operators and Flag States. Therefore, the 
construction of consensus with like-minded Port States on a common program for the coordinated imposition of an expanded 
program of PSMs must be an important part of any future strategy to universalise jurisdiction for better protection against MLR 
crime. 
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The fisheries enforcement framework, codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘LOSC’), is based on a 
careful balance between the sovereignty (internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial seas) and sovereign rights (exclusive 
economic zones) of coastal States on one hand and flag States on the other on the high seas. In maritime zones under sovereignty, 
LOSC does not impose any limitations on the enforcement powers of coastal States with regard to fisheries offences committed by 
foreign fishing vessels. In the EEZ, LOSC gives power to coastal States to board, inspect, arrest foreign fishing vessels and take 
judicial proceedings to ensure compliance with their fisheries laws and regulations.360 LOSC also leaves it each coastal State to 
define what constitutes fishing and fisheries offences in accordance with its fisheries laws and regulations.  
On the high seas, however, the dominant rule is freedom of fishing on the high seas,361 subject to a few limitations, including treaty 
obligations and the rights and jurisdiction on coastal States in their EEZs.362 The high seas fisheries enforcement framework under 
LOSC also mirrors the traditional framework codified in Article 92(1) of LOSC.363 Under LOSC. It is the sole duty of flag States to 
take measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high 
seas.364This leaves it to each flag State to define what constitutes a fisheries crime on the high seas. 
UN FISH STOCKS AGREEMENT AND ORIGINS OF HIGH SEAS BOARDING AND INSPECTION 
Global dissatisfaction with the ability of the LOSC high seas fisheries framework to deliver an effective conservation and 
management outcome in the 1990s resulted in the convening  of the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, which adopted the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks Agreement)365 on 4 August 1995. The objective of the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement is to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks 
through effective implementation of the relevant provisions of the LOS Convention.366  
                                                                    
360 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 (entered into force 16 November 
1994) art 73(1). 
361 Ibid art 87. 
362 Ibid art 116. 
363 Ibid art 92(1). ‘Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in 
this Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.’ 
364 Ibid art 117. 
365 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to 
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Higly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature 4 December 1995, 24 ILM 1542 
(entered into force 11 December 2001). The Parties are: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cook Islands, Costa 
Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, European Community, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Senegal, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Sweden, Tonga, Ukraine, United Kingdom on behalf of its Territories, United States of America, Uruguay.  
366 Ibid art 2. 
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A cardinal feature of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement is the attempt to universalised high seas fisheries crimes and its enforcement. 
This was done through the establishment of a treaty framework for high seas boarding and inspection and, for the first time in 
international law, the definition of what may be characterised as high seas fisheries crimes. The high seas boarding and inspection 
provisions under the UN Fish Stocks Agreement are spelt out in Articles 21-22 of the Agreement. 
Before the negotiation of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, three Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, namely: 
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR); North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) 
and the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) implemented schemes for inspection of member vessels on the high 
seas.367 However, these pre-UN Fish Stocks Agreement schemes were limited in their scope and did not define common standards 
for definition of fisheries crimes by RFMOs.  
The scope of the High seas boarding and inspection framework under the UN Fish Stocks Agreement extends beyond the State 
parties to the Agreement to also include members of or participants in a relevant regional or sub-regional fisheries management 
organization or arrangement Article 21(1) provides: 
 In any high seas area covered by a subregional or regional fisheries management organization or arrangement, a State Party which 
is a member of such organization or a participant in such arrangement may, through its duly authorized inspectors, board and 
inspect, in accordance with paragraph 2, fishing vessels flying the flag of another State Party to this Agreement, whether or not such 
State Party is also a member of the organization or a participant in the arrangement, for the purpose of ensuring compliance with 
conservation and management measures for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks established by that organization 
or arrangement. 
Serious Violation 
For the purpose this study, the most significant aspects of the high seas boarding and inspection framework under the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement is that, for the first time in international fisheries law, there is specification of certain fishing activities and 
practices which can be characterised as criminal behaviour. These infractions are described as ‘serious violations’ under the UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement. Include (Art. 21(11). 
• fishing without a valid licence, authorization or permit issued by the flag State;  
• failing to maintain accurate records of catch and catch-related data, as required by the relevant subregional or regional 
fisheries management organization or arrangement, or serious misreporting of catch, contrary to the catch reporting 
requirements of such organization or arrangement; 
• fishing in a closed area, fishing during a closed season or fishing without, or after attainment of, a quota established by 
the relevant subregional or regional fisheries management organization or arrangement; 
• directed fishing for a stock which is subject to a moratorium or for which fishing is prohibited; 
• using prohibited fishing gear; 
• falsifying or concealing the markings, identity or registration of a fishing vessel; 
• concealing, tampering with or disposing of evidence relating to an investigation; 
• multiple violations which together constitute a serious disregard of conservation and management measures; or 
The various activities listed in Article 21(11) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement as constituting ‘serious violations’ almost mirror the 
definition of fisheries crimes under most national fisheries legislation for violations in maritime zones under sovereignty and 
sovereign rights. It is also worth noting that the list of activities constituting “serious violation” is not exhaustive. Article 21(11) (i) 
allows regional fisheries management organizations, in their implementation of the Agreement, to specify other infractions which 
may constitute ‘serious violations.’  
The practical consequences of a fishing vessel committing a ‘serious violation’ are spelt out in Article 21(8) of the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement: 
Where, following boarding and inspection, there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel has committed a serious 
violation, and the flag State has either failed to respond or failed to take action as required under paragraphs 6 or 7, the 
inspectors may remain on board and secure evidence and may require the master to assist in further investigation 
including, where appropriate, by bringing the vessel without delay to the nearest appropriate port, or to such other port as 
may be specified in procedures established in accordance with paragraph 2. The inspecting State shall immediately inform 
the flag State of the name of the port to which the vessel is to proceed. The inspecting State and the flag State and, as 
appropriate, the port State shall take all necessary steps to ensure the well-being of the crew regardless of their 
nationality.… 
                                                                    
367 See: Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, opened for signature 20 May 1980, 1329 UNTS 47 (entered into 
force 7 April 1982).part 9; NAFO- (2/88) Resolution determining the Date on which the Proposal establishing the Modified Scheme of Joint 
International Enforcement to be entitled "Scheme of Joint International Inspection" shall become a Measure Binding on all Contracting Parties, 
adopted by the Fisheries Commission on 10 February 1988; NEAFC Chap IV Inspections at sea (art 15-19) of Scheme of Control and enforcement 
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Implementation through Regional Fisheries management Organizations 
State parties to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, in accordance with their duty to cooperate to manage straddling fish stocks and 
highly migratory fish stocks under LOSC, are required to ‘establish, through subregional or regional fisheries management 
organizations or arrangements, procedures for boarding and inspection.’368 Article 21(3) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement outlines 
default procedures for regional fisheries management organizations that fail to establish their own high seas boarding and 
inspection procedures within two years of the adoption of the UN Fish Stocks.369  
CASE STUDY OF THE WCPFC 
To-date, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) is the only comprehensive implementation of the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement high seas boarding and inspection framework. The WCPFC was created under the Convention on the 
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (WCPF Convention) in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean 
(WCPF Convention) (2000) entered into force in June 2004, creating the first regional fisheries management organizations to be 
established since the adoption in 1995 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.  
The objective of the WCPF Convention is to ensure, through effective management, the long-term conservation and sustainable use 
of highly migratory fish stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea and the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. The current members370 and cooperating non-members371 of the 
WCPFC, comprising all the major distant water fishing nations and all coastal States in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, have 
mandate to manage about 60 per cent of global tuna catches. Consequently, the practice of WCPFC with regard to high seas 
boarding and inspection, has global significance in State practice. 
Article 26(1) of the WCPF Convention creates an obligation on members of the WCPFC to establish high seas boarding and 
inspection procedures to ensure compliance with conservation and management measures adopted by the Commission and 
requires the adoption of a specific conservation and management measure to give effect to this obligation. Under Article 26(2) of 
the WCPF Convention if the Commission was unable to agree on such procedures (or an alternate mechanism) within two years 
from the entry into force of the WCPF Convention (which was 19 June 2004), then Articles 21 and 22 of UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
would apply as the default high seas boarding and inspection scheme for the WCPFC>  Pursuant to the obligation in Article 26 of 
the WCPF Convention, WCPFC adopted The High Seas Boarding and Inspection Procedures (Conservation and Management 
Measure 2006-08), setting out detailed provisions for the boarding and inspection of fishing vessels flying the flags of members and 
cooperative non-members of the Commission and fishing on the high seas in the Convention Area.  
Serious Violation 
Consistent with the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the WCPFC High Seas Boarding and Inspection Procedures make special 
procedures for dealing with “serious violations” during a high seas boarding and inspection by authorised inspectors. The WCPFC 
also significantly expands of the scope of offences constituting “serious violation”. Where an authorised inspector observes an 
activity or condition that would constitute a serious violation, the authorities of the inspection vessels are required to immediately 
notify the authorities of the fishing vessel, directly as well as through the Commission. A ‘serious violation’ is defined broadly in 
paragraph 37 to include the following violations of the provisions of the Convention or conservation and management measures 
adopted by the Commission: 
• fishing without a license, permit or authorization issued by the flag Member, in accordance with Article 24 of the 
Convention;  
• failure to maintain sufficient records of catch and catch-related data in accordance with the Commission’s reporting 
requirements or significant misreporting of such catch and/or catch-related data; 
• fishing in a closed area; 
• fishing during a closed season; 
• intentional taking or retention of species in contravention of any applicable conservation and management measure 
adopted by the Commission; significant violation of catch limits or quotas in force pursuant to the Convention; 
• using prohibited fishing gear; 
                                                                    
368 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to 
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Higly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature 4 December 1995, 24 ILM 1542 
(entered into force 11 December 2001).art 21(2). 
369 Ibid art 21(3) 
370 Australia, Canada, People’s Republic of China, Cook Islands, European Union, France, Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Japan, Kiribati, 
Republic of Korea, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand , Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Chinese Taipei, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, United States of America, and Vanuatu. 
371 Belize, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, El Salvador, Indonesia, Mexico, Senegal, St Kitts and Nevis, Panama, Thailand and 
Vietnam 
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• falsifying or intentionally concealing the markings, identity or registration of a fishing vessel; 
• concealing, tampering with or disposing of evidence relating to investigation of a violation; 
• multiple violations which taken together constitute a serious disregard of measures in force pursuant to the Commission; 
• refusal to accept a boarding and inspection, other than as provided in paragraphs 26 and 27; 
• assault, resist, intimidate, sexually harass, interfere with, or unduly obstruct or delay an authorized inspector;  
• intentionally tampering with or disabling the vessel monitoring system; 
• such other violations as may be determined by the Commission, once these are included and circulated in a revised 
version of these procedures. 
Implementation 
To ensure a transparent implementation of the High Seas Boarding and Inspection Procedures, WCPFC is required to maintain a 
register of all authorized inspection vessels and authorities or inspectors. Only vessels and authorities or inspectors listed on the 
Commission’s register are authorized under the procedures to board and inspect foreign flagged fishing vessels on the high seas 
within the Convention Area. Each Contracting Party that intends to carry out boarding and inspection activities under the 
Procedures is required to notify the Commission and provide detailed information on two aspects. 
First, with respect to each inspection vessel it assigns to boarding and inspection activities under the Procedures, the inspecting 
member is required to provide: 
• the details of the vessel (name, description, photograph, registration number, port of registry (and, if different from the 
port of registry, port marked on the vessel hull), international radio call sign and communication capability); 
•  notification that the inspection vessel is clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service; 
• notification that the crew has received and completed training in carrying out boarding and inspection activities at sea 
in accordance with any standards and procedures as may be adopted by the Commission. 
Second, with respect to inspectors it assigns pursuant to the Procedures, the inspecting members is required to provide: 
• the names of the authorities responsible for boarding and inspection; 
• notification that such authorities’ inspectors are fully familiar with the fishing activities to be inspected and the 
provisions of the Convention and conservation and management measures in force; and 
• notification that such authorities’ inspectors have received and completed training in carrying out boarding and 
inspection activities at sea in accordance with any standards and procedures as may be adopted by the Commission. 
Table 1 below provides a summary the Members of WCPFC who have notified the Commission of their intention to participate in 
conducting boarding and inspection activities under the High Seas Boarding and Inspection Procedures.  
Table 1: Summary the WCPFC members participating who have notified the Commission of their intention to participate in 
the high seas boarding and inspection procedure.  
WCPFC Member Notification  Number of Vessels on the Register of Authorised Inspection Vessels (as at 29 Sept 2012) 
New Zealand YES 12 
France372 YES 9 
United States of America YES 79 
Chinese Taipei  11 
Papua New Guinea  4 
Republic of Korea  - 
Cook Islands YES 1 
Japan YES 2 
Canada  5 
Australia YES 11 
Federated States of Micronesia  3 
Tuvalu  1 
  138 
                                                                    
372 Separate notifications were provided by France for French Authorities that are based in French Polynesia and New Caledonia 
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Of the 13 members of the WCPFC who have notified the commission of their intention to participate in boarding and inspection 
activities only five members have actually conducted high seas boarding and inspection. These members are the United States of 
America, French Polynesia, Chinese Taipei, New Caledonia and the Cook Islands the numbers of boarding’s can be seen in table 2. 
Table 2. High Seas Boarding and Inspection carried out between 20 August 2008 - 11 November 2012 by WCPFC members. 
 United 
States of 
America 
French Polynesia Chinese Taipei New Caledonia Cook Islands 
Total  65 52 2 3 5 
Chinese Taipei 20 22 - 2 2 
China 12 18 - - 2 
Republic of Korea 18 1 - - - 
Japan 8 3 - 1 - 
Fiji - 5 - - 1 
USA - 0 2 - - 
EU 1 1 - - - 
Philippines 2 - - - - 
Indonesia 2 - - - - 
Belize 1 - - - - 
Singapore - 1 - - - 
Vanuatu - 1 - - - 
Kiribati 1 - - - - 
      
 
Since inception of the WCPFC high seas boarding and inspection procedures in 2008 the numbers have steadily risen to 49 
boarding’s in 2011 and 2012 looks to have a similar increase with 39 boarding’s conducted by the end of September of that year. 
Table 3 shows the trends in boarding numbers since 2008. 
Table 3. Trends in boarding numbers for WCPFC 2008-12. 
Year Number of Boarding’s 
2008 7 
2009 3 
2010 28 
2011 49 
2012 39 
Total 126 
 
Conclusion 
High seas boarding and inspection remains a relatively new concept in international fisheries law since its introduction in 1995 
through the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Implementation through the WCPFC highlights two important aspects of this study from a 
global fisheries governance perspective. The first is gradual erosion of the principle of exclusive flag State jurisdiction over its 
fishing vessels on the high seas. More significantly is the concept of “serious violations” is, to a large extent, is leading to global 
consensus on the definition of fisheries crimes on the high seas. 
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GLOBAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
Marine living resources (MLR) crime can be combated using both legal and institutional mechanisms. The following survey and 
assessment of existing mechanisms is divided between legal frameworks and institutional frameworks. Legal frameworks are 
subdivided according to their primary area of concern and according to their original purpose; i.e. whether they deal primarily with 
marine, environment, or criminal justice concerns. Although institutional bodies are often multifunctional or have the flexibility to 
apply themselves to emerging problems and to evolve, they have been similarly categorised according to a dominant purpose for 
simplified reading. Distinctions have been made between general political bodies, marine governance bodies, environmental 
governance bodies and crime-fighting institutions. Regional legal frameworks and institutions are considered in the following 
chapter and are categorised in a similar fashion. 
The following survey demonstrates that, at the global level, no global legal regime specifically concerning the punishment of MLR 
crimes has yet been established. The survey also indicates that many more treaties and institutions criminalising some relevant 
aspect of MLR crimes, or potentially applicable to MLR crimes, have been developed within the legal frameworks for criminal 
justice than those for general political affairs, marine or environment protection. This is to be expected as crime prevention laws 
and institutions have long been concerned with exercising jurisdiction to enforce criminal laws. In contrast, international bodies 
concerned with general affairs, marine and environmental affairs are primarily concerned with standard setting rather than 
criminal law enforcement.  
Marine Legal Framework 
Legally binding global standards for the management of MLR are set out in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, FAO 
Compliance Agreement 1993, UN Fish Stocks Agreement 1995, and the FAO Port States Measures Agreement 2009.  
Although these global standards broadly address the conservation and management of MLR, commercial fisheries management is 
their primary concern. Nevertheless, fisheries management has extensive impacts across the broad range of management of other 
MLR. It impacts on non-target and non-fish species, whether these are affected as by-catch or are impacted by environmental 
pollution or by degradation of ecosystem integrity.  
Fisheries treaties tend not to require criminalisation of breaches by individuals of their prescribed standards. Instead of engaging 
with criminal justice systems, they address breaches through managerial and administrative capacity building mechanisms. 
Breaches of internationally prescribed standards of conduct are treated as non-compliance problems rather than as universalised 
crimes. 
The Port State Measures IUU Agreement 
The Port State Measures Agreement (PSM-IUU Agreement) is potentially the most important global legal framework for 
enforcement of fisheries management and conservation laws. As noted in the case study on Port State measures, the PSM-IUU 
Agreement provides that the Port State may take specified enforcement measures against a vessel that has engaged in IUU fishing, 
including denying the use of the port for landing, transhipping, packaging and processing of fish and denying the use of other port 
services including refuelling and resupply, maintenance and dry docking.373  
The PSM-IUU Agreement also explicitly provides that it does ‘not prevent a party from taking measures that are in conformity with 
international law in addition to those specified’.374 These additional measures could conceivably include vessel detention and the 
seizure of catch and/or gear.375 Moreover, civil penalties, such as related catch and asset forfeiture, and criminal prosecutions of 
masters, owners and operators for breaching the publicised conditions of entry into port remain within the power of the Port State. 
 The PSM-IUU Agreement provides the most relevant and potentially useful legal framework for the universalisation of 
MLR crimes. A protocol to the Agreement, or a declaration or resolution by the parties to it, could seek to harmonise 
among its parties the adoption of national criminal provisions and to universalise enforcement jurisdiction by through law 
                                                                    
373 PSM-IUU Agreement, art 18.1(b). 
374 PSM-IUU Agreement, art 18.3. 
375 Audrey Sharp, The effectiveness or not of the new port State measures in the battle to control illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing (2 
October 2010) Social Science Research Network < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2140528>. 
 
 Page 86 
enforcement cooperation. However, as the Agreement has yet to enter into force and has many implementation hurdles to 
clear, a push to universalise MLR crime under it is premature at this time. 
IPOA-IUU Soft Law 
International standards directly governing MLR crimes are set out in non-legally binding policy instruments, with the exception of 
the PSM-IUU Agreement, which has not yet entered into force.376 These soft laws include UN Resolutions on Driftnet Fishing, UN 
Resolutions on Sustainable Fisheries, the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct and FAO Guidelines; i.e.: International Plan of Action on 
Capacity, International Plan of Action on Seabirds, International Plan of Action on Sharks, and the 2004 FAO Model Scheme on 
Port State Measures to Combat IUU Fishing. 
The International Plan of Action - IUU adopted by the FAO Council in 2001 is the predominant instrument specifically addressing 
IUU fishing. It supplements earlier international soft law standards, such as the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct on Responsible Fishing, 
and is itself reinforced by later international instruments, including the 2005 Rome Declaration on IUU Fishing. Although not 
legally binding, the International Plan of Action-IUU articulates an accepted international standard requiring the penalisation of 
illegal fishing.377 It describes illegal fishing in paragraph 3.1 as referring to either activities:  
3.1.1 Conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a State without the permission of that 
State, or in contravention of its laws and regulations;  
3.1.2 Conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to a relevant regional fisheries management 
organisation [RFMO] but operate in contravention of the conservation and management measures adopted by 
that organisation or by which the States are bound, or relevant provisions of the applicable international law; or  
3.1.3 In violation of national laws or international obligations, including those undertaken by cooperating States to a 
relevant [RFMO]. 
Coastal States can prescribe the precise terms of illegal fishing within their maritime zones (paragraph 3.1.1), as qualified by limits 
on their jurisdiction imposed under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. In areas regulated by a relevant RFMO, which 
often include areas of high seas, fishing is considered illegal if it contravenes the organisation’s conservation and management 
measures and is conducted by a vessel that is subject to those measures because it flies the flag of a State which is a member of that 
organisation (paragraph 3.1.2) or a State cooperating with that organisation (paragraph 3.1.3).  
The use of judicial or quasi-judicial processes to enforce fisheries laws is implicitly recognised, in paragraph 17 of the IPOA-IUU, 
which requires that national implementing legislation address the admissibility as legal evidence of information from electronic 
data and new technologies. Most importantly, it provides, in paragraph 21, that a State should penalise both vessels and persons of 
its nationality under its jurisdiction and that the penalties should be sufficiently severe to deter IUU fishing and deprive offenders 
of their illicit proceeds.  
21. States should ensure that sanctions for IUU fishing by vessels and, to the greatest extent possible, nationals under 
its jurisdiction are sufficient severity to effectively prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing and to deprive 
offenders of the benefits accruing fishing. This may include the adoption of the civil sanction regime based on an 
administrative penalties scheme. States should ensure the consistent and transparent application of sanctions.  
In the penultimate sentence, the IPOA-IUU reflects international consensus that the penalty regime may be based in administrative 
processes or civil justice systems, rather than criminal justice alone. Therefore, it stops short of requiring that States criminalise of 
illegal fishing as a serious crime. Nevertheless, it provides evidence, in combination with other relevant international standards, of 
widespread international practice that is leading to the development of international standards to criminalise illegal fishing. 
Non-legally binding norms are easier to agree upon because they are less consequential. Even so, they build consensus as to what 
later binding norms might look like. Normative frameworks set out in international soft law often form a preparatory basis for the 
later development of legally binding international standards.  
 The IPOA-IUU offers a promising basis upon which to build the non-legally binding normative infrastructure for 
universalised MLR crime. Likelihood of success in this endeavour is better than for a legally binding framework such as the 
PSM-IUU Agreement.  
Environmental Legal Framework 
None of the multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) that aim to resolve global environmental problems address themselves 
to the shaping of domestic mechanisms of criminal law or to international legal cooperation in relation to their enforcement. They 
                                                                    
376 See PSM Case Study above 
377 Fisheries treaties and policy instruments have come to distinguish between illegal fishing, unregulated fishing and unreported fishing (IUU 
fishing). Whereas illegal fishing designates fishing activities in breach of applicable national or international legal standards, unregulated fishing 
signifies fishing in an area where there are no applicable legal standards, and unreported fishing signifies a failure to report fishing activities to 
authorities. There is overlap between these categories, as unreported fishing is prohibited under some fisheries laws which makes it illegal fishing 
However, if these activities are not prohibited, then they are not illegal.  
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commonly require simply that parties take the appropriate legal and administrative measures to implement and enforce their 
obligations under the MEA. A partial exception is the Basel Convention on Hazardous Waste, which states that illegal traffic in 
hazardous wastes or in other wastes is criminal.  
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes378 regulates the transboundary 
movements of hazardous wastes and imposes obligations on its Parties to ensure that such wastes are managed and disposed of in 
an environmentally sound manner. The Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes is the only MEA to 
specifically provide that illegal traffic is a criminal activity. Article 9 defines illegal traffic and requires its criminalisation: 
1. For the purpose of this Convention, any transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes:  
(a)  without notification…; or  
(b)  without the consent … of a State concerned; …. shall be deemed to be illegal traffic…. 
5. Each Party shall introduce appropriate national/domestic legislation to prevent and punish illegal traffic.  
Article 4 emphasises that:  
3. The Parties consider that illegal traffic in hazardous wastes or other wastes is criminal. 
4. Each Party shall take appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement and enforce the provisions of 
this Convention, including measures to prevent and punish conduct in contravention of the Convention. 
At the Sixth Conference of Parties, in 2002, the Guidance Elements for Detection, Prevention and Control of Illegal Traffic in 
Hazardous Wastes were adopted.379 These Guidance Elements are intended to provide a practical guide to assist enforcement of 
national laws implementing the Basel Convention. Part VII of the Model National Legislation developed by the Basel Convention 
Legal Working Group contains model provisions criminalising illegal trafficking in hazardous wastes.  
The Eighth Conference of Parties, in 2006, requested the Secretariat to prepare a draft legal instruction manual on prosecuting 
illegal traffic based upon a draft outline already prepared by the Secretariat, and to maintain a collection of national legislation and 
other measures adopted by Parties to implement the Basel Convention, including measures to prevent and punish illegal traffic, and 
to make such measures available on the Convention website.380 In 2008, the Conference of Parties (Decision IX/23) invited Parties 
to provide the Secretariat with their comments on an existing draft detailed outline of the manual (UNEP/CHW/OEWG/6/12). 
Parties are also encouraged to submit to the Secretariat judgments of their respective courts dealing with illegal traffic, so it can 
publish them on the forthcoming case law section of this web site as an information tool for other Parties.  
 The legal model provided by the Basel Convention demonstrates how the universalisation of enforcement jurisdiction 
against MLR crime might evolve over time. First, the illegal activity is defined and the treaty parties commit to prevent and 
punish offenders. Second, the gravity of the illegality is categorised as being criminal at a serious level and technical 
assistance is made available to develop model criminal laws to prevent the activity and punish offenders. Third, a register 
of national criminal legislation and related enforcement measures is assembled and maintained on a shared database so as 
to promote transparency, efficacy and cooperation. 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species  
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species381 (CITES) requires parties to penalize trade that violates the 
Convention (art VIII). It does not specifically describe such violations as criminal or illegal.  
Substantial work has been done to respond to transnational crime undermining the implementation of CITES.382 The Secretariat, at 
the direction of the Conference of Parties, has adopted memoranda of understanding with the World Customs Organisation and 
with Interpol, providing for strengthened cooperation and increased exchange of information, joint publication of information 
materials to combat wildlife crime and joint training activities for enforcement officers. A report of the United Nations Secretary-
General on the subject of the trafficking in protected species of flora and fauna submitted to the Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice at its 12th session, 13-22 May 2003 set out indicators for assessing the probability that organized criminal 
                                                                    
378 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, opened for signature 22 March 1989, 
1673 UNTS 126, (entered into force 5 May 1992). The present text of the Convention, with all current amendments and ratifications, came into full 
force on 8 October 2005. There are 53 signatories and 173 parties to the convention. A list of all parties with dates of accession can be found on the 
Convention website at http://www.basel.int/ratif/convention.htm (website: http://www.basel.int/ ). 
379 Resolution VI/16 on Guidance Elements for Detection, Prevention and Control of Illegal Traffic in Hazardous Wastes, 
http://www.basel.int/legalmatters/illegtraffic/index.html. 
380 Resolution IX/23 on Enforcement: national legislation and other measures adopted by Parties to implement the Basel Convention and to combat 
illegal traffic. 
381 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for signature 3 March 1973, 993 UNTS 243, 
(entered into force 1 July 1975). There are currently 175 States Parties to the treaty. A list of all parties with dates of accession can be found on the 
Convention website at http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/index.shtml. 
382 Some information has been gathered, however, which looks at the likely international trade in endangered species, as evidenced by the number 
of classified advertisements published on the internet for these species. See http://www.cites.org/eng/news/world/19/7.shtml. 
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groups were involved in that form of crime.383 The increased involvement of organized criminal groups in trafficking in protected 
species of wild flora and fauna was also noted in the Bangkok Declaration of the 11th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice in 2005. A European Union study on the enforcement of the wildlife trade regulations among its members 
recommended the development of guidance on best practices for CITES enforcement as well as a common enforcement action plan 
and strengthened sanctions. Since CITES does not explicitly criminalise contraventions of its provisions per se, there are no 
statistics related to breaches of the Convention. The illegal trade in endangered marine species, such as certain turtles, or in their 
products, such as bones and eggs is lucrative. The illicit trade is facilitated by counterfeit documents, fraudulent applications for 
permits and false declarations to customs officials. South-east Asia alone is thought to be responsible for about a quarter of the 
world's illegal wildlife trade.  
 CITES is not a suitable avenue by which a global legal framework to universally criminalise MLR crimes can be 
implemented. The main disadvantage of using CITES to universally criminalise CITES is that it would apply only to MLR 
already listed as endangered species under CITES. Most commercially managed fisheries are not listed. Furthermore, as 
CITES does not apply to actions other than illegal trade in endangered species, it cannot address such other harms to 
marine living resources as habitat destruction or destructive fishing practices. 
Convention on Biological Diversity  
The Convention on Biological Diversity384 has 3 main objectives: the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of the 
components of biological diversity, and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic 
resources (art. 1). The treaty contains no criminal provisions concerning criminalisation at the national level and there is no data 
available concerning criminal incidences under it. 
In 2010, the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization was adopted as a supplementary agreement to the Convention on Biological Diversity. It is yet to reach the 50 
instruments of ratification required for it to enter into force. The Protocol will establish a global agreement for the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources (art 1). During its negotiation, a group of technical and legal 
experts was established to report on compliance to the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group. The technical and legal experts 
suggested that, in relation to a breach of law concerning access and benefit sharing that occurs across jurisdictions, transnational 
law enforcement cooperation might be necessary. This could require proof of dual criminality in both countries and, therefore, the 
international regime might facilitate international enforcement cooperation (in ways compared to agreements such as the 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage 
and UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property, draft WHO Protocol on the Trafficking in Illicit Tobacco Products and Substances). The technical and legal 
experts also suggested that the international framework might expand on existing bilateral arrangements for cross-border 
enforcement and seek to harmonise due process of law standards, mutual recognition, basic remedies and time limits, as well as to 
list additional international measures such as criteria to guide courts in addressing compliance across jurisdictions. Although these 
suggestions provide an interesting template, they were not ultimately adopted.  
On 29 January 2000, the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity adopted the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety.385 The Cartagena Protocol seeks to protect biological diversity from the potential risks posed by genetically modified 
organisms. The Cartagena Protocol establishes an advance informed agreement procedure for ensuring that States are provided 
with the information necessary to make informed decisions before agreeing to the import of such organisms into their territory. 
Parties are obliged to adopt measures to penalise illegal transboundary movement of living modified organisms (Article 25). The 
Cartagena Protocol does not prescribe criminal sanctions for breach of this or any other of its provisions. Nevertheless, it does 
establish a Biosafety Clearing-House to facilitate the exchange of information on living modified organisms and to assist States in 
the implementation of the Protocol.386 Although the Cartagena Protocol requires, albeit not in any detail, that Parties adopt 
sanctions, it does not deal with an area of significant MLR crime at this time.  
 Among the CBD-related treaties, only the Nagoya Protocol addresses a significant MLR management issue in terms that 
relate to criminal acts. However, as it concerns a relatively narrow aspect of MLR management and has not yet entered 
into force and its negotiating parties rejected a criminal law model for its enforcement, the Nagoya Protocol is a fragile 
framework upon which to base the development of universalised MLR crime. 
                                                                    
383 Report of the Secretary-General on Illicit Trafficking in Protected Species of Wild Flora and Fauna E/CN.15/2003/8, para. 29. UNODC CTOC 
2008 Note 23. 
384 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993) There are 168 
signatories and 193 parties to the Convention. 
385 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, opened for signature 15 May 2000, 39 ILM 1027 (entered into force 11 September 2003). To date, 158 
instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited. 
386 See http://www.cbd.int/biosafety/background.shtml. 
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Crime Prevention Legal Framework 
In contrast to the MEA regimes, global cooperative efforts to combat transnational crime have produced treaties that require their 
parties to proscribe specified acts as criminal. As yet, none of these require the proscription of specific acts of MLR harm. Oganised 
crime, corruption and bribery are often incidental activities that facilitate MLR crimes. Multilateral crime prevention treaties 
requiring that their Parties act to prohibit and punish organised crime, corruption and bribery relate to transnational MLR crime, 
albeit indirectly.  
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime  
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC), adopted in 2000, addresses both the 
harmonisation of certain criminal laws of its parties and the facilitation of law enforcement co-operation between those parties. It 
requires that its parties criminalise activities that are transnational in nature whenever they involve the following:  
 Participation in an organised criminal group (art 5);  
 Laundering of the proceeds of crime (art 6); 
 Corruption (art 8); or  
 Obstruction of justice (art 24).  
These criminal activities might involve MLR crimes in some instances, such as where an illegal MLR activity is undertaken by an 
organised group, or when the proceeds of the illegal MLR activity are laundered, or where the MLR activity is facilitated by the 
corruption of public officials, or it involves obstruction of the administration of justice. Thus, these offences might pick up MLR 
crime only incidentally.  
The CTOC also extends broadly to ‘serious crime’, if the offence is transnational and involves an organized criminal group (art 3). 
Serious crimes are offences that carry a maximum penalty of at least 4 years imprisonment (art 2). Although much MLR crime is 
transnational and undertaken by organised crime syndicates, it would seem to fall outside this provision, because it may not qualify 
as ‘serious crime’. 
In recent years, the Conference of Parties to CTOC has become more engaged on the specific topic of transnational environmental 
crime. In 2008, it decided to include transnational environmental crime as a form of emerging transnational crime in its work 
program for 2009. It noted that this form of crime did not receive attention at the time of the drafting of CTOC but that it can be 
embraced within it. Further discussion drew attention to the need for environmental crimes to be included within predicate 
offences to the crime of money laundering.387 In 2010, the fifth Conference of Parties identified environmental crime as one of five 
areas of emerging transnational crime.388 
 There are signs of momentum gathering to address environmental crime under the CTOC. Naturally, this would relate to 
environmental crime that is transnational and organised, which would cover much MLR. There is no suggestion yet to 
commence any negotiations on a CTOC protocol on natural resources and environmental crime. However, formulation of a 
protocol suitable to combat MLR crime would appear to be conceptually straight forward. CTOC is the natural and most 
likely global framework for new legally binding commitments to universalise MLR crimes. 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery  
Any enterprise involving exploitation of natural resources is usually subject to the issuance of a governmental permit. For example, 
permits are required to harvest seafoods in fishing grounds or to access samples of marine biological resources. Foreign fishing 
enterprises seeking to avoid landing or transhipment laws in the Port State may bribe port inspectors or customs officials in order 
to obtain the documentation necessary to sell their catch. Thus, public administration processes create opportunities for the 
corruption that is believed to be pervasive in the seafoods industry.  
The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Bribery 
Convention)389 does not criminalise MLR crimes but has obvious relevance due to the presence of corruption in the international 
fishing industry.390  
The Parties to the OECD Bribery Convention adopted an OECD Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions on 9 December 2009, the 10th anniversary of the entry into force of the OECD 
Bribery Convention. This Recomemdation sets out additional measures to prevent, detect and investigate foreign bribery. These 
include making companies liable despite the use of agents and intermediaries; the review of legitimate facilitation payments 
allowed to speed it up administrative processes; improvements in mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and the 
                                                                    
387 Decision 4/8 Reorganization of the work of the fifth session of the COP to CTOC, Report of the Conference of the Parties to CTOC on its 4th 
session, Vienna 8-17 October 2008, CTOC/COP/2008/19. http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/CTOC_COP_19_Report-edited_version.pdf 
388 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/wildlife-and-forest-crime/index.html 
389 OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, opened for signature 17 December 
1997, 37 ILM 1 (entered into force 15 February 1999). It currently has 38 parties. Although the OECD has only 30 members, non-members may 
ratify the Convention. http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.html  
390 Hanich Q. and Tsamenyi M.B, ‘Managing Fisheries and Corruption in the Pacific Islands Region’ (2009) 33(2) Marine Policy 386 
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recovery of proceeds; and improving channels for reporting suspected foreign bribery, including by protecting whistleblowers from 
retaliation. 
 The OECD Bribery Convention offers very limited possibilities for universalising jurisdiction over MLR crimes. It applies 
already to corrupt transactions in the MLR sector. Even though widespread, these corrupt transactions are only those 
involving foreign countries that have ratified the OECD Convention, involving foreign public officials, and active bribery. 
Its limitations to international transactions with foreign countries mean that it does not encompass bribery which is 
entirely domestic or which does not involve a foreign country. Nor does it cover bribery of private business persons, or of 
persons holding influential political positions, such as political party officials, who are not members of government in 
legislative, administrative or judicial positions. Finally, it does not require that its parties criminalise the receiving or 
requesting of bribes.  
The United Nations Convention on Corruption 
The United Nations Convention on Corruption (UNCAC) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 31 October 2003 
and came into force on 14 December 2005.391 Its Preamble refers to the connection between sustainable development and the fight 
against corruption, stating that the Parties have adopted the convention because they are:  
Concerned about the seriousness of problems and threats posed by corruption to the stability and security of 
societies, undermining the institutions and values of democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizing 
sustainable development and the rule of law, … 
Concerned further about cases of corruption that involve vast quantities of assets, which may constitute a 
substantial proportion of the resources of States, and that threaten the political stability and sustainable 
development of those States, [and] 
Convinced that corruption is no longer a local matter but a transnational phenomenon that affects all societies and 
economies, making international cooperation to prevent and control it essential… . 
At its first session, the Conference of Parties to UNCAC acknowledged that the fight against corruption is an essential element to 
sustainable development.392 However, the Conference of Parties has not yet addressed the nexus between corruption and natural 
resources crime. Article 62 of the UNCAC is the only one that mentions sustainable development specifically. It only addresses 
measures for implementation of the Convention through economic development and technical assistance and calls upon the Parties 
to take into account the negative effects of corruption on sustainable development, in particular, when taking measures to 
implement the Convention.  
 The UNCAC applies primarily to domestic corruption without a transnational link required but does provide for 
international technical assistance and capacity building. It could provide a useful legal framework for capacity building in 
fishing ports for fisheries and customs inspectors in order to minimise corrupt facilitation of MLR crimes.  
GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS 
MLR crime has been on the agenda of some global institutions, but to varying degrees. International compliance capacity building 
activities, aimed at prevention of environmental crimes, are said to be intensifying at a rapid rate, perhaps even threatening 
congestion by overlapping agendas.393 The following survey of global institutions active in the field of marine governance, 
environmental management and criminal justice is intended to indicate which agencies may be likely to carry forward an agenda for 
universalising jurisdiction to enforce against MLR crimes.  
The means available to global bodies to promote the universalisation of MLR crimes include the commissioning a feasibility studies, 
establishment of expert working groups to explore the issues and make recommendations, formulation of guidelines and action 
plans, adoption of resolutions urging cooperative action, and declarations of principles or norms, etc. As noted in Chapter 10 on 
transnational law enforcement cooperation, practical mechanisms available to coordinate the work of national criminal law 
enforcement institutions include information and intelligence exchange, mutual legal assistance, extradition, technical assistance 
and capacity building, asset seizure and sharing, and complaints investigation and integrity monitoring. 
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General Mandate Institutions 
The United Nations General Assembly  
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) provided the mandate for the negotiation of the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, its 1994 Implementing Agreement, and its 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement supplementary to the LOSC. In 1989, UNGA 
adopted the first of a succession of almost annual recommendations until the year 2002 on Large Scale Driftnet Fishing.394 In 2003, 
these recommendations were replaced by a broader annual recommendation on sustainable fisheries. The annual sustainable 
fisheries recommendations address problems in implementation of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement and broader fisheries 
conservation and management issues in such areas as: conservation of marine biodiversity; illegal, unregulated and unreported 
fishing; fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance; by-catch; and compliance and enforcement.395  
The UNGA is also the body to which the UN Secretary General reports annually on the situation and progress on ocean affairs and 
law of the sea. Since 1993, UNGA has adopted an annual resolution on oceans and law of the sea that highlights problematic issues 
and instructs the Secretary-General on priority work for the coming calendar year.396 Finally, it should be noted that in the year 
2000 UNGA also resolved that the CTOC ‘constitutes an effective tool and the necessary legal framework for international 
cooperation in combating such criminal activities as illicit trafficking of protected species of wild flora and fauna…’.397 In 2012, the 
most recent in a series of resolutions adopted by the UNGA expressed concern about environmental crime, including trafficking in 
endangered and protected species of wild fauna and flora.398 
 UNGA could mandate that the UN Secretary-General prepare a report on the threats posed by MLR crime and 
opportunities to combat it. Ultimately, the objective might be to mandate negotiations of a further protocol to the LOSC or 
to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement to address MLR crime. An avenue through which this might be brought to the attention 
of the UNGA is the UNICOPOLOS process, discussed below. 
The Economic and Social Council  
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is an organ of the United Nations established under the United Nations Charter that 
coordinates the economic, social and related work of UN bodies, including specialized agencies, functional commissions and 
regional commissions. ECOSOC does this by formulating policy recommendations and initiating studies and reports on issues 
related to this work and by directing the preparations and organization of major international conferences and follow-up to these 
conferences in the economic, social and related fields. Among the functional commissions relevant to MLR crime that ECOSOC 
coordinates is the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ), also discussed below.  
In ECOSOC Resolution 2001/12, it first urged its members to adopt ‘legislative or other measures necessary for establishing illicit 
trafficking in protected species of wild fauna and flora as a criminal offence in their domestic legislation’. In Resolution 2003/27, 
ECOSOC called on its members to ‘review their criminal legislation with a view to ensuring that offences relating to trafficking in 
protected species of wild for a and fauna are punishable by appropriate penalties that take into account the serious nature of those 
offences’ and to undertake mutual legal assistance agreements to promote international law enforcement cooperative measures.399 
In 2010, ECOSOC decided that the prominent theme for the 22nd session of the UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders (CPC) would be on environmental crime.400 In 2011, ECOSOC requested that its members ‘consider making 
illicit trafficking in endangered species of wild fauna and flora a serious crime, in accordance with their national legislation and 
article 2, paragraph (b), of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime’.401 In 2012, ECOSOC recognised 
the links between transnational organised crime and environment.402 ECOSOC Resolution Resolution 2012/19, among other things, 
recognised that “transnational organized crime has diversified and represents a threat to health and safety, security, good 
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governance and the sustainable development of States”, and emphasised that “all States have a shared responsibility to take steps to 
counter transnational organized crime, including through international cooperation and in cooperation with relevant entities such 
as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.” 
The ECOSOC is a suitable forum within which to raise the profile of discussion and dialogue concerning MLR crimes. It has the 
capacity to establish subsidiary bodies for the discussion and formulation of international policy relating to MLR crimes, and has in 
the past formulated resolutions for the establishment of United Nations programs to combat crime and environmental degradation.  
 ECOSOC has an institutional interest in environmental crime but it does not have the institutional ability to build national 
capacities in this area, nor does it have authority to mandate negotiations for new legal agreements. It is, therefore, not of 
primary importance in promoting the universalization of enforcement jurisdiction over MLR crimes. 
Marine Institutions 
The United Nations Open-Ended Informal Consultative Process  
The United Nations Open-Ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and Law of the Sea (UNICOPOLOS) was established in 
1999 by the United Nations General Assembly.403 UNICPOLOS facilitates dialogue across different UN institutions engaged in 
oceans and law of the sea policy formulation processes and therefore has a unique function in enabling them to coordinate their 
respective positions and initiatives. As an open-ended informal process, non-governmental organisations are also invited to 
participate fully.  
UNICPOLOS meets for one week annually in June in New York, having met for the 14th time in 2013. Its role is to consider the 
annual report by the UN Secretary General on oceans and law of the sea and, then, to suggest particular areas to be reported on in it 
and areas where coordination and cooperation of the intergovernmental and interagency levels should be enhanced.404 Each year, 
UNICPOLOS adopts a list of issues that could benefit from the attention of the General Assembly in its future work on oceans and 
law of the sea. The theme of the 14th meeting was on ‘impacts of ocean acidification on the marine environment’. The theme of the 
15th meeting, in 2014, will be potential and new uses of the oceans. To promote United Nations attention to marine living resources 
crimes, it could be helpful to raise this issue for discussion at a meeting of the UNICPOLOS. 
 Could a future UNICOPOLOS theme be devoted to MLR crime? This would be a major step forward to secure the attention 
of the General Assembly and the UNSG. Priority for this area on the UNICOPLOS agenda might be more accessible if 
presented as a facet of the broader area of maritime crime. A crime against MLR could then be highlighted in panel 
presentations . 
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation is an intergovernmental organisation established under its own charter during the 
incumbency of the League of Nations and is now as a specialised agency of the United Nations. It has 194 member States, two 
associate members and one member organisation (namely, the European Union). The FAO aims to eliminate hunger, food 
insecurity and malnutrition globally and it promotes its aims mostly by collecting and disseminating data, providing policy advice to 
member countries, providing a forum for members to meet and sending them technical expertise. Serviced by its Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Department, which aims ‘to strengthen global governance and the management and technical capacities of members 
and to lead consensus-building towards improved conservation and utilization of aquatic resources,405 the FAO’s Committee on 
Fisheries (COFI) is a major force in the formulation of global policy concerning MLR. 
Concerning IUU fishing, the FAO has adopted, through COFI, the PSM-IUU Agreement, Compliance Agreement, and Model 
Scheme on Port State Measures. It has also adopted a Code of Conduct on Responsible Fishing as well as many supporting 
Technical Guidelines on Responsible Fishing, and International Plans of Action on IUU, Capacity, Seabirds, and Sharks. None of 
these instruments mandate criminal sanctions for illegal fishing. The International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing advocates simply for an administrative penalty scheme to deprive offenders of the 
benefits of IUU fishing, without specifically advocating any criminal sanctions.406 The record indicates that some FAO members do 
not tend to regard criminal sanctions as a necessary to prevent and deter IUU fishing, preferring economic sanctions such as denial 
of port access.407 This reluctance may be due to the sensitivity to crime in the area of marine living resources crime for those 
countries whose nationals are known to organise illegal fishing activities. 
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 The FAO is an unlikely global institution through which universalised criminalisation of MLR crimes can be pursued. 
Although its outputs recognise the relevance of sanctions for MLR illegal fishing, FAO is institutionally reticent to obligate 
criminal sanctions.  
Environmental Institutions 
The United Nations Environment Programme  
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) organized a UNEP Workshop on Enforcement of and Compliance with 
MEAS focused on environmental crime in 1999.408 Subsequently, UNEP adopted Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement 
of Multilateral Environmental Agreements.409 Those Guidelines comprise two parts. The first deals with enhancing international 
compliance with multilateral environmental agreements and the second with national enforcement and international cooperation 
in combating violations of domestic laws implementing multilateral environmental agreements. Part II of the Guidelines for 
National Enforcement goes on to make special provisions for international cooperation and coordination to promote and assist in 
national enforcement. National enforcement methods include the use of criminal provisions, prosecutions and sanctions for 
breaches of national standards implementing multilateral environment agreements.410 The UNEP Manual on Compliance with and 
Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements also addresses environmental crime and provides case studies of 
administrative, civil and criminal penalties.411  
UNEP’s existing initiatives in relation to compliance with multilateral environment agreements engage it in a practical effort to 
improve enforcement of national laws through the prosecution of environmental crimes. These initiatives addressing enforcement 
include capacity building for judges and prosecutors to combat environmental crime.412  
UNEP’s Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific is the host and Secretariat for the Asian Regional Partners Forum on Combating 
Environmental Crime (ARPEC). ARPEC members meet biannually and, in 2011, the 11th meeting initiated ARPEC attention to 
issues of illegal fishing.413 In November 2013, UNEP will hold a Joint Conference with INTERPOL on international environmental 
compliance and enforcement. Immediately related to the problem of MLR crime, UNEP will host at its headquarters in Nairobi 
INTERPOL’s 2nd Fisheries Crime Working Group Meeting, which will be held in conjunction with the November compliance and 
enforcement conference.  
UNEP is not institutionally engaged in law enforcement issues for fisheries management and conservation but is deeply involved in 
these issues for biodiversity conservation. Legal frameworks and national capacity building to combat MLR crime are within 
UNEP’s mandate. A focus on combating MLR crime would complement UNEP’s existing capacity building work on environmental 
law enforcement.  
 UNEP would be an appropriate platform to carry forward an initiative to universalise jurisdiction to combat MLR crime 
but in partnership with other international organisations deeply engaged in MLR conservation and management, 
particularly the FAO, as it is with INTERPOL.  
Criminal Justice Institutions 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) was formed in 1997 through a merger between the Drug Control 
Programme and the Centre for International Crime Prevention.414 UNODC’s work is focused on combating illicit drugs, crime and 
terrorism through technical assistance projects to build the law enforcement capacity of countries; research and analytical work to 
increase knowledge and understanding of drugs and crime issues; and the development of domestic legislation to enable States 
implement the relevant international treaties. UNODC is based in Vienna and serves as Secretariat to treaty-based conferences of 
parties and to related policy bodies such the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) and the UN Congress 
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (CPCP) (see below).  
UNODC’s interest in transnational environmental crime has grown dramatically in recent years. Acting as Secretariat to the 
Conference of Parties to CTOC, UNODC presented a Note by the Secretariat in October 2008 to the CTOC Conference of Parties on 
‘Criminalization within the Scope of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols 
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thereto’. Under the heading of its activities in relation to ‘emerging crime’, the Note set out UNODC’s work in recent years 
examining the involvement of organized criminal groups in different forms of environmental crime.415  
The immediate past Executive Director of UNODC, Antonio Maria Costa, in his UNODC blog ‘Costa’s Corner’ posted an item on 
15 October 2008 entitled ‘Raping the Planet’.416 He noted that  
Since environmental crimes defy borders there must be laws to match. Just as there are international laws against the 
trafficking of people, weapons and drugs, it is time to take global action against the illicit trade in natural resources. … But 
there is no comprehensive legal framework to prevent the trafficking of timber from illegal logging. … How can the existing 
legal framework, like the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, be applied more effectively 
to deal with environmental crime? Do we need a special (Fourth) Protocol? Something must be done to set clear and 
common international standards and create universal measures, subject to peer review, to fight environmental crime, to 
deter businesses and individuals involved in these trades, and strengthen the capacity of states to work across borders to 
catch environmental offenders. 
Since then, UNODC has established a programme on environmental crime that focuses on forest and wildlife offences with much of 
its work regionally focused on Africa and South East Asia.417 The African work programme is focused on wildlife trafficking, 
particularly for ivory and rhinoceros horn, largely in Eastern Africa418 but seems relatively weak. 
The South East Asia programme, coordinated through the UNODC regional office for Asia in Bangkok is a more active and better 
resourced endeavour. It seeks to suppress crimes of illicit trafficking in natural resources and hazardous substances by building the 
capacity of vulnerable States to implement environmental governance. This aim is being promoted through regional policies and 
strategies to suppress trafficking and corruption, promotion of international law enforcement cooperation, training for law 
enforcement officials, and engagement of manufacturers and consumers to reduce market demand for illicit natural resources and 
hazardous substances.419 Almost half of UNODC’s 2013 report on transnational organised crime in East Asia and the Pacific 
addressed environmental crime.420 
In 2010, UNODC launched a project to fight illegal logging in Indonesia421 which forms the central point of its regional activities. 
Another UNODC project launched in 2010 is the Partnership Against Transnational-crime through Regional Organized Law-
enforcement (PATROL). PATROL aims to improve international law enforcement cooperation in Indo-China against transnational 
crime, including environmental crime. In 2012, UNODC published a Wildlife and Forest Crime Analytic Toolkit.422 
The UNODC has also embarked on a research and publication effort relevant to MLR crime. In 2011, it published a report on 
transnational organized crime and other criminal activity in the fishing industry, which touched on environmental crime423 and in 
2013 UNODC published an issue paper on Combating Transnational Organized Crime Committed at Sea 424 that includes a 
chapter on fisheries crime. It seems clear that environmental crime is regarded as an area of emerging crime that UNODC will 
become increasing engaged in, both by virtue of its own mandate and by reason of its Secretariat role to bodies such as the CCPCJ 
(see below) and the Conference of Parties to the CTOC.  
 Among UN organisations currently engaged in combating environmental and MLR crimes, UNODC is the most active. Its 
work includes research and publication, assembling relevant expertise through conferences and partnership projects, 
building capacity through training and information toolkits, and through fostering international cooperation. UNODC is 
likely to be most able to take forward an initiative to universalise jurisdiction to combat MLR crime. However, it is not a 
political body and will not mandate political actions such as the drafting of guidelines or commencement of treaty 
negotiations. Its role would be to conduct research and publication and to organise a workshop on the subject. 
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The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute  
The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)425 was established in 1968 to undertake applied 
research in the formulation and implementation of improved policies in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice. 
UNICRI’s Applied Research Programme comprises four themes: Emerging Crimes and Anti-Human Trafficking; Security 
Governance and Counter Terrorism Laboratory; Justice Reform and Post-Graduate Training (training of specialized personnel 
forms an integral part of UNICRI activities). The notion of Emerging Crimes is conceptually broad enough to encompass 
environmental crime.  
UNICRI’s research work on environmental crime was initiated in 1994. It conducted work on the topic of "Environmental 
protection at the national and international levels: potentials and limits of criminal justice", following the workshop held on that 
topic at the Ninth Congress in 1995. After 1995, work on this topic went into hiatus until 2009, when UNICRI published research on 
‘Eco-crime and Justice Essays on Environmental Crime’.426 UNICRI’s projects are targeted to regions and countries that are more 
in need of support in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice and they tend to holistically tackle legislative, enforcement 
and social aspects, and may provide services such as documentation, research and training. 
 Although UNICRI has no mandate to develop legal norms but functions only as a research institute or think tank, it could 
provide a useful forum for developing significant research and knowledge concerning global MLR crime. It might also 
consider aspects of the universalisation of national prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction against it in its future work.  
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders  
A United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (CPC) is held every five years. The first was 
held in 1955 and the next, the 13th, will be held in 2015. Each Congress assembles experts on criminal justice systems and of 
government representatives from United Nations members and includes a high-level segment, round tables and workshops. The 
Congress serves as a guiding body for the work of the CCPJ. Regional preparatory meetings are also held. Each Congress adopts a 
declaration containing recommendations submitted back to the following CCPCJ.427  
The Eighth Congress, held in 1990, initiated the Congress’s engagement with environmental crime.428 In the lead up to the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio in 1992, CPC adopted a resolution on the role of criminal law in the 
protection of nature and the environment. It dealt with the general theme of environmental crime more fully at the Ninth Congress, 
in 1995 which requested that the CCPCJ place special emphasis on the development of strategies for the effective prevention and 
control of transnational and organized crime and on the role of criminal law in the protection of the environment.429 The CCP 
became engaged engagement with the notion of environmental crime in the lead up to UNCED in 1992 was at a broad theoretical 
level and dissipated altogether after 1995.  
 To reinforce the work of the UNODC on MLR crime it might be possible for CPC to pick up this issue in 2015 as part of its 
mandate to set the agenda for international cooperative projects for the progressive development of criminal justice. 
The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice  
The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) is a subsidiary body of the ECOSOC.430 It was established by 
resolution of the UNGA in 1992 following the recommendation of the Eighth CPC, a related ministerial meeting held in Versailles in 
1991, and ECOSOC recommendation 1992/1. CCCPCJ succeeded a more technically focussed Committee on Crime Prevention and 
Control. The CCPCJ guides the work of UNODC and provides a forum for its member States to formulate common policies and 
collaborative work programs. The members of CCCPCJ comprise 40 government representatives and it meets in annual sessions 
that are staggered through each year. CCCPCJ is based in Vienna and the UNODC provides it with Secretariat services. 
The CCPCJ’s four mandated priorities, set out below, now include combating environmental crime: 
1. International action to combat national and transnational crime, including organized crime, economic crime and 
money laundering; 
2. Promoting the role of criminal law in protecting the environment; 
3. Crime prevention in urban areas, including juvenile crime and violence; and 
4. Improving the efficiency and fairness of criminal justice administration systems.431 
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Although promoting the role of criminal law in protecting the environment was one of the four mandated areas of work of the 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice upon its establishment in 1992, it was not engaged in this area for its first 
dozen years. In 2005, in the context of combating transnational crime, CCPCJ noted that trafficking in protected species of wild 
flora and fauna posed a significant threat to protection of the environment and the involvement of transnational organised criminal 
groups in those activities.432  
In 2007, at its 16th Session, CCPCJ became engaged in a specific and substantive way with the effort to combat transnational 
environmental crime. Resolution 16/1, on “International cooperation in preventing and combating illicit international trafficking in 
forest products, including timber, wildlife and other forest biological resources”, was adopted by the Commission.433 This 
Resolution expressed concern over the adverse environmental, social and economic impacts of such trafficking in illegally harvested 
forest products, noted that it was often perpetrated by organised criminal groups that operate transnationally and might also be 
engaged in other illicit activities, and urged the use of international cooperation and mutual legal assistance to help prevent, combat 
and eradicate such trafficking.  
In response to the reports of the Open-Ended Working Group and of the Secretariat, CCPCJ, at its 18th session, held in 2009, 
recommended that ECOSOC adopt a decision noting that the CCPCJ proposes to have as the theme for its 21st session “New and 
emerging forms of transnational organized crime, including environmental crime”.434 Ultimately, this thematic discussion was 
postponed to the 22nd session. Discussion at the 18th session welcomed the growing attention being paid to crimes against the 
environment, noting its emergence as a form of transnational organised crime, and stressed the importance of criminalizing 
trafficking in plants or products traded in violation of the law. [para. 88]  
At the CCPCJ 22nd session, 22-26 April 2013, the thematic discussion took place on emerging environmental crime (Agenda item 4). 
The Secretariat produced a discussion guide435 and the discussion addressed challenges posed by forms of crime that have a 
significant impact on the environment and possible responses, programs and initiatives to deal effectively with them. Non-
governmental environmental organisations actively participated in the issues, hosting information displays and discussion forums. 
Side events on environmental crime included panels on transnational organised fisheries crime and the universalisation of 
jurisdiction against MLR crime.436 The CCPCJ session considered a draft resolution for ECOSOC on criminal justice responses to 
trafficking in protected species of wild flora and fauna437 and adopted a resolution on combating transnational organised crime 
committed at sea.438 The Secretariat produced a report on transnational organised crime committed at sea, following on from an 
international expert workshop convened on this topic,439 and CCPCJ adopted a resolution calling for UNODC to continue its work 
in this area, in accordance with the recommendations in the report, and to reconvene the international expert workshop.440  
 CCPCJ is the primary United Nations system decision-making body forming policy in the area of environmental crime. 
The work that it has undertaken since 2007 has been highly focused on illegal trafficking in wildlife and forest products. 
This work is likely to be expanded in the future to address fishing crimes. CCPCJ is, therefore, a most important vehicle for 
progressing the notion of universalised MLR crime within the United Nations system.  
INTERPOL 
INTERPOL was established in 1923 to facilitate cross-border police co-operation. It is a global organization, with 188 member 
countries although not part of the United Nations system of organizations. It is based in Lyon, France.441 Environmental crime is 
not one of the organization’s six priority areas. The Environmental Crime Programme itself has a small staff but is growing rapidly 
due to external secondments and funding. 
The INTERPOL Environmental Crime Programme’s work was guided by an Environmental Crime Committee that was established 
in 1992 and which held a biennial conference that serves as a forum for environmental crime enforcement information exchange 
concerning emerging trends, new strategies and practices, expertise and international co-operation. In March 2012, an 
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434 Report of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice on its 18th Session, 18th sess, UN Doc E/2009/30, E/CN.15/2009/20 (18 
April 2008 and 16-24 April 2009) [75 page doc] 
435 UNODC, Discussion Guide for the Thematic Discussion on the Challenge Posed by Emerging Forms of Crime that have a Significant Impact on 
the Environment and Ways to Deal with it Effectively, UN Doc E/CN.15/2013/2 (12 February 2103) 
436 The interim report for this research project was delivered as a side panel event in April 2013. 
437 UNODC E/CN.15/2013/L/20, 2 April 2103 (draft submitted by Peru and USA) and adopted as E/CN.15/2013/27, Chap 1.B Draft Resolutions to 
be adopted by ECOSOC, Draft Resolution IV, p. 36. 
438 UNODC E/CN.15/2013/L/17, 2 April 2103 (draft submitted by Norway) and adopted as E/CN.15/2013/27, Chap 1.D Matters Brought to the 
Attention of ECOSOC, Resolution 22/6 ‘Promoting international cooperation and strengthening capacity to combat the problem of transnational 
organized crime committed at sea’, p.59. 
439 Report of the Executive Director, Combating the Problem of Transnational Organized Crime Committed at Sea, UN DOC E/CN.15/2013/17.  
440 Chap 1.D Matters Brought to the Attention of ECOSOC, Resolution 22/6 ‘Promoting international cooperation and strengthening capacity to 
combat the problem of transnational organized crime committed at sea’, p 59 para. 11 UNODC E/CN.15/2013/27 
441 <http://www.interpol.int/> 
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INTERPOL/UNEP ‘International Chiefs of Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Summit’ decided to restructure and 
rename the committee as the Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Committee. The new committee will hold its first 
meeting in November 2013. The Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Committee is supported by three open ended 
working groups which each meet annually. The three working groups are on Wildlife Crime, on Pollution Crime, and on Fishing 
Crime. 
In relation to Wildlife Crime, the working group's focus is on poaching of tigers, elephant tusk and rhinoceros horn and on illegal 
logging. Project Predator addresses tiger poaching; Project Wisdom addresses elephant poaching; and Project Leaf addresses illegal 
logging. INTERPOL activities in these areas have included establishing an international wildlife forensics database, publishing 
procedures manuals, handbooks and best practice guides, training exercises and joint operations leading to the arrests of wildlife 
poachers and traffickers.442  
In relation to Pollution Crime, INTERPOL’s focus was originally on the marine environment. The CLEAN SEA project on maritime 
pollution seeks to combat illegal oil discharges from ships and has compiled an Investigative Manual on Illegal Oil Discharges from 
Vessels and a training course delivered through workshops. The Pollution Crime area of work has expanded to include reports, 
manuals and training on climate change and corruption, organized criminal involvement in electronic waste disposal, and 
environmental crime forensics. The latter involves training courses for the investigation and prosecution of significant 
environmental crimes.443  
The Fishing Crime Working Group was established in February 2013, preceded in 2012 by meetings of an Ad Hoc Fisheries Crime 
Working Group on the establishment of a permanent fisheries crime working group. It aims to promote capacity building, 
information exchange and operational support to suppress fisheries crime. Project Scale provides a strategic plan for INTERPOL's 
role in addressing connections with crossover crimes, information and intelligence exchange, facilitation of networks between 
members, and provision of analytical and operational support.  
In 2012, Interpol initiated a concerted effort to encourage each of its 190 member countries to form a National Environmental 
Security Task Force (NEST). The idea is that each NEST will bring together environmental compliance and enforcement agencies to 
form environmental units that cooperate across government sectors of administration. The NESTS are promoted in particular 
through regional conferences and National Environmental Security Seminars. 
In addition, INTERPOL provides support in law enforcement operations across its wildlife, pollution and fisheries project areas,444 
and produces manuals and broader spectrum information products and electronic channels for data sharing. INTERPOL’s 
Environmental Law Programme has pioneered a system, called Ecomessage, to provide a uniform format for the exchange of 
criminal intelligence and construction of a database for intelligence on environmental crime.445  
INTERPOL’s role in facilitating cross-border police cooperation is essentially one of coordination but the role is dynamic and is 
being developed to include the building of national law enforcement capacity. This fluid approach also allows for some conceptual 
developmental work, as evidenced in its reports on emerging areas of crime, such as its assessment of the links between organised 
crime and electronic waste and its Guide to Carbon Trading Crime.446 
 INTERPOL is rapidly expanding its Environmental Crime Programme. As fisheries crime is a major component of 
environmental crime and intimately related to most facets of MLR crime, many opportunities to promote the 
universalisation of jurisdiction over MLR crime are available through the new Fisheries Crime Working Group. Further 
connection with broader MLR could be managed by a link between the Wildlife Crime and the Fisheries Working Group. 
An INTERPOL report on the contemporary problems of international legal gaps in national enforcement jurisdiction over 
fisheries or MLR crime, that canvasses solutions including the universalisation of enforcement jurisdiction, could be 
produced for consideration by the Fisheries Crime Working Group. 
The World Customs Organisation 
The World Customs Organisation (WCO) works with international and national environmental governance bodies to promote the 
implementation of trade-related obligations in multilateral environmental agreements. The environmentally-sensitive commodities 
of concern are those covered by agreements with trade-related provisions, namely: Basel, Cartagena, CITES, Montreal, Rotterdam 
and Stockholm Conventions.  
WCO is in the process of establishing customs codes under the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System for 
chemicals restricted in international trade, such as those listed under the Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions, and for key 
categories of hazardous waste, such as electronics waste, so as to facilitate their identification at customs borders.  
                                                                    
442 INTERPOL, Projects <http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/Projects/Project-Predator> 
443 INTERPOL, Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Committee <http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/Environmental-
Compliance-and-Enforcement-Committee/Pollution-Crime-Working-Group> 
444 INTERPOL, Operations <http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/Operational-support> 
445 INTERPOL, Ecomessage <http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/Information-management> 
446 INTERPOL, Resources <http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/Resources> 
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As yet, the harmonised system has not developed a nomenclature for MLR products that distinguish seafood products by species or 
region. Seafood is classified instead according to whether it is fish, crustaceans, or molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates and 
whether it is live, fresh, chilled, frozen, dried, salted smoked.447 The nomenclature is designed for the use of customs officials, 
rather than fisheries and seafood port and inspectors. 
The Green Customs Initiative is to prevent illegal trade and facilitate licit trade in environmentally-sensitive commodities.448 In 
relation to stratospheric ozone depletion, WCO’s Project Sky Hole Patching provided assistance in preventing the illegal trade in 
ozone depleting substances. The WCO is the hub for the Green Customs Initiative and its partners comprise the secretariats of 
relevant multilateral environmental agreements as well as INTERPOL, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 
UNEP and UNODC. WCO’s fundamental modus operandi is to facilitate training, information delivery and exchange to build the 
capacities of national customs and other relevant law enforcement officials.  
 The WCO harmonized commodity descriptions for fish and other MLR products is of marginal institutional relevance to 
progressing the universalization of jurisdiction over MLR crime. 
The Financial Action Task Force  
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an intergovernmental collaboration of over 130 countries to combat money-laundering. 
Its Secretariat is located within the Secretariat of the OECD in Paris, France. In 1996, the FATF adopted 40 recommendations 
(revised in 2003) for participating countries to combat money-laundering. These were supplemented in 2001 by 9 special 
recommendations on combating terrorist financing which are implemented by participating countries and subjected to mutual 
evaluations by the FATF and related regional bodies.449  
Recommendation 1 is that countries should criminalise money-laundering and that the crime of money laundering should include 
the widest range possible of predicate offences. Predicate offences are those criminal acts which generate valuable proceeds, i.e. 
proceeds of crime. Those proceeds usually flow to the organisers and higher order perpetrators of the crime, who may need to 
disguise their illicit source, i.e. launder the money. Predicate offences are typically serious offences, as indicated by their penalties, 
although they can also be specifically listed types of offences. Recommendation 1 also provides that predicate offences should 
include all serious offences under national law, i.e. usually offences punishable by a maximum penalty of more than one year's 
imprisonment, or, for those countries that have a minimum threshold for offences, all offences punishable by a minimum penalty of 
more than six months imprisonment.  
In addition, Recommendation 1 urges each country to include the categories of predicate offences designated in the 
Recommendation’s glossary, which includes environmental offences. However fisheries and other MLR crimes are not included. 
Recommendation 1 also suggests that predicate offences should include foreign offences, if the conduct that occurred in the foreign 
country would also have been an offence in the country where the money laundering is criminalised. This could connect MLR 
crimes in foreign jurisdictions with money-laundering elsewhere, making it of particular relevance to the transnational nature of 
MLR crime. 
 It is reasonable to open dialogue with FATF to increase awareness of its members and the OECD Secretariat of the 
importance of MLR crimes, irrespective of the highly variable penalty ranges that apply to them under national laws. The 
objective would be to encourage the future inclusion by FATF of MLR crimes as a designated of category of offences for 
predicate crimes in money laundering.  
CONCLUSION  
Options to develop the global legal framework for the universalisation of jurisdiction against MLR crime have been canvassed in 
this chapter, followed by a survey and assessment of global institutions that might carry forward that legal framework.  
Global Legal Framework  
A new international legal framework to harmonise definitions of certain MLR crimes would carry forward the universalisation of 
jurisdiction to enforce. It would build on existing international laws for criminal law enforcement cooperation by raising the 
understanding, profile and importance of MLR crime and by developing tailored provisions suited specifically to law enforcement 
within the multinational context and transnational commission of MLR crimes. The observations set out below In relation to 
                                                                    
447 The WCO harmonised system nomenclature HS0301 to HS0307 classifies seafood according to whether it is live fish (HS 0301); fresh or chilled 
fish (HS0302); frozen fish (HS0303); fish fillets and other fish meat whether fresh chilled or frozen (HS0304); dried, salted or smoked fish (HS0305); 
crustaceans (HS 0306); or molluscs and flours or meals made of other aquatic invertebrates (HS 207). See: WCO HS Nomenclature, s 1 chap 3: 
Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates; available at www.wco.org. 
448 The program was initiated in accordance with UNEP Governing Council Decision 21/27 on Compliance with and Enforcement of MEAs (February 
2001). 
449 FATF, Who We Are <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_32236836_1_1_1_1_1,00.html> 
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options to develop a global legal instrument seek both to enable States to prescribe harmonised MLR crimes and to exercise 
universal MLR enforcement jurisdiction.  
 A new legal framework could take the form of commitments to adopt national legislation to harmonise criminalisation of 
MLR crimes in coordination with the criminalisation of other relevant ‘crossover’ crimes that support MLR crimes, such as 
bribery, money laundering, conspiracy and participation in organised crime syndicates. The legal framework could serve 
also as a basis for national law enforcement cooperation applied to the widest possible range of MLR offences, such as 
information exchange, mutual legal assistance, extradition and transfer of proceedings, as well as for operational 
initiatives such as joint investigations.  
Soft law instruments may be more achievable in the near term than a legally binding international agreement. The difficulty of 
reaching consensus on binding terms also can result in a lowest common denominator in the adopted binding obligations. Soft law, 
in the form of guidelines and best-endeavours commitments, on the other hand, may be expressed in more ambitious aspirational 
terms. Soft law can also build both consensus and international practice concerning international standards in the interim until 
binding measures are adopted. For example, guidelines on the universalisation of MLR jurisdiction could urge the further adoption 
of legally binding agreements at the bilateral or regional levels to facilitate cooperative enforcement actions (such as is urged also 
under the UN Drug Trafficking Convention).  
 The most likely existing legal framework within which to situate a new binding legal standard would be the UN Convention 
on Transnational Organised Crime (CTOC). A protocol to CTOC could be formulated as dedicated to MLR crime or else it 
could embrace MLR crime in the wider context of crimes at sea. The most likely existing legal framework within which to 
situate a new, non-binding soft law international standard would be the International Plan of Action on Port State 
Measures to Combat Illegal Unregulated and Unreported Fishing National legislation, although this is potentially subject 
to institutional reticence as suggested below. 
Marine  
 The PSM-IUU Agreement, when it enters into force, will provide the most relevant legal framework for the universalisation 
of MLR crimes, particularly in relation to fisheries. A protocol to the Agreement, or a declaration or resolution by the 
parties to it, could seek to harmonise among its parties the adoption of national criminal provisions and to universalise 
enforcement jurisdiction by through law enforcement cooperation.  
 The IPOA-IUU offers a promising basis upon which to build the non-legally binding normative infrastructure for 
universalised MLR crime. Likelihood of success in this endeavour is better than for a legally binding framework such as the 
PSM-IUU Agreement.  
Environmental  
 The legal model provided by the Basel Convention demonstrates how the universalisation of enforcement jurisdiction 
against MLR crime might evolve over time. First, the illegal activity is defined and the treaty parties commit to prevent and 
punish offenders. Second, the gravity of the illegality is categorised as being criminal at a serious level and technical 
assistance is made available to develop model criminal laws to prevent the activity and punish offenders. Third, a register 
of national criminal legislation and related enforcement measures is assembled and maintained on a shared database so as 
to promote transparency, efficacy and cooperation. 
 CITES is not a suitable framework within which to a global legal framework to universally criminalise MLR crimes. The 
main disadvantage is that it would apply only to MLR already listed as endangered species under CITES. Most 
commercially managed fisheries are not listed. Furthermore, as CITES does not apply to actions other than illegal trade in 
endangered species, it cannot address such other harms to marine living resources as habitat destruction or destructive 
fishing practices. 
 Among the CBD-related treaties, only the Nagoya Protocol addresses a significant MLR management issue in terms that 
relate to criminal acts. However, as it concerns a relatively narrow aspect of MLR management and has not yet entered 
into force and its negotiating parties rejected a criminal law model for its enforcement, the Nagoya Protocol is a fragile 
framework upon which to base the development of universalised MLR crime. 
Criminal Justice  
 There are signs of momentum gathering to address environmental crime under the CTOC, Naturally, this would concern 
environmental crime that is transnational and organised, which would cover much MLR. There is no suggestion yet to 
commence any negotiations on a CTOC protocol on natural resources and environmental crime. However, formulation of a 
binding protocol suitable to combat MLR crime would be conceptually straight forward. The CTOC is the natural and most 
likely global framework for new legally binding commitments to universalise MLR crimes. 
 The OECD Bribery Convention offers very limited possibilities for universalising jurisdiction over MLR crimes. It applies 
already to corrupt transactions in the MLR sector. Even though widespread, these are only those involving international 
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transactions with foreign countries, involving also foreign public officials, active bribery and Parties that have ratified the 
OECD Convention.  
 UNCAC applies primarily to domestic corruption without a transnational link required but does provide for international 
technical assistance and capacity building. It could provide a useful legal framework for capacity building in fisheries ports 
for fisheries and customs inspectors in order to constrain corrupt facilitation of MLR crimes.  
Global Institutions 
Likely institutional vehicles at the global level to carry forward an initiative for the universalisation of MLR crime were canvassed by 
categories: general, marine, environmental and criminal Justice institutions. The following recommendations are preliminary and 
require further substantive research on the relative merits of specific institutions and institutional strategies. Successfully Focus on 
IUU fishing  
General  
 UNGA could mandate that the UN Secretary-General prepare a report on the threats posed by MLR crime and 
opportunities to combat it. Ultimately, the objective might be to mandate negotiations of a protocol or guidelines to 
address MLR crime. An avenue through which this might be brought to the attention of the UNGA is the UNICOPOLOS, 
discussed below. 
 ECOSOC has an institutional presence in the area of environmental crime but it does not have the institutional ability to 
build national capacities in this area exercise nor does it have authority to mandate negotiations for new legal agreements. 
It is, therefore, not of primary importance in promoting the universalization of enforcement jurisdiction over MLR crimes. 
Marine 
 The devotion of a future UNICOPOLOS theme to MLR crime would be a major step forward to secure the attention of the 
General Assembly and the UNSG. Priority for this area on UNICOPLOS agenda might be more accessible if presented as a 
facet of the broader area of maritime crime. Crimes against MLR could then be highlighted in panel presentations. 
 The FAO is not very likely global institution to host efforts to universalise the criminalisation of MLR crimes. Although its 
outputs recognise the relevance of sanctions for MLR illegal fishing, it has been reticent to obligate criminal sanctions.  
Environmental  
 UNEP would be an appropriate platform to carry forward an initiative to universalise jurisdiction to combat MLR crime 
but would need to be in partnership with other international organisations more deeply engaged in MLR conservation and 
management, particularly the FAO and INTERPOL.  
 Criminal Justice  
 Among UN organisations currently engaged in combatting environmental and MLR crimes, UNODC is likely to be most 
able to take forward an initiative to universalise jurisdiction to combat MLR crime. It is not a political body and will not 
mandate political actions such as the drafting of guidelines or commencement of treaty negotiations. Its role would be to 
conduct research and publication and to organise a workshop on the subject, if mandated to do so by a policy-making body 
such as the CCPCJ or CPC. 
 CCPCJ is the primary United Nations system decision-making body forming policy in the area of environmental crime. 
The work that it has undertaken since 2007 is liable to be expanded in the future to address fishing crimes. The CCPCJ is, 
therefore, a most important vehicle for progressing the notion of universalised MLR crime within the United Nations 
system.  
 To reinforce the work of the UNODC on MLR crime it might be possible for the CPC to pick up the MLR crime issue in 
2015 as part of its mandate to set the agenda for international cooperative projects for the progressive development of 
criminal justice. 
 Although UNICRI has no mandate to develop legal norms but functions only as a research institute or think tank, it could 
provide a forum for developing research and knowledge concerning global MLR crime, including aspects of the 
universalisation of national jurisdiction.  
 INTERPOL is rapidly expanding its Environmental Crime Programme and many opportunities to promote the 
universalisation of jurisdiction over MLR crime are available through the new Fisheries Crime Working Group. A useful 
strategy could be to instigate an INTERPOL report on the contemporary problems of international legal gaps in national 
enforcement jurisdiction over fisheries or MLR crime that could be commissioned for consideration by the Fisheries Crime 
Working Group and that might canvass solutions including the universalisation of enforcement jurisdiction. 
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 The WCO harmonized commodity descriptions for fish and other MLR products is of marginal institutional relevance to 
progressing the universalization of jurisdiction over MLR crime. 
 Dialogue with the FATF to increase awareness of its members and of the OECD Secretariat concerning the importance of 
MLR crimes would encourage the future inclusion by the FATF of MLR crimes as a designated of category of offences for 
predicate crimes in money laundering.  
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REGIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The growth in prominence of transnational organised crime and the increasing prominence of the concept of sustainable 
development led the Ninth Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, in 1995, to discuss ‘[a]ction 
against national and transnational economic and organized crime and the role of criminal law in the protection of the environment: 
national experiences and international cooperation.’450 The Secretariat paper proposed directions for national and international 
action, suggesting that: 
                                                                    
450 Report of the Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, UN Doc A/CONF.169/16 (12 May 
1995) 40. 
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150. … Agreement may be more easily reached at the regional level than at the interregional level, because of shared 
problems related to geographical proximity…, e.g. the Council of Europe has prepared a draft convention on the protection 
of the environment through criminal law, and …. 
152. …Ways should be found to improve the integration of criminal law into national and regional capacity–building 
packages in order to provide an important buttress to the enforcement of environmental laws and regulations, where 
necessary.  
In fact, it has been at the regional level that legal codes on harmonising enactments against environmental crime have been 
developed and environmental crime law enforcement capacity building has taken place. The following survey considers regional 
legal frameworks and regional institutions that have developed to combat environmental crime. As in the previous chapter 
assessing global legal frameworks and institutions, regional legal frameworks are subdivided here according to their primary area of 
concern and according to their original purpose; i.e. whether they deal primarily with marine, environment, or criminal justice 
concerns. Institutional bodies have been similarly categorised as general political bodies, marine governance bodies, environmental 
governance bodies or crime-fighting institutions.  
Marine Legal  
Legal frameworks set in place for the management of marine living resources are dominated by formal legal cooperation measures 
for fisheries monitoring control and surveillance and by the treaty frameworks set in place under the Regional Seas Program of the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Although the latter is concerned with the marine environment, it is primarily a 
legal framework for environment protection and is therefore categorised here as an environmental legal framework. 
Fisheries Monitoring Control and Surveillance Treaties 
A diverse a range of regional and bilateral legal agreements concerning international cooperation in monitoring, control and 
surveillance have been adopted by States with adjacent maritime zones concerning fisheries activities in waters under their 
jurisdiction.  
The 1992 Niue Treaty on Cooperation and Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific Region provides a 
general obligation to incorporate to cooperate in the enforcement of fisheries laws and to develop regionally agreed procedures for 
fisheries surveillance and enforcement. Article 6 provides that: 
‘a Party may by way of a Subsidiary Agreement or otherwise, permit another Party to extend its fisheries surveillance and law 
enforcement activities to the territorial sea and archipelagic waters of a Party. In such circumstances the conditions and 
methods of stopping, inspecting, detaining, directing to port and seizing vessels shall be covered by the national laws and 
regulations applicable in the State in whose territorial sea or archipelagic waters the fishery surveillance or law enforcement 
activity was carried out.’ 
Further provisions provide for cooperation in prosecutions (art VII) and enforcement of penalties (art VIII). Concerning 
prosecutions, Article VIII provides that the Parties may agree on procedures for the extradition of persons charged with offences 
against fisheries laws, for the holding of equipment and vessels in custody, accrediting advocates or expert witnesses in their 
respective courts, and for other legal assistance. Several subsidiary implementing agreements to the Niue Treaty have been 
adopted451 and a comprehensive Multilateral Subsidiary Agreement was adopted in 2012 but has not yet come into force.452 
Examples of other regional agreements on enforcement of MLR laws are the two bilateral agreements sequentially adopted between 
Australia and France, to facilitate their cooperation in enforcement of their respective fishing laws in their sub-Antarctic waters by 
enabling French vessels to patrol Australian waters and vice versa and to engage in hot pursuit of offending vessels .453  
Other non-legally binding international arrangements have been entered into in order to facilitate hot pursuit, such as between 
Australia and South Africa for the Indian Ocean region.454 Non-legally binding international arrangements were established in 
2000 between the members of the International Network for the Cooperation of Fisheries Related Monitoring Control and 
                                                                    
451 Examples include subsidiary agreements between Tonga and Tuvalu, Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, 
and Australia and Papua New Guinea. 
452Agreement on Strengthening Implementation of the Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South 
Pacific Region 
<https://www.ffa.int/system/files/Multilateral%20NTSA_Agreement%20on%20Strengthening%20Implementation%20of%20the%20Niue%20Treaty.p
df> 
453 Treaty Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the French Republic on Cooperation in the Maritime Areas Adjacent to the 
French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Heard Island and McDonald Islands, opened for signature 24 November 2003, [2005] ATS 6 (entered 
into force 1 February 2005); Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement of Fisheries Laws between the Government of Australia and the Government 
of the French Republic in the Maritime Areas Adjacent to the French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Heard island and McDonald Islands, 
opened for signature 8 January 2007, [2011] ATS 1 (entered into force 7 January 2011). 
454 Warwick Gullett and Clive Schofield, ‘Pushing the Limits of the Law of the Sea Convention: Australian and French Cooperative Surveillance and 
Enforcement in the Southern Ocean’ (2007) 22(4) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 545, 573. Erik Jaap Moleaar, ‘Multilateral Hot 
Pursuit and Illegal Fishing in the Southern Ocean: the Pursuits of the Viarsa and the South Tomi’ (2004) 19(1) International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 19, 37-31. 
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Surveillance Activities (International MCS Network). Their objective is to enhance cooperation between national organisations 
responsible for fisheries enforcement.455  
In Southeast Asia, a Regional Plan of Action (RPOA) to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices Including Combating Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in the South East Region operates to build regional capacity to monitor, control and conduct 
surveillance over fishing activities. Its objective is to sustain fisheries resources and the marine environment by strengthening 
fisheries management capacity in the region to conserve fisheries resources, manage fishing capacity, and combat illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.456 The RPOA was agreed to in May 2007 by Ministers responsible for fisheries from 11 
regional countries457 and four existing regional fisheries organisations provide technical advice and assistance.458  
Recently, a non-binding Code of Conduct concerning Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships and Illicit Maritime 
Activity in West and Central Africa was adopted by coastal states in the Gulf of Guinea.459 Article 7 provides that the Parties shall 
consult at the bilateral and subregional levels to formulate and harmonise their policies for conservation and management of MLR 
and shall cooperate to combat IUU fishing. Subsequent articles deal with law enforcement cooperation (art 8), including by national 
law enforcement officers embarked upon the patrol ships of other Parties (art 9). Duly designated embarked officers may authorise 
the foreign law enforcement vessels on which they are embarked to enter within the waters of the designating country and authorise 
the vessel’s officials to assist in enforcement of the laws of the designating country. The Code of Conduct also provides that assets 
seized and forfeited during a law enforcement operation shall be disposed of in accordance with the laws of the country in whose 
waters the enforcement action took place (art 10). 
 There are legal precedents in regional marine legal frameworks for cooperation in related criminal justice enforcement. The 
marine legal frameworks are regional fisheries management agreements. Less formal legal frameworks are networks for 
monitoring control and surveillance, particularly over IUU fishing. The forms of cooperation include intelligence sharing, 
joint enforcement operations, mutual legal assistance, extradition and sharing of seized assets. In some instances, the forms 
of cooperation already include extraterritorial exercise of criminal jurisdiction. These legal precedents suggest that 
expansion of criminal law enforcement cooperation to include a broader range of MLR is feasible.  
Environmental Legal  
Regional environmental standards that concern the exercise of criminal jurisdiction have been adopted principally for regional seas, 
under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme, and for European and African land territories. Three legal 
instruments at European regional level provide frameworks to combat environmental crime through environmental law 
enforcement cooperation. They were adopted by the Council of Europe and the European Union. The two African instruments are 
the Lusaka Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Flora and Fauna, which is open to 
all African countries, and the Southern African Development Community Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement. 
Regional Seas Conventions 
The UNEP Regional Seas Programme (RSP) promotes the sustainable use and management of marine resources.460 Each of the 13 
UNEP RSP regional areas461 includes a regional action plan and nine of these are supported by framework treaties.462 Six of those 9 
regional framework treaties now have protocols specific to marine biodiversity: 
1. Protocol Concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in the Eastern African Region 1985; 
2. Protocol for the Conservation and Management of Protected Marine and Coastal Areas of the South East Pacific 
1989; 
3. Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife in the Wider Caribbean Region 1990; 
4. Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean 1995; 
5. Protocol concerning the Conservation of Biological Diversity and the Establishment of Network of Protected 
Areas in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden 2005; and 
6. Black Sea Biodiversity and Landscape Conservation Protocol 2009. 
                                                                    
455 www.imcsnet.org  
456 International Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Network for Fisheries-related Activities <www.rpoa.sec.dkp.go.id/> 
457 Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and 
Vietnam. 
458 Regional advisory organisations: FAO/Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission; Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Centre; InfoFish and Worldfish 
Center. 
459 Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
460 United Nations Environment Programme, About, UNEP Regional Seas Programme <http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/about/default.asp> 
461 Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Wider Caribbean, Pacific, North East Pacific, South East Pacific, North West Pacific, East Asian Seas, South 
Asian Seas, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Eastern Africa, and Western Africa.  
462 No general framework convention has yet been adopted in the South Asian Seas region, East Asian Seas region, North West Pacific region, 
South East Atlantic region, or the Upper South West Atlantic. 
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In the Wider Caribbean Region, for example, the Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife Protocol (SPAW Protocol) requires that its 
Parties prohibit certain actions, such as despoliation of protected areas (art 5) or the taking of protected species (art 10) but does 
not specify the criminal nature of breach of the prohibitions;463 nor, in its provision for mutual assistance, does it specify law 
enforcement cooperation measures (art 18). Similarly, the Protocol concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in 
the Mediterranean calls upon its Parties to prohibit despoliation of protected area (art 6) and the taking of threatened species (art 
11) but do not require the offences against these prohibitions be criminalised. Within the region of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, as 
another example, the 2005 Protocol concerning the Conservation of Biological Diversity and the Establishment of Network of 
Protected Areas seeks to protect MLR through the creation of protected areas for important species of marine life, requiring special 
management of these regions including the careful management of threatened species464 and consideration of restoration of the 
population of threatened species465 but makes no provision in relation to MLR crime.  
In addition to the regional seas framework conventions and their protocols, the UNEP Regional Seas Programme non-legally 
binding action plans make some provision for the conservation of MLR. The South Pacific Regional Environment Programme 
(SPREP), for example, has adopted an action plan specific to the Action Strategy for Nature Conservation and Protected Areas in 
the Pacific Island Region (2008-2012).466  
 The UNEP Regional Seas Programme has adopted MLR protocols under framework conventions for six regions. Two of 
these protocols (Red Sea and Gulf of Aden 2005 Protocol467 and the Black Sea 2009 Protocol)468 have yet to enter into 
force.) Two regions within RSP that have adopted MLR related protocols are nevertheless not highly active areas in the 
UNEP RSP: East Africa is impacted by the instability in the region, particularly Somalia; and the South East Pacific. The 
variations in vitality can depend upon factors such regional; national governmental stability, the degree of their geo-
political and marine interests convergence in marine management activities, and available funding. The innovations in 
each instrument primarily concern their harmonisation of environmental criminal standards. 
Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law 
The Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law (CoE Convention) was adopted on 4 
November 1998.469 It ambitiously aims to harmonise environmental laws through, inter alia, common criminal policies and 
penalties and to enhance European legal cooperation in prosecuting environmental crimes. It is the only international treaty 
dedicated to combating environmental crime. 
The CoE Convention is open for signature by both member and non-member States of the Council of Europe. It has been signed by 
14 of the 47 member States of the Council of Europe but only Estonia has ratified and the treaty has not yet entered into force. As 
more than a decade has passed since its adoption, the poor rate of signature and ratification indicates that the obligations set out in 
the CoE Convention are not presently acceptable to member States.  
Problems that have given rise to non-ratification may include a lack of precision in its provisions, the insuperable differences 
between the national legal cultures the Parties that the CoE Convention seeks to harmonise, together with a lack of flexibility for 
national variability in its implementation. The CoE Convention allows for no reservations, other than those specific options 
delimited in the treaty text (art 17). 
The CoE Convention asserts, in its Preamble, that criminal law has an important part to play in protecting the environment but also 
recognises that protection of the environment must be achieved primarily through other measures. It emphasises that 
environmental violations having serious consequences must be established as criminal offences and that sanctions should apply 
also to legal persons such as corporations in order to prevent serious violations of environmental laws. 
Article 2.1 focuses upon hazardous substances and nuclear activity. It requires the Parties to take measures at national level to 
criminalise the following offences when committed intentionally: discharge of substances or ionising radiation which causes or 
creates a significant risk death or serious injury to any person; the unlawful discharge of substances or ionising radiation which 
causes or is likely to cause lasting deterioration or death or serious injury; the unlawful disposal, treatment, storage, transport, 
export or import of hazardous waste which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage 
to the quality of air, soil, water, animals or plants; the unlawful operation of a plant in which a dangerous activity is carried out and 
                                                                    
463 The Caribbean Environment Programme, SPAW – Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife, United Nations Environment Programme 
<http://www.cep.unep.org/about-cep/spaw> 
464 Protocol concerning the Conservation of Biological Diversity and Establishment of a Network of Protected Areas in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden 
2005, art 9. 
465Ibid art 16. 
466Roundtable for Nature Conservation in the Pacific Islands, Action Strategy for Nature Conservaiton and protected Areas in the Pacific Island 
Region 2008-2012, <http://www.sprep.org/att/publication/000755_RoundtableActionStrategy.pdf> 
467Regional Seas Programme, Red Sea & Gulf of Aden – Governing Instruments, United Nations Environment Programme 
<http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/programmes/nonunep/redsea/instruments/default.asp> 
468 Regional Seas Programme, Black Sea – Governing Instruments, United Nations Environment Programme 
<http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/programmes/nonunep/blacksea/instruments/default.asp> 
469 Convention on the Protection of Environment Through Criminal Law, opened for signature 4 November 1998, CETS No 172 (not yet in force). 
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which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or substantial damage to the quality of air, soil, water, animals or plants; or 
the unlawful manufacture, treatment, storage, use, transport, export or import of nuclear materials or other hazardous 
radioactive substances which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to the quality 
of air, soil, water, animals or plants, when committed intentionally. (emphasis added) 
The Council of Europe members that signed off on the Convention agreed to a formulation that means that discharges of substances 
or ionising radiation that are not unlawful ipso facto are criminalised if they entail release of pollution that causes or creates a 
significant risk of causing death or serious injury. They further agreed that the unlawful acts listed above should be criminalised in 
circumstances where both the release and the consequences are intentional.  
In relation to unintentional or negligent acts a different approach was taken. Article 3.1 provides that:  
Each Party shall adopt such appropriate measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic 
law, when committed with negligence, the offences enumerated in Article 2, paragraph 1 (a) to (e). 
However, Parties are explicitly enabled to limit the application of Article 3 by limiting it to circumstances of gross negligence (art 
3.2), or by excluding its application to either property damage or to causation of significant risks to life and health (art 3.3). A catch-
all provision in Article 4 provides that other specified unlawful activities, insofar as they are not covered by the provisions of 
Articles 2 and 3, shall be established as criminal offences or administrative offences, when committed intentionally or with 
negligence.470 
Article 5.1 requires that Parties establish jurisdiction over the specified environmental offences when committed: in its territory; or 
on board a ship or an aircraft registered in it or flying its flag; or by one of its nationals, if the offence is punishable under criminal 
law where it was committed or if the place where it was committed does not fall under any territorial jurisdiction. In addition, each 
Party is to establish jurisdiction over a criminal offence established by the Convention, in cases where an alleged offender is present 
in its territory and it does not extradite him to another Party after a request for extradition.471 (art 5.2) 
Other noteworthy features of the CoE Convention are its suggestions that appropriate sanctions for environmental offences shall 
include imprisonment and pecuniary sanctions and may include reinstatement of the environment (art 6) and that the proceeds of 
environmental crimes shall be confiscated (art 7). An important feature is corporate liability, in the form of criminal or 
administrative sanctions, although Parties may opt out of this (art 8). It also provides that environmental groups may be granted 
the right to participate in environmental crime trials, at the option of a Party holding the trial. The voluntary nature of this 
provision recognises the lack of a common practice allowing community groups to participate in trials. 
The CoE Convention’s measures for promoting national co-operation between the domestic authorities responsible for 
environmental protection and for investigating and prosecuting criminal offences are bare and might usefully be developed further. 
It also aims to foster international cooperation between parties in investigations and judicial proceedings relating to the 
environmental crimes that it establishes. (art 12) It is noteworthy that this is the sole provision dedicated to international 
cooperation and that it is lacking in detail.472  
 It is almost a dozen years since the CoE Convention was adopted and it can be assessed as a failure as it has only one 
ratification. This may be because its provisions too broad and sweeping as well as too inflexible for divergent legal cultures 
of Council of Europe members, as it allows a very limited degree of dissent in the application of criminal sanctions. 
EU – Community Directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law 
In contrast to the formulation of common norms from zero in the Council of Europe Convention on Environmental Crime, 
European Community Directives on environmental crime were able to build upon a established common body of environmental 
acts previously agreed to be unlawful by members of the European Union.  
                                                                    
470 These are: the unlawful discharge, emission or introduction of a quantity of substances or ionising radiation into air, soil or water; the unlawful 
causing of noise; the unlawful disposal, treatment, storage, transport, export or import of waste; the unlawful operation of a plant; the unlawful 
manufacture, treatment, use, transport, export or import of nuclear materials, other radioactive substances or hazardous chemicals; the unlawful 
causing of changes detrimental to natural components of a national park, nature reserve, water conservation area or other protected areas; the 
unlawful possession, taking, damaging, killing or trading of or in protected wild flora and fauna species. 
471 These bases for establishing jurisdiction extend beyond those customarily used by some countries, particularly those within the common law 
tradition. However, a Party may declare to the Convention Depository under paragraph 5.4 that the extended bases for exercise of jurisdiction set 
out in paragraphs 5.1.c (i.e. nationality) and 5.2 (i.e. non-extradition) shall not apply.  
472 It says little on mutual legal assistance and makes no provisions for extradition. This is explained by the presence of other treaties on law 
enforcement cooperation adopted by the Council of Europe. These include the European Convention on Extradition, opened for signature 13 
December 1957, CETS No 24 (entered into force 18 April 1960), the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, opened for 
signature 20 April 1959, CETS No 30 (entered into force 12 June 1962), the European Convention on the Supervision of Conditionally Sentenced or 
Conditionally Released Offenders, opened for signature 30 November 1964, CETS No 51 (entered into force 22 August 1975), the European 
Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgements, opened for signature 28 May 1970, CETS No 70 (entered into force 26 July 1974), 
the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, opened for signature 15 May 1972, CETS No 73 (entered into force 
30 March 1978), the European Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, opened for signature 21 March 1983, CETS No 112 (entered into 
force 1 July 1985), and the Convention on the Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, opened for signature 8 
November 1990, CETS No 141 (entered into force 1 September 1993). 
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Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through criminal law (the ‘Environmental Crime Directive’) was 
adopted on 19 November 2008 by the European Parliament and the Council.473 It establishes measures relating to criminal law in 
order to protect the environment more effectively. (art 1) The Preamble to the Environmental Crime Directive expresses concern at 
the rise in environmental offences and at their effects, which are increasingly extending beyond the borders of the States in which 
the offences are committed. It asserts that experience has shown that the existing systems of administrative penalties or 
compensation under civil law have not been sufficient disincentives to prevent environmental offences being committed 
intentionally or with serious negligence and that they should be strengthened by the imposition of criminal penalties.  
The Environmental Crime Directive operates by requiring Member States to impose criminal penalties in respect of serious 
infringements of Community law on the protection of the environment, if committed intentionally or with serious negligence. The 
relevant Community environmental law is already in place and the Directive adds to this by harmonising the use of criminal 
penalties in enforcing these environmental laws. The specified environmental protection laws are listed in the Annexes to the 
Directive. The environmental harms are listed under Article 3, summarised below. Paragraphs (f), (g) and (h) could apply to certain 
MLR crimes. 
a. discharge of materials or ionising radiation which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or 
substantial damage to the quality of air, the quality of soil or the quality of water, or to animals or plants; 
b. the collection, transport, recovery or disposal of waste, including the supervision of such operations and the after-care of 
disposal sites, and including action taken as a dealer or a broker (waste management), which causes or is likely to cause 
death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to the quality of air, the quality of soil or the quality of water, 
or to animals or plants; 
c. the shipment of waste, where this activity falls within the scope of Article 2(35) of Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006; 
d. the operation of a plant in which a dangerous activity is carried out and which, outside the plant, causes or is likely to 
cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage; 
e. the production, processing, handling, use, holding, storage, transport, import, export or disposal of nuclear materials or 
other hazardous radioactive substances which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or 
substantial damage; 
f. the killing, destruction, possession or taking of specimens of protected wild fauna or flora species, except for cases 
where the conduct concerns a negligible quantity of such specimens and has a negligible impact on the conservation 
status of the species; 
g. trading in specimens of protected wild fauna or flora species or parts or derivatives thereof, except for cases where the 
conduct concerns a negligible quantity of such specimens and has a negligible impact on the conservation status of the 
species; 
h. any conduct which causes the significant deterioration of a habitat within a protected site; [and] 
i. the production, importation, exportation, placing on the market or use of ozone-depleting substances. (emphasis added) 
Persons are to be subject to criminal penalties also for acts of omission or for inciting, aiding and abetting intentional conduct that 
causes the environmental harms listed in Article 3.  The Directive requires, in Article 6, that corporations should be held liable 
where the offences have been committed for their benefit by any person who has a leading position within the corporation, as based 
on: a power of representation of the legal person; an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person; or an authority to 
exercise control within the legal person. 
The sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, whether applied against natural or legal persons. The 
sanctions against a natural person should be of a criminal nature but the sanctions against a corporation can be non-criminal. The 
Directive sets a minimum standard and Member States may prescribe more stringent measures. It does not prescribe criminal 
procedures or affect the operation of national court systems.  
The European Union Directive was supported by studies on environmental crime that demonstrated large differences between the 
Member States in the criminal sanctions provided for environmental offences.474 Its process of implementation over an initial 18 
month period required that Member States transpose its provisions into their domestic laws by 26 December 2010 (art 8.1). In June 
2011, the European Commission gave notice to 10 Member States that they had failed to transpose the 2008 Environmental Crime 
Directive into their national laws. These EU Member States were given two months to comply by implementing the Directives as 
national legislation.475 By late October 2011, three Member States remained non-compliant and legal action against them was 
escalated. In March 2012, as the next step in infringement procedure, the European Commission referred Cyprus to the European 
Court of Justice for breach of the Environmental Crime Directive 2008/99/EC. The subsequent effectiveness of the Directive over 
the past two years, in terms of national transpositions, prosecutions and deterrence, is being assessed by the Commission.476 
                                                                    
473 Council Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through criminal law [2008] OJ L 328/28. 
474 European Commission, Environmental Crime <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/crime/studies_en.htm> 
475 European Commission, Environmental Crimes: Commission Asks 12 Member States to Implement EU Rules <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-11-739_en.htm> 
476 See: http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:11251-2012:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=4 
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EU – Community Directive on ship-source pollution 
Community Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements (the ‘Ship 
Pollution Crime Directive’) was adopted on 7 September 2005 by the European Parliament and the Council. It was supplemented by 
a Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA of 12 July 2005 which provides detailed rules on criminal offences and penalties as 
well as other provisions to strengthen the criminal-law framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution.477 
The Ship Pollution Crime Directive states in its Preamble that there is a need for effective, dissuasive and proportionate penalties 
that the international regime for the civil liability and compensation do not provide. It asserts that the required dissuasive effects 
can only be achieved through the introduction of penalties applying to the ship-owner or master of the ship, owner of the cargo, the 
classification society or any other person involved in ship-source discharges of polluting substances. It applies to ships of any 
national flag and applies to the high seas, Community waters and to its Member States’ territorial seas and internal waters (art 3). 
The amended Directive obliges Member States to impose criminal penalties for ship-source discharges of pollutants specified in the 
Directive. These are substances covered by Annexes I (oil) and II (noxious liquid substances in bulk) to the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 and its 1978 Protocol (Marpol 73/78), as amended up-to-date (art 1). 
Illicit discharges committed with intent, recklessly or with serious negligence are to be regarded as a criminal offences (art 4). 
However, to be regarded as criminal, such illicit discharges must also cause deterioration in water quality. Minor discharges that do 
not cause such deterioration water need not be regarded as criminal offences unless they are repeated, and cumulatively do result in 
deterioration of water quality. The Directive also makes provisions for enforcement measures, including enforcement cooperation 
between coastal and port States, and for reporting and studying the feasibility of further collective action.  
In June 2010, the European Commission gave notice to 8 Member States that they had failed to comply with the 2009 Ship 
Pollution Crime Directive and gave them two months in which to enact national legislation to implement the Directive.  
 The European legal instruments both seek to harmonise national criminal laws among their members to protect the 
environment and to coordinate law enforcement cooperation between them. Yet they are different from each other, in that 
the CoE Convention criminalises categories of environmental harms broadly defined, whereas the European Union 
instruments addresses breaches of national laws that implement EU environmental Directives that have already been 
adopted. The EU approach limits proscribed crimes to unlawful acts as referenced in the previous Directives. The reliance 
upon previously agreed standards, is a preferable model for a multilateral instrument on MLR crime because it leverages 
off already established consensus concerning what acts are to be defined as unlawful. Thus, environmental harms that 
countries have already agreed to treat as unlawful under MLR laws form the basis of the acts to be criminalised under a 
new multilateral instrument. The innovations of the European legal instruments in operational law enforcement 
cooperation are modest, as each parent organisation has already established substantial regional cooperation in criminal 
justice cooperation matters.  
Convention on Migratory Species Regional Agreements 
The 1989 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS) seeks to ensure that its Parties protect 
migratory species listed in the Bonn Convention’s annexes.478 It also urges range States to cooperate in the formulation of regional 
conservation agreements between them. In relation to MLR, two binding agreements have been concluded to protect cetaceans and 
four non-binding memoranda of understanding (MOUs) have been adopted between governments for the conservation of 
cetaceans, sharks or turtles. 
The Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area479 seeks to 
prevent pollution, ensure sustainable coastal development, manage vessel traffic and reduce the impacts of over-fishing on both 
large and small cetaceans within the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and along the Atlantic coasts of North Morocco and South 
Portugal480 and it covers all species of toothed whales, except the sperm whale, within the area of the Baltic Sea, North Sea and the 
Northern Atlantic adjacent to Ireland, Portugal and Spain.481 It includes a management plan that sets out measures for the 
reduction of marine pollution and cetacean by-catch and for the establishment of an international database about species ecology 
and population status. It also calls for parties to implement domestic legislation prohibiting the intentional killing and taking of 
small cetaceans.482  
                                                                    
477 A constitutional dispute between European Community institutions as to the appropriate legal basis for introducing criminal penalty provisions 
arose and the matter was taken to the European Court of Justice which decided on 23 October 2007 to annul the Framework Decision, thereby 
disrupting the implementation of the Directive. Consequently, the Directive was amended by Directive 2009/123/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 21 October 2009 amending Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements 
[2009] OJ L280/52. 
478 Convention on Migratory Species, Introduction to the Convention on Migratory Species, 2004 < http://www.cms.int/about/intro.htm>. 
479 The annexes list species threatened with extinction or that would benefit from international cooperation across their migratory ranges. Agreement 
on the Conservation of Cetaceans in the Black Sea Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area, opened for signature 24 November 1996, 36 
ILM 777 (entered into force 1 June 2001). 
480 Convention on Migratory Species, ACCOBAMS, 2004 <http://www.cms.int/species/accobams/acc_bkrd.htm>. 
481 Ibid. 
482 Ibid. 
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An MOU has been signed for the protection of cetaceans within the Pacific region. The MOU seeks to coordinate ongoing 
conservation efforts for whales and dolphins including by standardised data reporting on stranded cetaceans and public education 
initiatives to raise awareness of the dangers of ocean pollution.483 An MOU on the Conservation of Migratory Sharks been signed by 
26 nations worldwide. It established a conservation plan which encourages research and information exchange about migratory 
shark populations and the development of plans to protect shark populations from direct fishing and being taken as by catch. 484 
Two regional MOUs for the Protection of Marine Turtles have been concluded for the Indian Ocean and in the South East Asian 
regions. Conservation and management plans developed as part of the MOUs aim to reduce the incidental capture of marine turtles 
as part of fishing activities, to protect turtle nesting sites and to prohibit the direct killing or capturing of turtles.485 The 
rehabilitation of turtle populations and the exchange of information obtained as a result of increased research are also key 
objectives.486 An MOU relating to turtles migrating along the African Atlantic coastline has also been developed with a conservation 
plan that mainly focuses on collecting data relating to turtle ecology and threats to turtle populations.487 A monitoring and 
protection network for nesting and feeding sites is also a primary goal of the conservation plan developed under this memorandum.  
 Regional legal arrangements for conservation of MLR under the Convention on Migratory Species concern migratory 
species, but not other categories of MLR. The one legally binding agreement does not address issues of criminal 
jurisdiction, although it does call for its Parties to adopt domestic legislation to prohibit a defined action. Other regional 
legal arrangements adopted under the CMS take the form of MoUs, which are not legally binding, suggesting weaker 
political commitment by the parties, and also do not address enforcement through the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. 
Therefore, regional arrangements adopted under the CMS do not appear to be a promising way forward for the 
universalisation of criminal jurisdiction over MLR crime. 
Lusaka Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement Operations  
In Southern Africa, The Lusaka Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and 
Flora opened for signature 9 September 1994, 1950 UNTS 35, and entered into force 10 December 1996.488 It is open to all African 
states.  
The principal function of the Lusaka Agreement is to establish the Lusaka Agreement Task Force (LATF). It facilitates the exchange 
of information, including criminal intelligence, and conducts investigative operations, including undercover, within the territories 
of its parties, subject to party consent (art V). A Governing Council is also established to set the general policies of the Task Force 
(art VII) and it meets biennially. The Lusaka Agreement can be considered as an agreement to implement the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). It is described as having had a ‘rocky ride’, remaining in limbo for its first few 
years due to lack of funds, being regarded warily the majority of African States and as unrelated to CITES Secretariat work.489 
Although noted at its inception for its potential, it was also observed to suffer from an absence of provisions for legal harmonization 
of the wildlife laws of the Parties.490  
The Lusaka Agreement Governing Council has since begun to address the problem of lack of harmonisation. At the 6th Governing 
Council Meeting, Decision IV/1 on Harmonization of Parties’ National Wildlife Enforcement/Management Laws and Regulations 
was adopted. It called upon the Parties to undertake measures to harmonize their national wildlife management laws and 
regulations to incorporate the provisions of the Lusaka Agreement and to facilitate the operations of the Lusaka Agreement Task 
Force and instructed the Director of the Task Force to collaborate with partners to assist the Parties in this process. Governing 
Council Decision VI/1 on development and harmonisation of wildlife laws and regulations then called upon the Parties to speed up 
the harmonisation process and to ensure comparable punishment for similar violations and listing of wildlife offences as 
extraditable offence, as well as to convene an expert wildlife law workshop(s) to follow up on the strengthening and harmonisation 
of wildlife laws. 
 The Lusaka Agreement seeks to improve law enforcement cooperation between African states combating wildlife crime. 
However, this objective has been frustrated in part by a lack of harmonised wildlife crime laws in between the cooperating 
parties, although they have sought to address this post hoc. Implementation of the Lusaka Agreement is focused upon 
terrestrial fauna rather than MLR.  
                                                                    
483 Convention on Migratory Species, Pacific Cetaceans, 2004 <http://www.cms.int/species/pacific_cet/pacific_cet_bkrd.htm>. 
484 Convention on Migratory Species, Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Migratory Sharks, Annex 3, Conservation Plan, 27 
September 2012. 
485 Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation and Management of Marine Turtles and their Habitats of the Indian Ocean and South East 
Asia, 23 June 2001, amended 1 March 2009, Conservation and Management Plan, 1. 
486 Ibid 3. 
487 Convention on Migratory Species, Marine Turtles- Africa, 2004 <http://www.cms.int/species/africa_turtle/AFRICAturtle_bkgd.htm>. 
488 Seven nations are Parties (Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Lesotho, Tanzania, Liberia) and three others are signatories. For further 
information see: http://www.lusakaagreement.org/faqs.html  
489 Rosalind Reeve, Policing International Trade In Endangered Species: The CITES Treaty and Compliance (The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 2002) 233. 
490 Alex Dehgan, ‘Determining Lusaka’s Potential’ (1998) 1 Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy 143. 
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Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol  
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement was opened for 
signature 18 August 1999 and entered into force on 30 November 2003. It has 14 signatories.491 The SADC Protocol was conceived 
subsequent to the Lusaka Agreement as an alternative to it. However, in the decade since its adoption, the SADC Protocol has 
gained less traction in terms of resources and implementation effort. 
 Both African treaties are focused on combating wildlife crime, rather than MLR crime, and neither addresses the need for 
common legal definitions of that wildlife crime. The African instruments are distinct from the European ones, in that the  
African instruments focus only on wildlife and flora law enforcement, and only on law enforcement cooperation rather 
than on harmonisation of those laws also.  
REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS  
Many regional institutions have been established around the world to bolster economic and political solidarity, environmental 
protection or marine resources management. They are greater in number than global institutions for these purposes but sometimes 
are more poorly resourced and can be ephemeral. As a general rule, regional organisations for economic co-operation are 
categorised here as general mandate organisations, due to the broad reach of economic cooperation. They are typically better 
resourced and more robust than narrowly mandated environmental or fisheries management organisations.  
General Organisations 
ASEAN 
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) comprises 10 members492 and was established in 1967, to promote, inter-alia 
regional cooperation and mutual assistance to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development, peace and 
stability.493 It produces a regular regional ‘state of the environment’ report and aspires to promote sustainable development in the 
region. ASEAN Vision 2020, adopted in 1997, the ASEAN Charter, adopted in 2008, and the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community, 
adopted in 2009, are each non-binding regional aspirations that reference sustainable development. Section D of the Roadmap, on 
Promoting Environmental Sustainability of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint 2009-2015, includes the sustainability 
of the coastal and marine environment and sustainability of natural resources and biodiversity. ASEAN has developed a legally 
binding framework for law enforcement cooperation and established regional police co-operation under the framework of 
ASEANPOL. 
 ASEAN maintains an environmental and marine conservation focus in its work and is also developing law enforcement 
cooperation as it moves towards deeper regional integration. However, it has not yet advanced to legally binding and 
substantive arrangements for MLR conservation and management and cooperation in law enforcement is not yet deeply 
developed. 
ECOWAS 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) comprises 15 states494 and was founded in 1975 with the objective of 
promoting ‘integration in all fields of activity, particularly industry, [including]… agriculture, natural resources, ….495. The 
ECOWAS is a relatively robust organisation, compared to other institutions in the region. It is one of the regional bodies supporting 
the non-binding Code of Conduct concerning Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activity in 
West and Central Africa, discussed above. In this initiative, support was also provided by other regional organisations with 
mandates relevant to the suppression of MLR crime, namely, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the 
Gulf of Guinea commission That (GGC).  
 Although the ECOWAS framework does not currently focus on MLR crime per se, the framework is robust enough to 
provide a pathway to a regional framework through a protocol to the ECOWAS Convention on a non-binding MOU to 
harmonise a regional approach MLR crime. 
                                                                    
491 The Protocol itself is not published in a treaty series but a scan of the original, signed text of the protocol can be found on the SADC website at 
<http://www.sadc-tribunal.org/docs/WildlifeConservation.pdf> and on the EcoLex website at 
<http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/RecordDetails;jsessionid=E24AE4F9805C30F14163010EA600726B?id=TRE-001348&index=treaties>. It 
has no official citation. The citation for the SADC Treaty is (1993) 32 ILM 120 and it can be found on the SADC website <http://www.sadc.int/> 
492 Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
493 ASEAN, Overview <http://www.aseansec.org/overview/> 
494 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, and Togo 
495ECOWAS, Member States <http://www.ecowas.int/> 
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European Union 
The European Union is the world's most wealthy, broad mandated and robust regional organisation. It comprises 28 States,496 
having grown from six countries when the organisation was founded in 1958 as the European Economic Community.497 The EU 
comprises the world's largest economy, with about 20% of global imports and exports. Its Secretariat draws upon the human 
resources of about 38,000 intergovernmental civil servants. 
The EU has evolved from its original conception as a common market into a political union with a broad mandate. Its rules for 
environmental protection, developed to ensure that national environment protection laws do not disrupt a ‘level playing field’ for 
economic competition among its members, are sometimes world leading innovations. 
The EU Common Fisheries Policy, also intended to maintain a level playing field, involves pervasive and detailed rule-making. The 
Common Fisheries Policy was established in 1982, consolidating fisheries instruments adopted early in the previous decade, and 
deals with a plethora of global fisheries sustainability issues.498 The EU Common Fisheries Policy is administered primarily through 
the European Commission Directorate on Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DGXI) and the European Fisheries and Control Agency, 
as well as the European Parliament Committee on Fisheries, and the Council of Ministers’ Agriculture and Fisheries Council, with 
additional support from the EU Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (Commission for Natural 
Resources).  
Justice and Home Affairs has evolved to become the third pillar of the integration of Europe. It is administered within the Council 
of ministers by a Ministerial Council on Justice and Home Affairs. Other principal EU law enforcement cooperation institutions 
include: EuroPol, the European Police Office established in 1993 as an executive agency of the EU; and EuroJust, the European 
judicial cooperation in unit established in 2001. Transnational organised criminal investigations are conducted by joint 
investigation teams that can conduct cross-border operations, covert operations and hot pursuits across borders. They are 
supported by additional institutions such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and a raft of EU legislation empowering a wide 
range of law enforcement cooperation. 
 The EU infrastructure for administration of MLR is more extensive and robust than for any other group of States in the 
world. The EU also has established a deep level of integration in the field of law enforcement. The precedent that it has 
established in the area of criminal law enforcement of environmental standards indicates that the same could be developed 
for fisheries conservation and management standards. Furthermore, this is the sophistication of EU law enforcement 
cooperation provides a solid foundation for such cooperation in enforcing MLR standards. However, the sophistication of 
EU legislative processes and the size and diversity of its bureaucratic ramparts might mean that innovative 
universalisation of criminal jurisdiction over MLR crime will be carefully considered process that can only be realised in 
the medium rather than short-term. 
Council of Europe 
The Council of Europe is an organisation of 47 member States with a primary mission to promote human rights through the rule of 
law, civil rights, democratic institutions, and criminal justice.499 It has adopted a series of regional conventions concerning 
landscape, conservation of wildlife and natural habitats, air quality, and access to environmental justice. 
 Environmental protection forms a subsidiary area of its work. Institutionally, it has a far narrower mandate and vastly less 
resources than the European Union. 
Marine Organisations 
Regional institutions for marine affairs cover a wide range of functions, including ensuring the safety of commercial maritime 
vessels and seafarers, regulating vessel traffic, protecting the marine environment, protecting customs borders, preventing 
transnational organised crime, interdicting pirates, conducting marine scientific research, managing fisheries, conserving 
biodiversity, etc. Rather than serving all these functions within one organisation, an individual regional marine organisation is 
established usually to serve only one or two such functions.  
The safety of maritime vessels, seafarers and traffic is not directly relevant to MLR crime. Those concerned with protecting 
sovereignty (customs borders, transnational organised crime and piracy) were treated above under the heading of general 
organisations. Those regional institutions with the purpose of protecting the marine environment are categorised below as 
                                                                    
496 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, (an additional 
five candidate countries are seeking membership). 
497 EUROPA, How the EU Works <http://europa.eu/about-eu/index_en.htm> 
498 Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, European Commission 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/maritimeaffairs_fisheries/index_en.htm> 
499Council of Europe <http://hub.coe.int/> 
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environmental organisations. Therefore, only institutions with a fisheries management function are considered under this heading 
of Marine Organisations. 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 
Regional fisheries management bodies and regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) have been established where 
there are active international fisheries and for waters where fish stocks cross international maritime boundaries. Although most 
were set up in the past four decades, the history of regional fisheries management organisations stretches back to 1902 with the 
creation of International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, an intergovernmental organisation for scientific research in the 
North East Atlantic Ocean. RFMOs vary in their mandates, functions and management powers, variously providing research, 
advice, quotas, inspections and enforcement.500 
At least 40 Regional Fisheries Bodies and RFMOs are in place worldwide, 10 of them established under the FAO and the others 
under independent regional conventions and arrangements.501 Those RFMOs that have adopted harmonised standards for port 
State measures to combat IUU fishing include the:502 
1. Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) 
2. Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) 
3. Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) 
4. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) 
5. Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) 
6. Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) 
7. North Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO) 
8. North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) 
The dynamics within each of these bodies and organizations vary in each regional context. The fishing situation in a region will be 
strongly influenced by the depth of participation of distant water fishing States, the political and economic strength of the coastal 
states, the relative numbers and economic power of each grouping within the regime, as well as by the abundance of target species 
that provide fishing opportunities, the depth of impacts on other marine biodiversity and by the mandate of the organisation as 
crafted into the governing legal instrument. Therefore, RFMOs need to be considered individually for their potential as vehicles for 
the universalisation of criminal jurisdiction over MLR crime.  
Generally, it may be said that regional fisheries bodies and RFMOs s enjoy longevity and adequate resources to fulfil their mandates 
and have the powers to adopt regional policies, such as concerning MLR crime.  
Indicators that regional fisheries bodies and RFMOs might be suitable to carry forward the universalisation of criminal jurisdiction 
over MLR crime include the presence of: numerous coastal States with clearly defined MLR conservation and management 
interests; numerous and/or strong Coastal State participation; distant water fishing States with benign interests in the fisheries and 
strong law enforcement capacity; as well as a governing treaty and constitutional structure that facilitates innovation and integrates 
broad MLR conservation and management objectives. Therefore, the possibility of regional fisheries bodies adopting protocols or 
decisions on harmonising MLR crime and extending enforcement jurisdiction extraterritorially between their parties needs to take 
these factors into account in each regional context individually. 
 An RFMO that might be suitable to carry forward the universalisation of criminal jurisdiction over MLR crime is the 
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency. The FFA provides a strong coastal state base of interest and provisions in the Niue 
Treaty that include mutual legal assistance in criminal prosecutions and civil procedure confiscations suggested that this is 
a feasible development in the south-west Pacific region. 
The Regional Plan of Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices Combat IUU Fishing cover actions for the conservation of 
fisheries resources and their environment, managing fishing capacity, and combating IUU fishing in the areas of the South China 
Sea, Sulu-Sulawesi Seas (Celebes Sea) and the Arafura-Timor Seas. The RPOA member States have developed a regional data base 
for the sharing of IUU vessel information and are currently in the process of developing a framework for the listing of vessels. 
 The RPOA offers a unique opportunity for a harmonised regional approach to MLR crime, particularly fisheries crime, in 
Southeast Asia. 
                                                                    
500 Judith Swan ‘Regional Fishery Bodies and Governments: Issues Action and Future Directions’ FAO Fisheries Circular No. N59 (Rome, FAO 
2002). 
501 S.H. Marashi ‘Regional Fishery Bodies and Arrangements: the Role of FAO Regional Fishery Bodies in the Conservation and Management of 
Fisheries’ FAO Fisheries Circular No. 916 (Rome, FAO, 1990). 
502 Judith Swan ‘Regional Fishery Bodies and Governments: Issues Action and Future Directions’ FAO Fisheries Circular No. N59 (Rome, FAO 
2002). 
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Environmental Organisations 
UNEP Regional Seas Programme - Regional Coordinating Units 
The UNEP Regional Seas at any Programme (RSP) was established in 1974 as a global programme to combat marine pollution 
through regional marine arrangements. Its initial focus on the prevention of marine pollution has grown into a more 
comprehensive concern with sound marine and coastal management, including the conservation of marine living resources. It has 
set in place regional governance arrangements for 13 marine regions503 and works in partnership with five other regional seas 
arrangements that were established independently of UNEP, making 18 regional seas arrangements in all.504 The UNEP RSP now 
involves more than 143 countries.505  
The individual UNEP regional programs are each serviced by a secretariat either provided by UNEP or established by the individual 
regional program itself. UNEP provides the secretariat for six regional seas programs.506 The six regional programs independent of 
UNEP have each established their own constitutional arrangements under a regional treaty and an independent Secretariat.507 
Regional Seas Programme MLR Protocols and Secretariats  
INDEPENDENT 
PROGRAMME 
UNEP REGIONAL 
SEAS PROGRAMME 
FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION 
MLR 
PROTOCOL 
UNEP 
SEC’TARIAT 
FUNDS 
SOURCE 
Baltic Sea      
North East Atlantic       
Antarctic Ocean      
Arctic Sea      
Caspian Sea      
 Mediterranean Sea     
 Wider Caribbean     
 East-Asian Seas     
 Eastern Africa Seas     
 West & Central Africa     
 North-West Pacific     
 Black Sea     
 Kuwait region     
 Red Sea & Gulf Aden     
 South Pacific     
 South-East Pacific     
 South-Asian Seas     
 South-West Atlantic     
5 13 12 7 6  
 
As with RFMOs, the dynamics within each regional seas program varies. The vitality of an individual program will be strongly 
influenced by the level of regional political and economic integration, of available operational funding, and the presence of driving 
economic forces. The participation of economically developed coastal states, their clearly defined benign interests in the regional 
marine environment, their relative numbers within the regime, as well as the character of impacts on marine biodiversity are all 
factors determining the relative capability and effectiveness of an individual RSP. Therefore, regional seas programs and need to be 
considered individually within their regional contexts for their potential as vehicles for the universalisation of criminal jurisdiction 
over MLR crime.  
Among the RSP Secretariats administered by UNEP, two have members with developed economies, being the Mediterranean (with 
EU members) and the Wider Caribbean Region (with United States membership). The presence of developed economies can 
introduce resources and expertise that invigorate the RSP and new initiatives to combat MLR crime. Among the RSP Secretariats 
not administered by UNEP, regional interests among members are more diverse for the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region (where the 
2005 Protocol has not yet come into force) than for the South East Pacific (where the 1989 Protocol has).  
The Permanent Commission for the South East Pacific, which administers the 1989 Protocol for the Conservation and Management 
of Protected Marine and Coastal Areas of the South East Pacific engages in a significant efforts to combat IUU fishing and other 
                                                                    
503 Black Sea, Wider Caribbean, East-Asian Seas, Eastern Africa, Kuwait region, Mediterranean, North-West Pacific, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, 
South-Asian Seas, South-East Pacific, South Pacific, South-West Atlantic, West and Central Africa,  
504 Baltic Sea, North East Atlantic Ocean, Antarctic Ocean, Arctic Sea and Caspian Sea. 
505 Regional Seas Programme, About, United Nations Environment Programme <http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/about/default.asp> 
506 Caribbean; East Asian seas, East African seas, Western African seas , Mediterranean sea, North-West Pacific. 
507 Those 6 sea regions that have a secretariat provided other than by UNEP are the: Black Sea; North East Pacific; Red Sea and Gulf of Aden; 
Persian/Arabian Gulf; South Asian Seas; South East Pacific; and Pacific. 
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maritime crime in the region.508 For example, it has conducted regional consultations and national studies and national workshops 
on the regional implementation of the 2009 Port State Measures Agreement on Combating IUU Fishing. It appears to display a 
convergence of regional interests in and commitments to combating MLR crime which would augur well for regional coordination 
to harmonise MLR crime definitions and to cooperate in extraterritorial enforcement efforts. 
 The Permanent Commission for the South-East Pacific is an appropriate address from which to commence efforts to combat 
MLR crime under the RSP program. As UNEP administers the Secretariats for the Mediterranean and for the Wider Caribbean 
Region, it could strengthen the possibility of action in those regions over MLR crime, if UNEP were to support such an initiative. 
The convergence of national interests in marine conservation in the Wider Caribbean region, in particular, and the resources and as 
an expertise is introduced through the participation of the United States in the RSP, a makes the Wider Caribbean region 
Secretariat a promising vehicle to carry forward to universalise criminal jurisdiction.  
CONCLUSION  
Regional agreements and institutions provide opportunities for a group of States to coordinate the harmonisation of national MLR 
criminal laws and to cooperate in their extraterritorial law enforcement. They provide a platform for the universalisation of criminal 
jurisdiction at a level that is less than global but that can be regarded as a step towards a new global norm. 
European regional efforts to achieve harmonisation of environmental criminal law suggests that adding to international obligations 
already agreed by attaching criminal penalties to their breach is a simpler approach, and more likely to enjoy success, than crafting 
new primary international obligations with criminal penalties. This is surely one of the reasons that the EU Council Directive of 
2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal law is simpler and more successful than the 1998 Council of Europe 
Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law. Currently, the most extensive international obligations 
and supporting organisational arrangements concerning MLR conservation and management at the regional are to be found in 
regional fisheries management organisation (RFMO) agreements and regional seas programs (RSPs) for environmental protection.  
The survey of these indicates that RFMO agreements provide suitable frameworks for universalising jurisdiction to combat MLR 
crime. RFMO agreements often set out implementation measures that include enforcement procedures, which could be extended to 
harmonise extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction against foreign (and domestic) vessels, crew and assets, based on a set of 
circumstances governed by individual regional MLR management organisations. Such exercises of enforcement jurisdiction could 
include cooperation in freezing financial assets of corporations and beneficiaries, blacklisting vessels, and issuing warrants against 
individuals charged with IUU fishing or associated non-fishing offences such as support or ‘crossover’ crimes. The Pacific Islands 
Forum Fisheries Agency and the RPOA process in Southeast Asia provide possible institutional vehicles to take forward this 
initiative in the south-west Pacific region, as it provides a strong base of interest for Coastal States, some of which have already 
coordinated extended criminal jurisdiction. 
Environmental protection agreements and programs for regional seas may also offer good prospects for the universalisation of 
criminal jurisdiction at regional level against MLR crimes. None of the UNEP RSP framework agreements or their protocols deal 
specifically with MLR crime but they do provide a framework for the adoption of new additional protocols or instruments to 
universalise jurisdiction over MLR crime. In particular, the Permanent Commission for the South Pacific, working with its 
framework convention and the 1989 Protocol for the Conservation and Management of Protected Marine and Coastal Areas of the 
South East Pacific, and the UNEP Secretariat for the Wider Caribbean Region, together with its framework convention and the 1990 
Protocol on Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife, appear likely partners in a project to universalise criminal jurisdiction in the 
region over MLR crime.  
The harmonisation of national MLR criminal laws and cooperation in their extraterritorial enforcement can be promoted at 
regional level by means of one or more instruments or arrangements adopted by a regional organisation, such as agreements, 
guidelines, resolutions or action plans. To maximise flexibility among its members, if required, these might nest a range of 
enforcement options and encourage them to be carried forward at subregional or bilateral levels within the framework of the 
regional MLR management organisation or by its individual State members, depending on the available exercise of enforcement 
jurisdiction extraterritorially or over individual persons, vessels or companies under the various legal systems of the member States. 
Thus, regional universalisation of criminal jurisdiction over MLR standards could be introduced in a gradual process by willing 
member States, rather than as a sweeping revision of MLR laws. 
 
 
                                                                    
508La Comisión Permanente del Pacífico Sur <http://www.cpps-int.org/> 
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